MLYNAR v CEA

Business and Profession Code section 6148; (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (12) fraud. Mlynar asserts she is the primary stakeholder of the interplead funds and filed the FAIC complaint to allow the Court to discharge its obligations to distribute the funds to her, preferably free from adverse claims or liens.

In response to the FAIC, both JMD and Milanfar filed motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Milanfar also filed a motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436.

II. MOTIONS

A. Milanfar and JMD’s Motion to Strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

Both Milanfar and JMD seek to strike claims in the FAIC within the third, fourth, and fifth causes of action, as well as general allegations incorporated by reference into the causes of action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. They argue these claims relate to their filing of notices of attorney liens and are within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute as protected litigation activities.

B. Milanfar’s MTS pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435, 436

Milanfar seeks to strike paragraphs 62, 64-67, 70-71, 76-77, 100 and 106 in their entirety, as well as parts of paragraphs 63, 69, 75, 87, 116, 157 and the prayer for punitive damages. Milanfar asserts the complaint contains false or improper matters because the conduct alleged is privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). As to the claim for punitive damages, Milanfar contends there are insufficient facts alleged to support such a claim.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Motions to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16

Civil Procedure Code section 425.16, subdivision (b) provides: “A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the Court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subd. (b).) The court must construe this section broadly. (Code of Civ. Proc.§ 425.16, subd. (a).) In ruling on a special motion to strike under section 425.16, the court must follow a two-step process. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385.) First, the court determines if the party moving to strike a cause of action has shown that the cause of action

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

arises from an act in furtherance of the moving party’s right of petition or free speech. (Ibid.) This is a threshold issue; if moving party fails to show the conduct is constitutionally protected, the court need not address prong two. (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 733.)

“The burden is on the moving party to identify the specific claims it seeks to strike. ‘This is crucial because complaints frequently include claims arising from protected activity alongside claims arising from unprotected activity as well as so called mixed causes of action that combine the two.” (Weil & Brown Civil Proc. Before Trial (TRG 2025) § 7:962.)

Neither JMD nor Milanfar seek to strike entire causes of action, but rather certain claims within those causes of action. In this context of a mixed cause of action (some activity which is protected and other activity which is not), “courts should analyze each claim for relief—each act or set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are protected and, if so, whether the claim they give rise to has the requisite degree of merit to survive the motion. [Citation.]” (Bonni v.

St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1010.) “‘[T]he moving defendant must identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them. In turn, a court should examine whether those acts are protected and supply the basis for any claims. It does not matter that other unprotected acts may also have been alleged within what has been labeled a single cause of action; these are “disregarded at this stage.’ [Citation.] So long as a ‘court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached’ with respect to these claims. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)

i. Prong one – protected activity

In the first step, the defendant must make a “threshold showing” that the challenged claims arise from protected activity. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) “[T]he moving defendant bears the burden of identifying all allegations of protected activity, and the claims for relief supported by them. When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 396.) “A defendant meets the burden of showing that a plaintiff’s action arises from a protected activity by showing that the acts underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action fall within one of the four categories of conduct described in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (Siam v.

Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1569.) Here, the operative category is (1) statements made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 425.16, subds. (e)(1)).

JMD and Milanfar seek to strike portions of the FAIC which refer to their filing of notices of attorney liens. Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) defines an

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

act in the furtherance of a person’s right to petition or free speech to include statements made before a judicial proceeding or made in connection with an issue under consideration by a judicial body. Mlynar asserts the allegations concerning the liens and the interpleader action in the FAIC are “context and damages – not as the operative wrongful act.” (Opp. at p. 9.)

The Court agrees that defendants’ filing of notices of liens and assertion of their lien rights are acts in the furtherance of their right to petition and are therefore a protected activity. A review of the FAIC reveals the claims concerning defendants’ assertion of their lien rights are more substantive than contextual. For example, the FAIC alleges that at a court hearing Milanfar and JMD “advocated for an interpleader action regarding the settlement funds. Plaintiff contends that this was a self-serving and malicious tactic intended to delay her access to the funds ... .” (FAIC at ¶ 64.)

Mlynar further alleges that the interpleader caused significant hardship. (FAIC at ¶ 65.) Additionally, the FAIC alleges JMD and Milanfar refused to support the proposal to have the settlement funds deposited in the new attorney’s client trust account, that they pressed for the interpleader action instead, and that they are acting vindictively against plaintiff. (FAIC at ¶¶ 67- 69.) The FAIC emphasizes Milanfar and JMD pursued interpleader rather than distributing the settlement funds to her which “are part of a broader pattern of malicious conduct and abuse of the attorney-client relationship ... resulting in clear breaches of fiduciary duty.” (FAIC at ¶ 75.)

The FAIC ties JMD and Dobrin’s conduct surrounding their pursuit of interpleader and filing notices of attorney liens with the causes of action for breach of professional negligence, fiduciary duty, and breach of contract. (See, FAIC at ¶¶ 100, 106, & 116.)

ii. Prong two – probability of prevailing by nonmoving party

The burden now shifts to Mlynar to “demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated. The court, without resolving evidentiary conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff's showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. If not, the claim is stricken. Allegations of protected activity supporting the stricken claim are eliminated from the complaint, unless they also support a distinct claim on which the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016)1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) (Emphasis added.)

JMD and Milanfar argue Mlynar cannot carry her burden by showing a probability of success on the merits because her claims relating to the protected activity are barred by the litigation privilege pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). “The litigation privilege is ‘relevant to the second step in the anti-SLAPP analysis in that it may present a substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing.’ [Citation.]” (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 415.) “The litigation privilege applies ‘to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

connection or logical relation to the action. [Citation.] ‘This privilege is absolute in nature... .’[Citation].” (Ibid.)

Mlynar does not really address this argument in her opposition but instead focuses on other claims she makes in the FAIC, which are not the subject of these motions; for example, her allegations concerning overbilling, coercive fees instruments, and failure to account. In her declaration, she asserts that none of her claims against defendant arise from the filing of attorney liens or their alleged support for interpleader proceedings, but rather her claims are based upon the underlying misconduct that occurred. (Decl. of Mlynar at ¶ 44.)

As already discussed, the FAIC connects the filing of the notices of liens to certain of the causes of action as well as damages. Defendants do not seek to strike all the allegations which constitute the causes of action – only those allegations which are protected activities. Mlynar does show how the litigation privilege is inapplicable. Therefore, the motions are granted.

B. Milanfar’s motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 435 and 436 and to strike punitive damages

Milanfar seeks to strike certain portions of the FAIC relating to the causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as the request for punitive damages based upon the litigation privilege pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). For the reasons discussed in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion, the Court agrees that the portions of the FAIC, enumerated by Milanfar, concerning the filing of notices of attorney liens and advocating for the interpleading of settlement proceeds fall within the litigation privilege.

Code of Civil Procedure section 436, subdivisions (a), (b), permits the court, upon a motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 435, to strike an irrelevant, false or improper matter inserted in any pleading as well as to strike any part of the pleading not drawn in conformity with the laws of the state, a court rule, or an order of the court.

Mlynar again argues her claims concerning the liens are background information and that the litigation privilege does not apply “when the claims are malpractice in nature and no cause of action is asserted” (Opp. at p. 3.) Milanfar counters that the allegations should be stricken because they took place after the attorney-client relationship ended, (Mlynar concedes this in her opposition at page 4) and therefore are superfluous to the malpractice cause of action.

“[T]he practice of filing a notice of lien in a pending action is permissible, and even advisable.” (Valenta v. Regents (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1465, 1470.) The filing of the lien notices as well as discussions concerning the lien and interpleader action are events in anticipation of litigation. The portions of the FAIC which Milanfar seeks to strike are allegations which appear

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

to be privileged pursuant to Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) except for paragraphs 70-71 which do not expressly discuss the filing of the notices of the attorney liens.

The motion to strike the punitive damages prayer as requested is granted. "In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant." (Code of Civ. Proc. § 3294 (a).) The Court does not find the allegations in the FAIC as to Milanfar are sufficiently pled to support a claim for punitive damages.

The motion to strike is granted, with prejudice, except as to paragraphs 70 and 71.

Plaintiff is ordered to file a second amended complaint in conformance with the Court’s ruling within 20 days from the date the order is signed by the Court. Plaintiff is only permitted to amend the complaint to strike the allegations as ordered by the Court; plaintiff is not given leave to amend her FAIC in any other way, including adding facts or additional causes of action.

Regarding plaintiff’s motion for trial preference, parties are ordered to appear to discuss trial and Ms. Mlynar’s retention of new counsel. Note that “[t]he interpleader action is tried to the court; parties to the interpleader action are not entitled to a trial by jury, even if the underlying controversy was one at law entitled to be resolved by a jury. [Citations.]” (Weil & Brown Civil Proc. Before Trial (TRG 2025) § 2:484.5.)

JMD’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

1. Substitution of Attorney filed November 2, 2020 in Mlynar v. CEA case no. 19CV03844.

2. Substitution of Attorney filed March 11, 2025 in Mlynar v. CEA case no. 19CV03844.

3. Notice of First Liens of the Law Office of Jon-Marc Dobrin filed March 11, 2025 in Mlynar v. CEA case no. 19CV03844.

4. Defendants’ Joint Notice of Motion and Motion to File Interpleader of Funds and Discharge of Liability filed April 2, 2025 in Mlynar v CEA case no. 19CV03844.

5. Order re: Defendants’ Joint Motion to Interplead Settlement Funds filed May 19, 2025. In Mlynar v. CEA case no. 19CV03844.

6. First Amended Interpleader Complaint for Distribution of Interpled Proceeds filed June 26, 2035 in Mlynar v. CEA case no 19CV03844.

The Court denies the requests as all documents are already part of the Court’s file in this matter.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: JUNE 9, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

MILANFAR’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE

1. Complaint for Assault and Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing filed January 18, 2019 in Mlynar v. CEA Napa County Superior Court case no. 19CV00135. Granted.

6. Judgment filed on April 10, 2024 in Stanzler Law Group v. Mlynar Sanat Cruz County Superior Court case no 23CV01928. Granted.

The request is denied as to numbers 2-5 and 9-25 as these documents are already part of the Court’s file in this matter.

MILANFAR’S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO STRIKE PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 435, 436

The request is denied as to numbers 3-7 and 9-21 as these documents are already part of the Court’s file in this matter.

Exhibit 8: Judgment filed on April 10, 2025 in Stanzler Law Group v. Mlynar Santa Cruz County Superior Court case no. 23CV01928. Granted.