Ramirez vs. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A, Inc.

costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794, subd. (d).)

“A prevailing buyer has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were ‘allowable,’ were ‘reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation,’ and were ‘reasonable in amount.’” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1158; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34-35; Levy v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 807, 816.)

“Determining a reasonable attorney fee award in Song- Beverly Act cases ordinarily begins with the ‘lodestar,’ [which is] the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157; Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691 [“To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, the trial court applies the lodestar method.”].) “The lodestar may ‘then be adjusted based on factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value of the legal services provided.’ ” (Id.)

“The Song-Beverly Act’s attorney fee provision requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended, and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1158 [internal quotations omitted].) “These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved.” (Ibid.; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 34, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019); Reck v. FCA US LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 682, 691.) “If the time expended or the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this into

account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount.” (Ibid.; see also Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 36, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019); Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)

“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.” (Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1157.) “The relevant “community” is generally based on where the services are rendered, i.e., where the court is located.” (Ibid.) “Accordingly, the reasonable hourly rate in this case is that charged by consumer attorneys practicing in the local legal community in Orange County.” (Ibid.)

In considering whether to apply a multiplier (positive or negative) the court should conder the following and other relevant circumstances: complexity of the case, procedural demands, delay by the opposing party, and litigation tactics used by the opposing party. (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 41.)

Notably, “it is inappropriate and an abuse of a trial court’s discretion to tie an attorney fee award to the amount of the prevailing buyer/plaintiff’s damages or recovery in a Song-Beverly Act action.” (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 35, as modified (Oct. 11, 2019).)

Here, the parties agreed in their Settlement Agreement that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have carried their burden to establish that the attorney fees sought are reasonable except as to the lodestar enhancement. The Court finds that (1) the circumstances of this case were not so complex or procedurally demanding such that a lodestar enhancement is appropriate, (2) Defendant did not delay the case or use litigation tactics that would justify the application of an enhancement/multiplier, and (3) the entries flagged as inappropriate in Defendant’s opposition are reasonable fees and billing entries under the circumstances of this case and the Court declines to subtract those fees and billing entries.

Given the above, the motion for attorney fees, costs and expenses is GRANTED in the amount of $16,373.75.

Plaintiff to give notice.

108 Robicheaux vs. Rowshan, 2022- 01261647 MOTION TO QUASH TRIAL SUBPOENA - CONTINUED

109 Security National Insurance Company v. O.C. Services Inc., 2020-01164470 MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT - CONTINUED

Plaintiff, Security National Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”), moves for entry of judgment in favor of Plaintiff, Security National Insurance Company, against Defendants, O. C. Services Inc. aka OC Services Inc. and dba Molly Maid of Newport, and S & C Inc. aka S and C Inc. and dba Molly Maid of Long Beach (collectively, “Defendants”), in the total amount of $432,914.42, inclusive of prejudgment interest plus the principal sums plus costs of suit and attorney’s fees, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

Plaintiff contends that this action was settled by way of a written settlement agreement, but that Defendants have defaulted and that the Court should enter judgment in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6. No opposition has been filed.

“If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.” (Code Civ. Proc. §664.6(a).)

“Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 provides a summary procedure to enforce a settlement agreement by entering judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. [Citation.]” (Hines v. Lukes (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1182.) “The court retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement under the statute even after a dismissal, but only if the parties requested such a retention of jurisdiction before the dismissal. [Citation.] Such a request must be made either in a writing signed by the parties or orally before the court. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “A court ruling on a motion under CCP § 664.6 must determine whether the parties entered into a valid and binding settlement.

A settlement is enforceable under section 664.6 only if the parties agreed to all material settlement terms. The court ruling on a motion may consider the parties’ declarations and other evidence in deciding what terms the parties agreed to, and the court’s factual findings in this regard are reviewed under the substantial evidence standard. If the court determines that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, it should grant the motion and enter a formal judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.

The statute expressly provides for the court to ‘enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement.’” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff provides an executed copy of the written settlement agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants, which provides, in relevant part: 1. Plaintiff was to have judgment in the principal amount of $344,890.35, plus prejudgment interest, plus attorney fees and costs; 2. Defendants would pay the discounted amount of $210,000 in monthly payments to settle the matter.

3. Default in the payments by Defendants would, “after seven days’ written notice of default in the manner and to the address(es) set forth in Section 3.M. hereinbelow” entitled Plaintiff to apply for entry of judgment.

4. Notices under the settlement agreement were to be made by “first class mail.”