Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District v. California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC et al

circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (§ 2031.320, subd. (b).) Moreover, “[t]he court may award sanctions under the Discovery Act in favor of a party who files a motion to compel discovery, even though no opposition to the motion was filed.” (Rules of Court, rule 3.1348, subd. (a).)

The Court finds neither that Plaintiff acted with substantial justification nor that other circumstances make imposition of sanctions unjust. The Court finds that the hourly rate charged by counsel is reasonable. (See Graft Decl. at ¶ 14.) The Court further finds that 10 hours is a reasonable number of billable hours for preparation of the motion. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ request for sanctions as against Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel is GRANTED. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are jointly and severally ordered to pay to Defendants, care of their attorney of record, within 10 calendar days of notice of entry of this order, sanctions in the amount of $2,460.

Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation 25CV000695 District v. California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC et al

DEFENDANT BRIAN LEE SHUTTS’ MOTION TO CONSOLIDATE ACTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED.

Defendant Brian Lee Shutts, by and through his undersigned counsel, moves pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1048, subdivision (a), and California Rules of Court, rule 3.350, for an order consolidating: Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District v. California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC, et al., Case No. 25CV000695 (Eminent Domain Action) with California Vacation Club v. Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District, et al., Case No. 24CV001395 (Breach of Contract Action).

California Vacation Club’s objections to those of Mr. Shutts’ arguments raised for the first time through his Reply, and the evidence submitted in support thereof, is well taken. (See Balboa Ins. Co. v. Aguirre (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1010 [“[t]he salutary rule is that points raised in a reply brief for the first time will not be considered unless good cause is shown for the failure to present them before”].) The instant ruling is made without regard to the evidence and arguments raised for the first time through the Reply.

“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court . . . it may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subs. (a).) The purpose of consolidation is to promote convenience and economy by avoiding duplication of procedure, especially regarding proof of issues common to both actions. (Wouldridge v. Burnes (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 82, 86.)

The Eminent Domain Action is brought by Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District (NC Flood Control District) to obtain, through the power of eminent

domain, certain property rights in and to certain real properly within the County of Napa (Subject Property). Pursuant to the allegations of the Complaint in that action, the following defendants had interests in and to the Subject Property: California Vacation Holdings Group, LLC (CVHG); California Vacation Club (CVC); Accelerated Assets, LLC (Accelerated); Newtek Small Business Finance, LLC (Newtek); NBL SPV U1 LLC (NBL); and, City of Napa (City).

By the Breach of Contract Action, California Vacation Club (CVC), seeks a declaration of the rights and interests, pursuant to written agreement, of itself and CVHG in and to any proceeds from a taking by the NC Flood Control District. CVC also seeks, through the Breach of Contract Action, injunctive relief prohibiting CVHG from acting inconsistently with that agreement, as well as damages for CVHG’s alleged breach thereof.4

On February 27, 2026, the Court, on stipulation of the parties, substituted Mr. Shutts into the Eminent Domain Action for both Newtek and NBL, for all purposes. By the instant motion, and consistent with the allegations of the Complaint in the Eminent Domain Action, Shutts contends that the interests he succeeded to are those of a creditor secured by a lien on the subject real property. He contends that those interests are not alleged or represented in the Breach of Contract Action.

Mr. Shutts seeks consolidation because “[b]oth actions present the same core question: how the condemnation proceeds are to be divided. Despite Shutts’ secured interest in the proceeds, Shutts is a party only to the Eminent Domain Action, and has no seat at the table in the Breach of Contract Action. The cases are already designated as related. Consolidation will ensure that all competing claims to the $3,400,000 are resolved in a single, efficient proceeding, avoid inconsistent judgments, and protect Shutts’ rights as a secured creditor.” (Support Memorandum at 4:20-25.)

The Motion is opposed by only CVC. It argues that consolidation would be improper because the questions to be resolved in the two litigations are not overlapping.

It appears uncontested (by Mr. Shutts and CVC) that the parties to the Eminent Domain Action are in the final stages of stipulating to a total compensation, by the NC Flood Control District, in the amount of $3,400,000. (See, e.g., Opposition at 7:9-12; see also Support Memorandum at 4:11-15.) CVC asserts that the Eminent Domain Action “will resolve . . how to apportion a sum of just compensation among multiple parties holding distinct interests in the same parcel of real property.” (Opposition at 8:23-24.)

CVC further asserts that the contemplated stipulation “expressly directs that, ‘pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1260.220(b), the trier of fact in [the Eminent Domain Action] shall determine the respective rights of the Defendants in and to the amount of the Total Compensation and shall apportion said amount accordingly.’” (Opposition at 7:13-17, quoting the Declaration of Thomas F. Carlucci, Exh. B, at p. 3.)

4 The Breach of Contract Action was filed before the Eminent Domain Action but (according to allegations of the Complaint filed in the Breach of Contract Action) following the commencement of discussions by and between the NC Flood Control District and the parties regarding the flood control project, and the need for the subject taking.

Through the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) in the Breach of Contract Action, CVC prays the Court for a declaration of CVC and CVHG’s respective rights in and to those proceeds, pursuant to their written agreement. (See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 15-17, 31-35, and Prayer at 12:4-11.) As such, the Court finds common questions of law and fact between the two actions, and further finds that consolidation would promote convenient and judicial economy. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subs. (a); see also Wouldridge v. Burnes, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 86.)

That the Breach of Contract Action also seeks damages for alleged breach, by CVHG, of the parties’ agreement does not, in the Court’s estimation, defeat the advantages of consolidation.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Kenneth Salomon 25CV001875

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. Defendant is granted 15 days’ leave from notice of entry of order to file and serve a response to the Summons and Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (b).) Plaintiff is directed to provide notice of entry of order.

Defendant Kenneth Salomon (“Defendant”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), 5 for an order quashing Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank’s (“Plaintiff”) personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant on March 31, 2026.

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over him because service of the summons and complaint was not completed within 180 days of filing the complaint on September 11, 2025, as required by Rules of Court, rule 3.740(d).

In Opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute the 180-day service- and proof-filing deadline, or that Plaintiff failed to comply with that deadline. However, Plaintiff argues that noncompliance is not a jurisdictional defect or a ground to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), and it alone does not render service void. Rather, the consequence for noncompliance is set out in rule 3.740(e), which provides that the Court may issue an OSC regarding reasonable monetary sanctions. Plaintiff points out that Defendant has not challenged any other defect in the service.

Defendant filed nothing by way of a reply or response to the Opposition.

5 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Rule 3.740 is not a jurisdictional rule; rather, it establishes case management procedures for collections cases. Subdivision (e) of rule 3.740 is entitled “Effect of failure to serve within required time” and provides the mechanism by which noncompliance with the 180-day service rule is handled by the court—i.e., the court may set an OSC why reasonable monetary sanctions should not be imposed, which hearing is to be continued if plaintiff thereafter files a proof of service.

This timing requirement is a procedural mandate designed to promote efficient case management rather than jurisdictional prerequisites that affect the court’s fundamental authority. In sum, Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint is not void solely by the fact that service occurred outside of the 180-day deadline. Defendant raises no other challenges to service. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.

Integon National Insurance Company v. Andrew Madison 26CV000413 Mackenzie-Davis et al

MOTION BY PLAINTIFF FOR ORDER PERMITTING SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT ANDREW MADISON MACKENZIE-DAVIS BY PUBLICATION

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.

Plaintiff Integon National Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50, 6 for an order directing that service of the summons and complaint in this action on defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis (“Mackenzie-Davis”) be effected by publication of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in Napa County.

The matter originally came on for hearing on May 8, 2026. Attorney Robert Stoll appeared on behalf of defendant Bryson Hall, who is involved in separate litigation with Mackenzie-Davis in another California state court. Attorney Stoll represented that Plaintiff is apparently providing Mackenzie-Davis a defense in the separate litigation. Therefore, Attorney Stoll argued, Plaintiff’s contention that it cannot locate Mackenzie-Davis for purposes of the instant motion lacks credibility. Attorney Patrick Howe appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

No one appeared on behalf of Mackenzie-Davis. Attorney Howe did not dispute that Plaintiff is providing a defense to Mackenzie-Davis in the separate litigation. However, Attorney Howe stated that Plaintiff is represented by separate attorneys in that litigation and that Mackenzie- Davis has an interest in Plaintiff losing the present case. The Court continued the matter to allow Attorney Stoll to serve and file a response to the motion by May 22, 2026. Attorney Howe was granted leave to file a Reply no later than May 27, 2026.

There is nothing new on file from the May 8, 2026 hearing.

“A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable

6 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

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