Final Approval Hearing
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Stanislaus County - Civil - https://www.stanislaus.courts.ca.gov/online-services/tentative-rulings/civil-tentati ve-rulings Civil Tentative Rulings June 5, 2026 The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge John R. Mayne in Department 21:
CV-23-006360 - LAINEZ, JUANA CASTILLO DE vs CITY OF CERES - Defendant County of Stanislaus' Motion for Order Compelling Plaintiff to Submit to an Examination - DENIED.
Code of Civil Procedure Sec. 2032.220(a) states, "In any case in which a plaintiff is seeking recovery for personal injuries, any defendant may demand one physical examination of the plaintiff, if both of the following conditions are satisfied: [P.] (1) The examination does not include any diagnostic test or procedure that is painful, protracted, or intrusive. [P.] (2) The examination is conducted at a location within 75 miles of the residence of the examinee."
A party seeking to deviate from these parameters must first seek leave from the Court (see Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2032.310(a)) and must show good cause (see Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2032.320(a)). In addition, where the examination is noticed for a location more than 75 miles from the examinee's residence, the Court may make the order only if "(1) [t]he court determines that there is good cause for the travel involved," and "(2) [t]he order is conditioned on the advancement by the moving party of the reasonable expenses and costs to the examinee for travel to the place of examination." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2032.320(e).)
As Defendant notes, " " 'Good cause' in the context of this motion is a demonstration of 'relevance and specific facts showing the need for the information and the lack of means for obtaining it elsewhere.' (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 833, 840.)" (Mem., at p. 4 [emphasis added].) None of the reasons set forth in the motion meet this standard.
Defendant asserts, inter alia, that "Defendant cannot be sure of retaining a North Carolina physician with the same attributes as Dr. Purnell and would have no reasonable way of vetting out-of-state doctors to find one with the appropriate professional qualifications and the ability to testify in a reasonable manner and to not have some unknown, disqualifying history." (Mem., at p. 5.) However, as Plaintiff has noted in her opposition, Durham, North Carolina probably has competent physicians for this task. The Court is not convinced that Defendant's efforts have been sufficient to overcome the code's requirements.
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Defendant's other stated reasons-- that Defendant would like to use the Modesto doctor it already knows and would prefer in-person testimony from its expert--also do not rise to the level of showing a lack of means.
On reply, Defendant further contends, "Plaintiff has not presented any evidence she is currently unable to travel." (Reply, at p. 1.) This contention, however, reverses the burden of proof. The burden is not on Plaintiff to demonstrate that she cannot currently travel; rather, the burden is on Defendant to show why Plaintiff's travel is necessary.
CV-24-009613 - RUIZ, ANA vs G3 ENTERPRISES INC - Final Approval Hearing - HEARING REQUIRED.
The Court would like additional information regarding the costs incurred by the Koul Law Firm. Provided that Class Counsel can explain the costs to the Court's satisfaction, and further providing that there are no unexpected issues, the Court is inclined to GRANT the motion.
It appears that proper notice to the settlement class has been given in compliance with the law and as required by the Court's order granting preliminary approval. Having considered the unopposed motion herein and the supporting declarations and evidence, the Court finds that the settlement was entered into good faith, is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and satisfies the standards for final approval under California law. (Civil Code Sec. 1781; Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 382; Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.769.)
Good cause appearing to the satisfaction of the Court, the proposed settlement and the associated fees and costs are approved as set forth in the motions and supporting papers, as follows: Fees and costs of Settlement Administrator: $12,000;
Payment to Class Representative: $7,500; PAGA allocation to LWDA (65%) and class members (35%): $30,000; Class Counsel's attorney's fees: $98,323.50; and Class Counsel's costs: $20,307.27.
In accordance with the provisions of Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 384 and pursuant to the suggestion in the proposed order, the Court SETS a compliance hearing for February 5, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 21, to confirm full administration of the settlement. The Settlement Administrator shall submit a compliance report no later than nine days before the date of the hearing, which shall include the total amount that was actually paid to the class members pursuant to the subject settlement and the remaining amount of unclaimed funds.
The Court orders that Notice of the Court's Order Granting Final Approval and Judgment be posted on the Settlement Administrator's website for a period of at least 90 days. (Cal. R. Ct., rule 3.771(b).) If this motion is granted as prayed, the Court will sign the proposed order.
CV-26-001562 - AMAYA, SALVINO vs DOCTORS MEDICAL CENTER OF MODESTO - Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Arbitration Pending Litigation - GRANTED
The Court has questions about the legal effect of the initiation of arbitration
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff's unopposed request for judicial notice is GRANTED.
Objections
Plaintiff has objected to paragraphs 2-27 of the Declaration of Michele Bava, the Group Chief Human Resources Officer for Tenet - Northern California and the exhibits attached to the declaration. Although the Court does not consider the information provided by the declaration material to the current dispute, the objections are OVERRULED in their entirety.
Merits
Plaintiff moves to stay an American Arbitration Association ("AAA") proceeding that was initiated by Defendant after this civil action was filed. The arbitration demand names Plaintiff as the "Claimant," notwithstanding that Plaintiff did not know about the commencement of the proceeding, let alone authorize the initiation.
California law strongly favors arbitration (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125), and arbitration agreements may, in some circumstances, be "self-executing" (see infra). Nonetheless, where a civil action has already been filed, the statutory scheme contemplates that a party seeking to arbitrate will pursue a court order enforcing the arbitration agreement. (See Code Civ. Proc., Sec.Sec. 1281.2, 1292.4.)
Here, Plaintiff filed the civil complaint, and Defendant did not seek a court order compelling arbitration. Instead, it initiated arbitration proceedings on Plaintiff's behalf after this case was filed and without Plaintiff's consent. That renders this case distinguishable from the authorities relied on by Defendant in pages 7 and 8 of its opposition.
Specifically, in Tutti Mangia Italian Grill, Inc. v. American Textile Maintenance Co. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 733, 736, fn. 1, "The arbitration award against TMIG had been rendered the day before appellants filed their declaratory relief action." Similarly, in National Marble Co. v. Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1057, 1063, the court case was initiated by a petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award. Able Building Maintenance Co. v. Board of Trustees of General Employees Trust Fund (9th Cir. 2006) 175 Fed.Appx. 118, 119, also arose from a petition seeking to vacate the arbitration award. King v. Larsen Realty, Inc. (1981) 121 Cal.App.3d 349, 352, was initiated by a petition to confirm an arbitration award.
In Kustom Kraft Homes v. Leivenstein (1971) 14 Cal.App.3d 805, 807?808, Plaintiffs filed their complaint first. Defendants demurred, and the trial court "treated defendant's misplaced demurrer as a request for arbitration and the court's ruling thereon, in effect, as an order therefor." (Id. at p. 811.)
Thus, none of the above cases stands for the proposition that it is appropriate for a civil defendant to unilaterally begin an arbitration without court authorization once a litigation has commenced. The instant sequence raises issues distinct from the ultimate question of arbitrability, including the procedural propriety of the arbitration's initiation and the management of parallel proceedings.