PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 664.6 AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 7 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 6 23-CIV-01570 ASHLEY MENDOSA VS APEX EQUITY GROUP, INC.
ASHLEY MENDOSA MATTHEW MATERN APEX EQUITY GROUP, INC. JAMES F. RUMM
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ENFORCE SETTLEMENT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 664.6 AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS
TENTATIVE RULING:
The Court rules on Plaintiff Ashley Mendosa’s (Plaintiff) Motion to Enforce Settlement and Request for Monetary Sanctions as follows:
On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a class and representative action alleging Labor Code violations committed by Defendant Apex Equity, Inc. dba European Wax Center (Defendant).
On July 22, 2025, the parties signed a settlement agreement (Agreement) to settle Plaintiff’s individual claims. On October 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a request for dismissal of the class and representative claims.
Plaintiff seeks to enforce the settlement agreement pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.
If parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing signed by the parties outside of the presence of the court or orally before the court, for settlement of the case, or part thereof, the court, upon motion, may enter judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement. If the parties to the settlement agreement or their counsel stipulate in writing or orally before the court, the court may dismiss the case as to the settling parties without prejudice and retain jurisdiction over the parties to enforce the settlement until performance in full of the terms of the settlement.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a).)
The Agreement provides that Defendant shall pay Plaintiff $20,000 in five installments of $4,000 each. (Agreement, ¶ 1(a).) The first installment was due “no later than thirty (30) days after Plaintiff returns an executed copy of this Agreement and completed W-9 forms from Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel to counsel for Defendant.” Plaintiff states, and Defendant does not contest, that the due date for initial payment fell on August 21, 2025. Plaintiff granted Defendant an extension to September 26, 2025, at which point Defendant still failed to pay the first installment. On October 15, 2026, Plaintiff requested a hearing date for the instant motion, and the following day Defendant made the first installment payment, resulting in a total delay of 19 days from when the payment was due.
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June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 8 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
For subsequent payments, the Agreement states that “each installment payment [is] due on the first calendar day of the month three (3) months after the previous installment payment was made.” The second payment was therefore due on January 1, 2026, and Defendant made the payment on January 20, 2026, again constituting a delay of 19 days. The third installment was due on April 1, 2026 and Defendant did not pay it until May 12, 2026, constituting a delay of 41 days. The fourth payment is not yet due.
Before turning to Plaintiff’s requested remedies, the Court addresses Defendant’s argument regarding a provision in the Agreement entitled “Stipulated Judgment.” The Agreement states that upon Plaintiff’s provision of the executed Agreement to Defendant, Defendant would provide Plaintiff with an executed copy of a “Stipulated Judgment,” which Plaintiff could then file if Defendant failed to timely make installment payments. (See Agreement, ¶ 3.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure to submit the “Stipulated Judgment” to the Court as part of the instant motion limits Plaintiff’s ability to recover under the Agreement.
Plaintiff argues that her motion is not brought pursuant to the Stipulated Judgment, but rather pursuant to the Agreement. The Court finds that although the section regarding the stipulated judgment provides a remedy for Defendant’s failure to pay an installment payment on time, it does not state that it is the exclusive remedy under the Agreement. Thus, this motion is proper.
While Defendant has breached the Agreement three times by failing to pay timely, Defendant has now made those payments and there is no penalty for the breach, e. g., interest. The Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s requested remedy of immediate judgment against Defendant for the full remaining contract balance because the Agreement does not provide for acceleration of payment if a payment is late. The Court therefore does not grant the remedy. (Code Civ. Proc., § 664.6, subd. (a); Machado v. Myers (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 779, 792 [court cannot add or modify the settlement agreement].)
Plaintiff also seeks attorneys’ fees for being forced to bring this motion to enforce the agreement. Paragraph 3 of the Agreement provides that Plaintiff shall be entitled to recover attorneys’ fees or costs associated with the collection of any past due installment payments. Plaintiff provided extensions to Defendant to pay the costs and then warned Defendant that she would bring a motion to enforce if the payment was not made. (Doyan Decl., Ex. B.) Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.
Plaintiff does not request costs. Her attorney, Kristen B. Doyan states that counsel has incurred $1,920.00 in attorneys’ fees in drafting, revising and filing the motion, and anticipates incurring an additional $720.00 for drafting the reply as well as preparing for and attending the hearing for a total of $2,6400.00. (Doyan Decl., ¶ 15.) The reply declaration does not include any information about the time spent for the reply and appearance at the hearing may not occur. Doyan provides no information about the background of the people who prepared the motion, their hourly rates, or the specific work performed.
In these type of cases, attorneys’ fees are generally awarded under the lodestar method, i.e., multiplying the number of hours reasonably spent by a reasonable hourly rate. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 697.) The hourly rate is based upon the reasonable rates for San Mateo County, where this case is venued (See Tidrick v. FCA US LLC (2025) 112
June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 9 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________ Cal.App.5th 1147 [Song-Beverly case reversing trial court who did not use hourly rates where the court was located].)
This court, may use its own experience to determine the value of attorneys’ fees. (Spencer v. Collins (1909) 156 Cal. 298, 306 [“The value of attorney’s services is a matter with which a judge must necessarily be familiar. When the court is informed of the extent and nature of such services, its own experience furnishes it with every element necessary to fix their value.”]; Reynolds v. Ford Motor Company (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1105, 1113-14 [“The trial court acted well within its discretion in using ‘the prevailing market value in the community for similar legal services’ relying on its personal knowledge and familiarity with the area legal services, as the ‘touchstone’ for determination” of the reasonable hourly rates.’” (citations omitted)].).
This court had extensive experience in class action and other common fund cases while an attorney and has made decisions about attorneys’ fees and costs frequently during her time as a judicial officer.
Therefore, rather than denying the request for attorneys’ fees outright for failure of supporting information or continuing the motion to allow Plaintiff to supplement the information provided which would cause more expense and use of resources, for both the parties and the Court, the Court determines that an attorney with three years of experience could prepare this motion and uses the Laffey Matrix, www.laffeymatrix.com/see/html, hourly rate of $508.00 per hour as the reasonable hourly rate for this straightforward motion. (Syers Properties III, Inc. v.
Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 702 [court can use Laffey Matrix for reasonable hourly rate].) The court finds that the hourly rate of $508.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for a third year attorney in San Mateo County. The court finds that four hours to prepare the motion and one hour for the reply is a reasonable amount to award in attorneys’ fees. Thus, the Court awards Plaintiff $2,540.00 in attorney’s fees to be paid by Defendant. This amount is only slightly less than the request made by Plaintiff.
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide written notice of the ruling to all parties who have appeared in the action, as required by law and the California Rules of Court.
June 2, 2026 Law and Motion Calendar PAGE 10 Judge: HONORABLE NANCY L. FINEMAN, Department 04 ________________________________________________________________________
2:00 PM LINE 7 23-CIV-01887 CHARLES KING VS. ERIC STUART, ET AL.
CHARLES KING PRO SE ERIC STUART
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO CONTEST AND AMEND COMPLAINT; PERSONAL INJURY, NEGLIGENCE, IIED
TENTATIVE RULING:
Plaintiff Charles King has filed two unopposed motions to contest. The first motion filed February 4, 2026 is entitled “Plaintiff’s Motion to Contest and Amend Complaint; Personal Injury, Negligence, IIED” consists of sixteen pages and is set for a hearing on June 2, 2026. The second motion filed March 30, 2026 is entitled “Motion to Contest Tentative Ruling and Proposed Order to Vacate Sanctions; Memorandum of Points and Authorities” is four pages and is set for a hearing on June 30, 2026. The motion set for a hearing on June 2, 2026 is DENIED.
First, there are no proofs of service in the court file. California Rules of Court 3.1300 requires that “proof of service of the moving papers must be filed no later than five court days before the time appointed for the hearing.” Without the proofs of service being filed, there is no evidence that defendants have been properly served with the motion and the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the motion. “[P]roof of service fulfills the function of establishing that ‘procedures implementing the constitutional requirements of due process were followed giving assurance that service really has been made.’ (West v.
West (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 120, 124, 154 Cal.Rptr. 667.) Accordingly, when adequate proof of service is available, it is of no legal import that a party actually may not have received notice. (Ibid.) That being the case, the courts are very strict in applying the statutory standards for proof of service; failure to strictly comply with those standards deprives the court of jurisdiction to act. (Ibid.)” (Oats v. Oats (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 416, 420.)
Second, while there is a date and time for the motion, June 2, 2026, plaintiff does not provide the location of the hearing or the judge hearing the motion, which information is required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.110(b)(1). Thus, defendants do not have proper notice of the hearing and the court cannot consider the motion. (See Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1204–1205 [court lacks jurisdiction to rule on a motion that has not been properly noticed].)
If the tentative ruling is not contested, it will become the order of the court without the need for a formal order.