Hal Pedersen et al vs County of Santa Barbara

Based upon this representation, Yi continued to foster Zeus for the day. (Compl., P. 13.)

On March 2, 2024, Zeus attacked and bit Pedersen (the attack) causing serious injuries. (Compl., P. 14.)

Plaintiffs believe that Zeus had a documented prior history of aggression, biting people, and breaking the skin requiring a mandated bite quarantine within the meaning of Food and Agricultural Code section 30503.5, including while Zeus was four months old. (Compl., P. 15.)

The County knew of but failed to warn Yi about Zeus' prior history before allowing Yi to foster Zeus. (Compl., P. 16.)

The County also had an unwritten policy under which it would house and place dangerous dogs into the community, including dogs that it knew had a documented history of aggression. (Compl., P. 17.)

After the attack, Plaintiffs returned Zeus to the Shelter. (Compl., P. 18.)

The County continued to advertise Zeus as available for adoption, describing Zeus as the "epitome of a friendly and easy going companion." (Compl., P. 18.)

After service of the complaint: On February 6, 2025, the County filed a demurrer directed to the second through sixth causes of action in the complaint and separately filed a motion to strike portions of the complaint.

On May 9, 2025, the court sustained the County's demurrer to the third cause of action with leave to amend and granted the County's motion to strike allegations of punitive damages.

On May 30, 2025, after the time elapsed for Plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, the County filed an answer generally denying the allegations in the complaint and setting forth ten affirmative defenses.

Also on May 30, 2025, the County filed a cross-complaint (CC) against Yi setting forth four causes of action for (1) equitable indemnity, (2) apportionment of fault/contribution, (3) express indemnity, and (4) declaratory relief.

On August 27, 2025, Yi filed an answer to the CC generally denying the allegations therein and setting forth twenty-six affirmative defenses.

On November 11, 2025, Plaintiffs served a deposition subpoena for personal appearance and for production of documents and things for the deposition of Dr. Mouhamad Hammami (Dr. Hammami), Director of the Santa Barbara County Health Department (Director). (Smith Decl., Ex. 12.)

The Director is "a single executive department head position responsible for the management, implementation, and direction on a countywide basis of all public health services provided by the County including statutory county health services, health education, multiple outpatient clinics providing primary and specialty care, contract hospital services and related programs and activities." (Hammami Decl., P. 3.)

On November 21, 2025, the County filed a motion to quash and for protective order on the basis that Dr. Hammami was an apex witness and that Plaintiffs had not demonstrated a sufficient showing to take his deposition.

This motion is opposed.

Analysis: "If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information ... at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made ... after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.

In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1987.1.)

"Despite the otherwise broad availability of discovery, '[t]he general rule in California ... is that agency heads and other top governmental executives are not subject to deposition absent compelling reasons....' [P.] 'This rule has been applied in numerous cases involving an array of constitutional officers, board members, and agency heads ....' [Citations.]

And the rule applies regardless of whether the official is a named defendant or a third party [Citation] or 'whether the official gained the information sought while in his or her present position or while serving in prior, lower ranking positions at the agency' [Citation].

'Thus, where a party seeks to depose a high government official, and the official moves for a protective order, the burden is on the deposing party to show that compelling reasons exist for permitting the deposition.' " (Ross v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 667, 680-681 (Ross).)

" 'An exception will be made to this rule only when the deposing party makes two showings. First, the deposing party must show that the government official 'has direct personal factual '--as opposed to legal --'information pertaining to material issues in the action.' [Citation.]

'Second, the deposing party must also show 'the information to be gained from the deposition is not available through any other source.' " (Ross, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 680, internal quotation marks omitted.)

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Dr. Hammami is an apex witness.

Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Hammami has personal knowledge of material facts at issue in the action and that they meet an exception to the apex doctrine under Ross.

Plaintiffs submit evidence that on June 16, 2023, Dr. Hammami received an email from Kerri Burns with "Santa Barbara Humane," an apparent third party who works with animal services provided by the County. (Maho Decl., Ex. D.)

The email read in part, "[o]ur top concern is that under current leadership, Animal Services is allowing dogs with documented aggression to remain at the shelter for months at a time (leading to overcrowding and staff/volunteer injuries) and knowingly placing these animals into our community. As a public safety agency, Animal Services is obligated to protect people and animals from dangerous dogs." (Ibid.)

In reply, the County does not dispute the authenticity of the June 16 email and argues that this referenced meeting does not demonstrate that Dr. Hammami had any direct information about the foster program, details of Plaintiffs' fostering of Zeus, actions of County animal services staff, or the facts surrounding the issues in the complaint.

Plaintiffs submit evidence that on April 9, 2024, Dr. Hammami was copied on email from Dori Villalon with Santa Barbara Humane, stating in part: "We continue to be concerned that dangerous dogs are being housed long-term and made available for foster, transfer, or adoption from SBCAS.

"Two current examples: "? Chewy (525852) has growled, lunged, and snapped at multiple people, including potential adopters, since arriving last December. SBCAS staff notes include, 'I do not feel safe around this dog and no other staff member...does either' and 'I do not feel confident that this dog would not seriously injure someone if given the opportunity.'

"? Yogi (A527259) attacked a kitten in the home and when the owner intervened, attacked her resulting in 15 stitches over both arms. The owner brought the dog to SBCAS and requested euthanasia but was denied that service.

"Both of these dogs are available for adoption today.

"I recently met with a gentleman who was bit in the face by his SBCAS foster dog, requiring reconstructive surgery. Your staff had not informed him of the dog's prior bites on record. A couple of weeks ago Yogi (A525123), a dog we warned you about after he lunged at an SBH clinic staff member, attacked an SBCAS employee and bit her in the chest. And today we scheduled behavior euthanasia for a dog recently adopted from SBCAS because the animal is attacking other animals. This will not be the first time SB Humane performs euthanasia of an SBCAS dog after the adopter realizes the animal they were given is dangerous and a threat to their family. Your clients don't return these dogs to your facility out of concern that the animal will simply be placed back up for adoption." (Maho Decl., Ex. E.)

In reply, the County does not dispute the authenticity of the April 9 email and argues that this email was after the attack on Pedersen and does not demonstrate that Dr. Hammami had any direct information about facts surrounding the issues in the complaint.

The court finds that Plaintiffs have met their burden to demonstrate that Dr. Hammami has personal factual information pertaining to material issues in this action.

Notably, the County has filed a CC against Yi alleging that Yi should be responsible in whole or in part for the alleged damages including injuries to Pedersen based on the theory of equitable indemnity. (CC, P.P. 5-9.)

"The elements of a cause of action for [equitable] indemnity are (1) a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which the indemnitor is ... equitably responsible." (C.W. Howe Partners Inc. v. Mooradian (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 688, 700.)

If, as argued by Plaintiffs, Dr. Hammami had knowledge that there were ongoing dog-bite risks in the foster program but failed to take reasonable steps pertaining to these risks, these communications and interactions with Santa Barbara Humane may be probative of these issues of equity.

There may be other similar communications or discussions.

These interactions may be probative of other issues in this action. (See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540; Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 2017.010.)

As to the second element of whether this information is available through any other source, the court will require Plaintiffs to first take non-apex discovery before the deposition of Dr. Hammami is allowed to move forward.

Plaintiffs can serve requests for production, requests for admission, and interrogatories pertaining to these communications, interactions, and policy issues.

Plaintiffs can take the deposition of the County's person most qualified.

Plaintiffs can take formal or informal discovery as to third parties involved or referenced in these interactions with Santa Barbara Humane.

The court notes this matter is set for trial on January 19, 2027, and there is ample time for Plaintiffs to take non-apex discovery.

At a minimum, non-apex discovery may substantially narrow the issues for this deposition.

At this point in time, Plaintiffs have not carried their burden to demonstrate that the deposition of Dr. Hammami is the only source for this information.

The court will grant the County's motion to quash and for protective order. (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1987.1.)

The court will enter a protective order that Dr. Hammami is not subject to deposition in this action until further order of the court. (Ibid.)

If Plaintiffs still lack the information they seek from Dr. Hammami's deposition after taking non-apex discovery as discussed herein, Plaintiffs can file a motion based on good cause and seek modification of this protective order. (Ibid.)

Tentative Ruling: Center for Biological Diversity et al vs California Dept of Forestry and Fire Protection et al

Tentative Ruling: Center for Biological Diversity et al vs California Dept of Forestry and Fire Protection et al