Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings
30-days agreed upon on the record, even arguing in its opposition brief that this Court had granted them additional time. (See Opposition Brief at 2:9:11 and 7:16-20.)
4. Throughout several drafts of the settlement agreement and subsequent emails, Defendants insisted that, as a condition to being paid the agreed-upon $1,600,000, Plaintiffs must waive all future monetary damages that may occur from a possible future flood, even though no such condition was placed on the record. Defendants' draft long form settlement agreement insisted as follows: "Subject to the terms of the Agreement, Defendants through their insurer, Farmers, promise and agree to pay in full and complete satisfaction to Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs agree to accept a full and complete satisfaction of all claims, including claims for past and future monetary damages pertaining to any of the facts and circumstances described in paragraph 4 of the RECITALS and work required to prevent flood damage in the future that may be caused by any of those facts and circumstances, as well as all causes of action, issues, claims and allegations and prayers for relief in Plaintiffs' Complaint." (See paragraph 1 of Article 1, attached to the Curtis Decl. as Exh.
B.) A future damages waiver was never agreed upon in open Court on March 6, 2026, pursuant to Sec. 664.6.
5. Defendants insisted that the settlement agreement contain a multitude of one-sided and argumentative summaries of the evidence in the recitals section and then tied those recitals directly into the draft 1542 waiver. This resulted in an extremely convoluted waiver provision; namely, Defendants draft settlement agreement waiver and 1542 section read as follows: "which Plaintiffs now have with respect to the damage claims subject of the pending action and also those that may hereafter accrue, including my way of illustration and not by way of limitation, future claims of damage for personal injury, emotional distress, wrongful death or property damage, whether known or unknown, that may accrue from or as a result of any of the facts and circumstances described in paragraph 4 of the RECITALS or arising out or related to the allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint." (See paragraph 1 of Article 2, attached to the Curtis Decl. as Exh.
B (emphasis added).) Such a broad and confusing release provision and 1542 waiver was never agreed upon in open Court on March 6, 2026, pursuant to Sec. 664.6.
6. Despite a clear waiver of appellate rights as part of the settlement, on April 8, 2026, Defendants' counsel, Mr. Becker, sent an email to Mr. Curtis stating, "our client reserves all rights relative to the payment including the right to appeal from the judgment." (See Email from Mr. Becker dated April 8, 2026, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. K.) Reserving the right to appeal was never agreed upon in Court on March 6, 2026, pursuant to Sec. 664.6 (in fact, the exact opposite is true of the agreement).
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7. The above examples clearly meet the standard for sanctions under Taeb and Levy, supra in that Defendants have taken positions that are "wholly incredible," are in total disregard of the "patent obligations of the contract," and are without "honest belief in the propriety or reasonableness" of the settlement. This was not a bona-fide dispute as to the essential core terms of the settlement, as Defendants' counsel's opposition brief has suggested. This was an obvious attempt to hold settlement monies hostage while trying to salvage a positive result for his client after a decisive jury loss. Put simply, Defendants' draft settlement agreement attempted to change the material terms of the on-the-record settlement and doing so was the height of bad-faith.
8. This Court was dismayed with what happened but was not unprepared. This Court concluded March 6, 2026 Sec. 664.6 hearing by stating the following: THE COURT: Thank you. The settlement is approved pursuant to 664.6. And as I've indicated, I think on the record, should there be any failure in any documentation that the lawyers are contemplating, the Court, when that happens and it rarely happens, but it has, I just get a copy of the settlement that you put on the record from Tara, cut and paste it and put it in a judgment form. That is how it ends up. Now everybody understands that. [Emphasis this Courts]; Reporters Transcript of Hearing dated March 6, 2026 at 24:12-20, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. A.]
9. Instead of continuing to deal with Mr. Becker's bad faith redlined settlement agreements with vague and confusing waiver provisions and argumentative recitals, Plaintiffs simply asked the Court to do what it said it was going to do. Plaintiffs were not required to assume the risk of Mr. Becker's "gotcha" settlement agreement, given the simple terms of the on-the-record settlement, namely, "a payment of $1,600,000 within 30 days, and that will be a complete resolution of the case with no appeal." (Reporters Transcript of Hearing dated March 6, 2026 at 10:23-26, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. A.)
10. And when the Court sent around a proposed Judgment laying out the simple terms of the settlement, what ensued were several emails from Mr. Becker to this Court accusing Mr. Curtis of "breaching the duty of good faith and fair dealing." (See Email from Mr. Becker dated April 2, 2026, attached to Curtis Decl. as Exh. G.)
11. Because of the repeated bad-faith positions taken by Defendants' counsel set forth above, and as detailed further in the Declaration of Robert A. Curtis, Plaintiffs were forced to pay Plaintiffs' counsel $8,125 in attorney fees between March 7, 2026, and the filing of the opening brief. [Plaintiffs are waiving the additional 1.8 hours it took reviewing the Opposition and preparing the Reply and the anticipated 1 hour attending the hearing on May 13, 2026. Plaintiffs only seek the same amount of fees as set forth in their initial filing.]
In Summary This case is guided by the more stringent rules requiring subjective bad faith applicable to section 128.5. A reasonable attorney knowing all the facts and the applicable law would conclude, as this Court did, that the sanctions set are justified because Defendants' and their Lawyer's conduct was intended to cause unnecessary delay and/or was undertaken for an improper motive. The Defense Attorney, and the Defendants, have, with rhythmic regularity, taken a position (1) that is "wholly incredible" and (2) in total disregard of the "patent obligations of the contract" and (3) without "honest belief in the propriety or reasonableness" of the settlement.
Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Tentative Ruling: Diana Sandoval v. Robert Seidler, et al. Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Wed, 05/13/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings Motion of Defendants Robert Seidler and PoloDonkey, LLC to Stay Proceedings in Case after Jury Trial in Related Case No. 24CV05259 Tentative Ruling For Plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust: Stephen M. Sanders, Jeff G. Coyner, Sanders Coyner Cade PC For Defendants PoloDonkey, LLC and Robert Seidler: Todd A. Amspoker, Jeff F. Tchakarov, Price Postel & Parma LLP RULING For all reasons discussed herein, the hearing on this matter is continued until June 24, 2026, at 10 a.m., to be heard concurrently with the hearing on the motion to stay enforcement of the judgment in Case No. 24CV05259.
Background/Analysis This action commenced on August 5, 2024, by the filing of the original petition and complaint by plaintiff Diana Sandoval, trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust (Sandoval) against defendants County of Santa Barbara Department of Planning and Development (CSBDPD) for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Nuisance, and (3) Negligence. In the original complaint, PoloDonkey was identified as the real party in interest. On February 6, 2025, Sandoval filed her operative second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint
for damages (SAC), asserting causes of action for: (1) Writ of Administrative Mandamus, (2) Writ of Mandate, (3) Violation of California Coastal Act, (4) Nuisance, (5) Negligence, (6) Inverse Condemnation, (7) Fraud/Deceit, (8) Negligent Misrepresentation, (9) Waste & Trespass, (10) Ejectment, (11) Quiet Title on Easement & Action for Possession Based on Unlawful Use, and (12) Declaratory Relief, against defendants CSBDPD, County of Santa Barbara Board of Building Appeals (collectively the "County Defendants"), California Coastal Commission (the "Coastal Commission"), PoloDonkey, and Robert Seidler (Seidler).
Following the sustaining of demurrers, without leave to amend, Sandoval's complaint was dismissed as to the County Defendants and the Coastal Commission. As alleged in the SAC: Sandoval is the owner of real property located at 3196 Serena Avene, Carpinteria (the Serena Property). (SAC, P. 1.) PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road, in Carpinteria, California (the Foothill Property). (SAC, P. 5.) Seidler is the principal, beneficiary, and interested owner of PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 6.)
On or before October 30, 2006, PoloDonkey's predecessor in interest, through its manager and principal Michael Rothbard (Rothbard), confirmed in writing that they would abandon one existing residential driveway and the use therefore of the Serena Property easement, road access, and previous bridge. (SAC, P. 34 & Exh. 12.) Rothbard expressly stated to the County that they would create two new driveways, one for residential access and one for commercial equestrian facility use, both of which driveways were located with access onto Foothill Road. (Ibid.)
Rothbard, and PoloDonkey's predecessor company, maintained this abandonment of the Serena Property easement and did not use the tertiary road and previous bridge associated with the easement until Rothbard sold the Foothill Property to PoloDonkey. (SAC, P. 35.) PoloDonkey, through Seidler, purchased the Foothill Property on July 31, 2014, and thereafter used it unlawfully, without permitted use or entitlement thereto, or right of legal access to the Serena Property. (SAC, P. 36.) In 2016, Siedler misrepresented and submitted on behalf of PoloDonkey an application stating, "Access will continue to be provided off of Foothill Road" without reference to or disclosure of PoloDonkey's and Siedler's unlawful use of the expressly abandoned bridge and the Serena Property easement. (SAC, P. 37.)
On June 30, 2025, Seidler and PoloDonkey answered the SAC admitting some allegations and denying others. Related Case: On December 18, 2024, Sandoval filed a notice of related case regarding Case No. 24CV04379, PoloDonkey v. Quiel, et al. In that matter: On September 23, 2024, plaintiff PoloDonkey, LLC, (PoloDonkey) filed a verified complaint against defendants Tyler N. Quiel (Quiel) and Diana Sandoval (Sandoval) (collectively, "Defendants"), alleging six causes of action: (1) interference with easement; (2) private nuisance; (3) quiet title; (4) declaratory relief; (5) temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions; and (6) quiet title to prescriptive easement.
As alleged in the complaint: PoloDonkey owns real property located at 3215 Foothill Road/3200 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 8.) Defendants are the owners of property located at 3196 Serena Avenue, in Carpinteria, California. (Compl., P. 9.) The PoloDonkey Property is benefitted by an express easement located on a portion of the Serena Property. (Compl., P.P. 11-13.) Contrary to the express language of the easement, Defendants have maintained a fence on and across the easement, blocking PoloDonkey's access and denying PoloDonkey a safe and unobstructed easement area. (Compl., P.P. 15-16.)
On November 26, 2024, Defendants filed a verified answer to the complaint, responding to its allegations and asserting forty-three affirmative defenses. The matter was tried simultaneously before a jury and the court on January 5, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 15, 16, 20, 22, and 23, 2026. Following the presentation of each side's respective cases, judgment was entered in favor of PoloDonkey. On February 9, 2026, the court issued its final statement of decision, and on March 17, 2026, the court signed
This action was pled, served, and tried solely against Tyler N. Quiel and Diana Sandoval in individual capacities, not against any trustee capacity or the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust. The Complaint nowhere identifies the Trust or trustees. The public docket showed only individuals; no amended complaint, new summons, or proof of service issued naming trustees. Trustee issues are being litigated separately in Case No. 24CV04379, ("Lead Case") in which the caption names Diana Sandoval, as trustee of the Sandoval Quiel Revocable Living Trust.
When the Trust and Sandoval in the Lead Case sought consolidation, Plaintiff, appearing as Defendant in the Lead Case, opposed consolidation, thereby excluding the trustee from this action. On October 29, 2025, the Court denied consolidation. This pretrial ruling confirmed that trust’capacity issues and trust property remained in the Lead Case, and the present case ("24CV05259") would proceed against individuals only. The trial record further confirms that the Plaintiff expressly proceeded against the individuals not the Trust or Trustee capacity.
On the morning of January 5, 2026, Plaintiff's counsel admitted to the Court that "[t]he property is owned by their family trust." Counsel hesitated on dismissing the Doe defendants, the Court explicitly warned that adding a new party would require starting all over again. Faced with the choice of starting over to properly serve the Trust and trustees, Plaintiff's counsel stated: "It's okay, your Honor. Let's dismiss the Does." By dismissing the Does, the parties and Court proceeded on the understanding that the Trust and trustees were not parties to this action.
Throughout trial, including in the jury verdict forms, the case was tried solely against the individuals, and even post’trial the Proposed Statement of Decision continued to identify only the individuals. Defense Was Limited to Individuals, Not Any Trust or Trustee Capacity. Plaintiff's own trial insurance exhibit confirms that, while the Policy's Conditions automatically extend coverage to a later trust owner, the actual defense engagement was framed as "individuals only." The First American Homeowners Policy No. 5026100?6273661 lists only Quiel and Sandoval as the named insureds, and while Condition 2(b)(3) extends coverage to a later trust owner, the reservation’of’rights letter that actually defines the defense in 24CV05259 identifies only the individuals as the insureds being defended in this lawsuit, never the Trust or any trustee capacity "First American will retain counsel to represent you in the defense of the PoloDonkey, LLC v.
Quiel and Sandoval lawsuit." and "First American is in the process of retaining counsel to represent you." Carrier’appointed counsel's statement of no objection therefore ran solely to the individual insureds; he had no separate retainer from the Trust or trustees and no engagement as trust counsel in the present case, so any purported consent to bind a trustee capacity exceeded the scope of that authority and cannot supply the missing personal jurisdiction. Further, Defendants were never informed of, and had no knowledge of, any purported stipulation to add the Trust or trustee capacity and thus could not and did not authorize or consent to such a stipulation.
A judgment that purports to reach a non’pleaded, non’served trust and trustee capacity based on the no objections from counsel whose written authority runs only the individual insureds, is void for lack of personal jurisdiction and violates due process. Counsel cannot, by acquiescence, confer jurisdiction over a legal capacity he was never retained or authorized to represent. (See, e.g., Portico Management Group, LLC v. Harrison 202 Cal. App.4th 464, 476-477 (FN7)). Improper Mid?Trial Attempt To Add Trustee Capacity.
Plaintiff waited until after the jury was sworn to improperly attempt to bind the Trust into this case through a variance statute. On January 8, 2026, two days into trial, Plaintiff filed a CCP Sec.Sec. 469 and 470 motion, still captioned only against the individuals. Plaintiff's memorandum concedes: "Plaintiff is suing Defendants in their individual capacity"; "the Complaint names Defendants only in their individual capacities"; and "Defendants' real property... is owned by Defendants in their capacity as trustees."
Because "trial is in progress," Plaintiff expressly "does not seek a noticed pretrial amendment under CCP section 473," and asks the Court, "during trial and without the necessity of a noticed motion," to deem the pleadings amended so that Defendants are "bound both individually and in their capacities as trustees." In substance, Plaintiff invoked a variance statute designed to clean up minor pleading’versus’proof issues and attempted to use it as a shortcut to add an entirely new capacity, trustees of a separate revocable trust holding title, without service, without proper joinder, and without any appearance by counsel authorized to speak for the Trust and