NINA BOGDANOFF, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED VS LIFT ENRICHMENT, INC.

If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious

June 9, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 9 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.

(Morgan v. Superior Ct. of Cal. in & for Los Angeles County (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 (collecting citations).) Recently, two different Courts of Appeal have reversed a trial court who refused leave to amend after a demurrer, even where it appeared doubtful that plaintiff could state a cause of action. (Black v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 677; Sproul v. Vallee (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 285.) The same public policy considerations apply to this motion to amend.

In this case, both parties agree that the law liberally grants motions to amend, but disagree on whether legally the new proposed plaintiffs may join this action and obtain the benefit of Bogdanoff’s PAGA notice, which was much earlier than the date of Fleeman’s and Grier- Fairley’s PAGA notice.

As to the court’s question, the omission of the overtime claim in the amended complaint does not operate as a bar to reviving the cause of action because the dismissal is without prejudice. (Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Sparks Construction, Inc. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1142-1143.) Thus, the fact that the overtime complaint was omitted from the amended complaint does not by itself bar the revival of the claim.

A noted practice guide explains the requirements for a complaint to relate back. “For an amended complaint to relate back to the original complaint as to parties named in it by their true names, it must: • — be based on the ‘same general set of facts’ as the original; and • — seek recovery against the same defendants for the ‘same injuries’; and • — refer to the ‘same incident’—i.e., the ‘same accident’ caused by the ‘same offending instrumentality.’ [Barrington v. A. H. Robins Co. (1985) 39 C3d 146, 150, 216 CR 405, 407; Norgart v.

Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 C4th 383, 408-409, 87 CR2d 453, 471-472; Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 100 CA5th 363, 374, 319 CR3d 119, 126; see Pointe San Diego Residential Comm., L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 CA4th 265, 277, 125 CR3d 540, 550—‘critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading,’ and ‘in applying the relation-back analysis, courts should consider the strong policy in this state that cases should be decided on their merits’ (internal quotes omitted); Hutcheson v.

Sup.Ct. (UBS Fin'l Services, Inc.) (2022) 74 CA5th 932, 940, 290 CR3d 60, 66]”

(Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (TRG, June 2026 update) § 6:735 (Rutter Guide).)

“It is the sameness of the facts rather than the rights or obligations arising from those facts that is determinative. Thus, amendments alleging a new theory of liability against the defendant relate back to the original complaint, so long as based on the same set facts [sic] previously alleged. [Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2 (2008) 163 CA4th 1157, 1199-1200, 78 CR3d 572, 606].” (Rutter Guide, supra, §6:736.)

June 9, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 10 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ “But a new plaintiff cannot be joined after the statute of limitations has run where plaintiff seeks to enforce an independent right or to impose greater liability upon the defendant. In such cases, the amended complaint does not relate back to the filing of the original. [Bartalo v. Sup.Ct. (Rosman) (1975) 51 CA3d 526, 533, 124 CR 370, 374; Quiroz v. Seventh Ave. Ctr. (2006) 140 CA4th 1256, 1278, 45 CR3d 222, 238 (citing text)]” (Rutter Guide, supra, § 6:755.)

In this case, defendants argues that Hargrove v. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 782 (Hargrove) bars plaintiff’s second amended complaint, but Hargrove supports amendment. The Hargrove court following Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932,939-940, held a new plaintiff “may substitute into this action, and her PAGA claim may relate back to the original complaint if she meets PAGA's prerequisites (standing, notice, & statute of limitations) and the amended complaint is able to relate back to the original complaint (i.e., it rests on the same general set of facts, involves the same injury, & involves the same cause of injury).” (Hargrove, at p. 791.)

The reason that the new plaintiff could not substitute into the action in Hargrove was because she did not work at the defendant company during the same time period as the original plaintiff and thus did not “rest on the same general set of facts or involve the same injury.” (Id. at p. 793.) In this case, in contrast as alleged, all three plaintiffs were employed by defendants during all times relevant to the complaint. (SAC, ¶¶ 1-3.)

The allegations of the FAC and SAC arises from the same set of facts and seeks recovery against defendants for the same injuries arising from defendants’ employment policies and practices. The FAC alleges that “Plaintiffs and Class Members were not properly paid for all hours that they spent working” and “Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all hours worked.” (FAC, ¶¶ 13, 18; see also ¶¶ 6, 26(4), 62, Prayer (5), all referring to failure to pay for “all hours worked”.) These allegations in the FAC were sufficient to put defendants on notice that they should prepare a defense based on an alleged failure to pay all hours spent working.

The case of Estrada v. Royalty Carpet Mills, Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 685 (Estrada) is instructive. In Estrada, plaintiffs sued a company which had various facilities, three of which were relevant to the lawsuit. (Id., at p. 698.) There were two original named plaintiffs, each of whom was from a different facility, and they sought leave to amend their SAC to add 11 new named plaintiffs, some of whom worked at the third facility, as well as an allegation that the third facility “had a unique policy that prevented employees from leaving the facility during meal periods.” (Id. at p. 699.)

The Estrada court first found that the original named plaintiffs’ proposed class covered employees from the third facility, and that the proposed class in the TAC “was substantially the same as the SAC.” (Estrada, supra 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 717.) The court then found as follows as to the new claim:

[T]he Porterville meal period claim alleged in the TAC is based in the same facts, injury, and instrumentality as the SAC's meal period claims: Royalty failed to provide its employees at Dyer, Derian, and Porterville with proper meal periods and failed to provide premium pay under section § 226.7. The exact nature of the noncompliant meal periods at Dyer and Derian (untimely meal periods) was different than Porterville (on-premises meals). But these two

June 9, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 11 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ theories are still grounded in plaintiffs' overall allegations that Royalty was not providing its employees at the three facilities with compliant meal periods and was not providing premium pay over the same period.

(Estrada, supra 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 718.) Similarly, here, the proposed SAC’s overtime claim is grounded in plaintiff’s overall claim that defendants failed to properly pay Plaintiff and Class Members for all hours spent working. As the Estrada court held, “[t]here was sufficient information in the SAC ‘to permit [the defendant] to gather and preserve the relevant materials and begin to conduct discovery and prepare a defense to the claims that were later refined and augmented in the amended complaints.’ ” (Id. at 718-719 [citing Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 278.])

As for the proposed plaintiffs, the Estrada court found that “[s]ince the on-premises meal policy claim in the TAC relates back to the SAC, it was permissible for plaintiffs to amend the SAC and add Porterville employees with standing to bring it.” (Estrada, supra 76 Cal.App.5th at p.719.)

Regarding the PAGA claims, both proposed plaintiffs fell within the definition of the class as stated in the FAC, and both gave the LWDA notice of their claims prior to the filing of this motion, therefore they have exhausted administrative remedies and their claims relate back.

Hutcheson v. Superior Court (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 932 (Hutcheson), which defendants attempt to distinguish, also supports amendment. In Hutcheson, an employee sued his employer seeking PAGA remedies on behalf of aggrieved employees, and a second employee sued the same employer under PAGA about a year later. (Hutcheson at 936-937.) The employee who filed the second lawsuit sought to intervene in the first employee’s lawsuit and replace him, but the parties disagreed over whether the second employee’s claim would relate back to the time of filing of the first lawsuit. (Id. at p. 937.)

The court found that “[a]t the time [the first employee] filed his original complaint, in February 2018, [the second employee] met the standing requirements for an aggrieved employee under section 2699, subdivision (c). That is because [the second employee] was a former employee of UBS, and the alleged violations had also been committed against him.” (Hutcheson, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 941.) The court concluded that “[t]he substitution of [the second employee] for [the first employee] does not expand the scope of the original complaint filed by [the first employee].” (Ibid.)

Here, the FAC defined the class as “[a]ll persons employed by Defendants in the State of California in a nonexempt position who performed work for Defendants at any time within four years prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint.” (FAC, ¶ 24.) The proposed SAC alleges as to both proposed plaintiffs: “During all times relevant to this Complaint, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a non-exempt hourly employee.” (Proposed SAC, ¶¶ 1-3.) As in Hutcheson, the proposed plaintiffs therefore “stood to recover civil penalties if [Plaintiff Bogdanoff]’s case were proved.” (Hutcheson, supra, at 941.) And as in Hutcheson, both

June 9, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 12 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ proposed plaintiffs here gave the LWDA notice well before the filing of this motion and the proposed SAC. (See Proposed SAC, ¶¶ 13-14.)

Since the addition of the overtime claim and the proposed plaintiffs do not improperly expand the scope or nature of the claims, there is no prejudice as the law defines it by the filing of the proposed SAC. (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 489 [change in legal theory not prejudice]; Rutter Guide, supra,§ 6:656 et seq.) Further, the filing of this motion was not untimely so as to cause prejudice to defendants. Plaintiff filed her initial complaint on December 6, 2024 and her FAC on February 10, 2025.

The case was then stayed from March 20, 2025 to September 5, 2025 based on defendants’ request for an early evaluation conference, and proposed Plaintiffs submitted PAGA notice in August and September 2025, respectively. Plaintiff informed defendants of her desire to amend the FAC and add the proposed plaintiffs and overtime claim by December 2025. (Declaration of Leonard Emma ISO Leave to Amend, filed Feb. 27, 2026, ¶ 6.)

The amended complaint is not deemed filed. It shall be filed and served within five court days of notice of entry of order.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, counsel for plaintiff shall prepare a written order consistent with the court’s ruling for the court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.