Mariette Wingard et al vs Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors

Prior to filing the criminal charges against Wingard, Sheriff and DA knew that cannabis cultivation took place at 2761 Cebada Canyon Road, Lompoc (the "property") prior to January 19, 2016. (Ibid.) Prior to November 9, 2022, two superior court judges disregarded the State cannabis cultivation licenses issued to Herbal, by authorizing search warrants and summarily denying Wingard's demurrer to counts 3 and 4 of the criminal complaint. (Compl., P. 47.) On November 9, 2022, following three years of litigation, Judge Adams ruled that Wingard was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture. (Compl., P. 48.)

The court specifically ruled that Wingard was connected to Herbal, that Herbal possessed active State licenses at the time of the criminal investigation and raid, and that only the State has authority to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke State licenses. (Id. at P. 49.) The criminal charges were dismissed. (Id at P. 50.) Despite the findings and dismissal of the criminal charges, the court continues to deny Wingard's factual innocence. (Id. at P. 51.) In September 2019, Sheriff began an "illegal" investigation of Herbal's cultivation site without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. (Compl., P. 70.)

Prior to investigating Herbal and Wingard, County, DA, and Sheriff had actual knowledge that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal had the licenses needed to cultivate cannabis in Santa Barbara County. (Id. at P. 71.) The investigation commenced when Walker was serving a search warrant at the property on September 14, 2019, and noticed "hoop houses" at the property. (Compl., P. 72.) Every fact uncovered by Walker after September 14, 2019, showed that Herbal was the cannabis operator at the property and that Herbal was a licensed cannabis cultivator with 12 active licenses issued by the State of California, and that Herbal and Avo Vista Farms, LLC were seeking zoning permits from Planning Dept. in accordance with the County's cannabis ordinances. (Ibid.)

On December 13, 2019, and December 16, 2019, Walker filed an affidavit in support of a requested search warrant for the property, Wingard's residence, the residence of a previous owner of Avo Vista Farms, and the office location for Avo Vista Farms, "for evidence of illegal cannabis cultivation, paraphernalia, records, proceeds and other evidence . . . which will . . . show that persons associated with this property are cultivating cannabis as a public offense, in violation of H.S. 11358(c)." (Compl., P. 73.)

Walker stated in the warrant affidavit that Herbal, at the time, had 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at P. 74.) A superior court judge signed the search warrants knowing that Herbal had 12 active State cultivation licenses that would remain active until May 2020. (Id. at P. 75.) Sheriff, DA, and Davis fabricated evidence against Wingard and Herbal by failing to inform the court that the 12 active State cannabis cultivation licenses conferred absolute immunity from charges of cultivation without a license on Wingard and Herbal by informing the court that the State cannabis licenses were invalid despite knowing the State never investigated, disciplined, conditioned, suspended, or revoked the licenses, by concealing from the court and from Wingard prior cultivation at the property. (Compl., P. 76.)

Planning and Sheriff colluded to "destroy" Herbal via the investigation. (Id. at P. 77.) Davis colluded with Sheriff to "destroy" Herbal via the investigation, and Davis colluded with Sheriff to fabricate evidence during the investigation, search, and seizure of Wingard and Herbal. (Id. at P. 78.) On December 16, 2019, Wingard, her infant daughter, her toddler daughter, and Wingard's mother Fritz left Wingard's residence in Wingard's family van. (Compl., P. 79.) Approximately one mile from her home, Wingard was pulled over and two law enforcement officers approached the vehicle, took Wingard's phone, and asked if there were any guns in the vehicle. (Ibid.)

Shortly thereafter, two more officers arrived. (Ibid.) Fritz asked if she could leave and was told that she was being detained but was not told why. (Id. at P. 80.) An officer threatened Fritz and Wingard that Wingard's infant would likely be taken away from the family by children's services. (Id. at P. 81.) Wingard and Fritz informed the officers that the infant needed to nurse and could not be separated from Wingard, but the officer reiterated that the infant might be taken. (Ibid.)

Fritz, the infant, and the toddler were not the subject of the investigation or persons of interest. (Compl., P. 82.) Fritz asked to leave with Wingard's infant and toddler, but the officers refused to let her leave with the children. (Ibid.) The officers searched and seized Fritz's belongings, including the money from her wallet, despite there being no evidence to indicate Fritz was in any way connected to the criminal investigation. (Compl., P. 83.) Sherriff still has Wingard's and Fritz's belongings and refuses to release them on the basis that they still must be retained as evidence of a crime. (Ibid.)

Eventually, Wingard was allowed to permit a friend to pick up the toddler. (Compl., P. 84.) After the toddler was picked up, the officers ordered Wingard to return to her residence with Fritz and the infant. (Ibid.) Fritz was still not allowed to leave. (Ibid.) At Wingard's residence, Wingard, Fritz, and the infant were detained in the living room while officers searched the residence for several hours. (Compl., P. 85.) Fritz was not permitted to leave until the search was complete, and she was not told why she was being detained or allowed to see the search warrant. (Ibid.)

Sheriff found no evidence of cannabis cultivation without a license but, despite this fact, Sheriff seized $206,418.72 from Herbal, Wingard, and Eli Sheiman (Sheiman), destroyed legally cultivated cannabis worth millions of dollars, and terrorized Wingard, Fritz, and Sheiman, as well as their two young children over the years. (Compl., P. 96.) Because County seized all of Wingard's funds, Fritz loaned Wingard $130,000.00 for rent, food, clothing, medical bills, taxes, transportation, insurance, therapy, and preschool tuition. (Id. at P. 97.)

Fritz was retried prior to the incident but went back to working full-time in 2020 to help support Wingard and Wingard's children. (Ibid.) During its investigation and search and seizure of Wingard and Herbal, Sheriff destroyed over $3,500,000.00 in lawfully cultivated cannabis, trade secrets, business property, and seized over $200,000.00 from Herbal, as well as all of Herbal's business records. (Compl., P. 98.) The seizure and destruction of Herbal's assets destroyed the business, destroyed the business's goodwill and reputation within the community, and made any attempts to revive the business and its conditional use permit futile. (Id. at P. 99.)

Despite the criminal case against Wingard being dismissed on November 9, 2022, it took nearly a year for DA and Sheriff to return the funds seized from Wingard and Herbal. (Compl., P. 100.) Davis and Sheriff colluded to destroy Herbal's conditional use permit. (Compl., P. 101.) Wingard was charged with the misdemeanor crimes of cultivating more than six cannabis plaints and possessing marijuana for sale. (Compl., P. 103.) Prior to the filing of the criminal complaint, DA and Sheriff were aware that Wingard was connected to Herbal, and that Herbal held active State cannabis cultivation licenses issued by the California Department of Agriculture Cannabis for the cultivation of marijuana at the property. (Ibid.)

What was presented as evidence in the criminal trial was the "false, manufactured, and fabricated" evidence by Davis, Walker, Vasquez, Perkins, Furber, Lucas, Carter, and the prosecutorial team. (Compl., P. 104.) Throughout the criminal action, and continuing to the present, defendants have joined and participated in Davis's efforts to withhold and conceal exculpatory evidence that "would have unraveled the illegal case against Wingard." (Ibid.) Defendants' actions were part of defendants' long-standing conspiracy to frame Wingard and Herbal for crimes they did not commit. (Id. at P. 105.)

On August 12, 2020, Wingard demurred to the criminal complaint on the grounds that she was immune from arrest, prosecution, and asset forfeiture for cultivation and possession of cannabis without a license because she was connected to Herbal and Herbal held an active State license for cannabis cultivation. (Compl., P. 106.) On August 31, 2021, the court denied the demurrer. (Ibid.) As the sole basis for the criminal charges against Wingard, DA "ruled" that the State licenses issued to Herbal were invalid. (Compl., P. 111.)

County has no authority to suspend, issue, or revoke State cannabis licenses. (Ibid.) DA and Sheriff engaged in interviews with the press and misstated facts in an effort to pressure Wingard and Herbal to waive their rights and to destroy their reputations with other businesses and the public. (Compl., P. 115.) On November 21, 2025, a Special Motion to Strike (Anti-SLAPP) was granted in favor of County of Santa

Barbara, Jordan Walker, Frank Vasquez, James Furber, John Savrnoch, Joyce Dudley, Anthony Davis, Morgan Lucas, Lee Carter, and Kristina Perkins. On December 12, 2025, an Anti-SLAPP motion was granted in favor of Pence. Pence now seeks attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (c), in the amount of $81,246.88 in fees and $877.91 in costs. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. Analysis: "[A] prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 425.16, subd. (c)(1).) Plaintiffs first argue that Pence's motion is untimely because Pence prepared and served a Notice of Entry of Order on December 22, 2025, and the current motion was filed on March 2, 2026. "A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment in the trial court--including attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial court--must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and 8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) "(1) Unless a statute or rules 8.108, 8.702, or 8.712 provide otherwise, a notice of appeal must be filed on or before the earliest of: "(A) 60 days after the superior court clerk serves on the party filing the notice of appeal a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, showing the date either was served; "(B) 60 days after the party filing the notice of appeal serves or is served by a party with a document entitled "Notice of Entry" of judgment or a filed-endorsed copy of the judgment, accompanied by proof of service; or "(C) 180 days after entry of judgment." (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1).) The Notice of Entry of Order, filed December 22, 2025, was not a Notice of Entry of Judgment, as contemplated by the Rule. It was a notice of entry of the ruling dated December 12, 2025. Judgment was entered, in favor of Pence, on January 15, 2026, and the present motion is timely. Pence appears to seek all fees incurred that were, in any way, related to this action. The declaration of Pence's counsel Robert A. Curtis, at paragraph 13, lists several items for which Pence seeks to recover fees.

The declaration of Ashley Sura, another attorney representing Pence, also sets forth, at paragraph 11, items for which Pence seeks to recover fees. Pence is not entitled to all those fees. Importantly: "We believe section 425.16, subdivision (c) is ambiguous. It states, " 'In any action subject to subdivision (b), a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs.' " This language is susceptible to two interpretations: first, that a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike is entitled to attorney fees and costs for the entire action; second, that a prevailing defendant is entitled to fees and costs only for the motion to strike.

In the face of this ambiguity, we turn to the legislative history. A report prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (the chairman of which authored the legislation that adopted section 425.16) leaves no doubt about the Legislature's intent. It states, " '[Senate Bill No. 1264] would provide attorney's fees and costs to a prevailing defendant in a motion to strike. [P.] . . . [P.] The provision applies only to the motion to strike, and not to the entire action.' " (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen.

Bill No. 1264 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 5, italics added.) A Senate floor report contains similar language. It states, " 'This bill provides that a lawsuit against a defendant for that person's acts in furtherance of constitutional free speech or petition rights in connection with a public issue is subject to a motion to strike, unless the plaintiff shows the court that the lawsuit has a substantial probability of success. [P.] This bill also provides that a prevailing defendant in the motion to strike is entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees for that motion.' " (Sen.

Floor Rep., Analysis of Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1264 (1991-1992 Reg. Sess.) p. 1, italics added.) "These reports clearly show the Legislature intended that a prevailing defendant on a motion to strike be allowed to recover attorney fees and costs only on the motion to strike, not the entire suit." (Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1382.)

Pence appears to seek fees related to many things that are not solely fees for the motion to strike, including a motion to quash service, to set aside default, the filing of an ex parte motion, attending other parties' hearings on motions, communications with plaintiff's counsel, etc. Pence's motion does not provide the court, or opposing counsel, with nearly enough information to assess his attorney fee request as it relates to the motion to strike. "Although an award of attorney fees is mandatory under the anti-SLAPP statute, the amount of such fees is discretionary.

See Metabolife, 213 F.Supp.2d at 1222. " 'The reasonableness of attorney fees is within the discretion of the trial court, to be determined from a consideration of such factors as the nature of the litigation, the complexity of the issues, the experience and expertise of counsel and the amount of time involved. [Citation.]' " [Citation.]. The Court must have " 'substantial evidence' " to support the fee award. [Citations.]. The party petitioning for attorneys' fees necessarily bears the burden of persuasion on the elements of that claim. [Citation.]

An attorney fee award should be reduced if claimed hours are " 'excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary,' " [Citation.]. Reasonableness depends in part on " 'the success of the attorney's efforts.' " [Citation.]" (Kearney v. Foley and Lardner (S.D. Cal. 2008) 553 F.Supp.2d 1178, 1184-1185.) " 'As the moving party, the prevailing defendant seeking fees and costs ' " 'bear[s] the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.' " [Citation.]

To that end, the court may require [a] defendant[] to produce records sufficient to provide " ' "a proper basis for determining how much time was spent on particular claims." ' " [Citation.] The court also may properly reduce compensation on account of any failure to maintain appropriate time records. [Citation.]" ' [Citation.] The evidence should allow the court to consider whether the case was overstaffed, how much time the attorneys spent on particular claims, and whether the hours were reasonably expended. [Citation.]' " [Citation.]" (City of Colton v.

Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) Pence does not produce any invoices in support of his motion, claiming that they are confidential and proprietary. While not strictly required on a motion seeking attorney fees, Pence, at the very least, is required to adequately summarize the specific tasks undertaken by each attorney and specify how much time each attorney spent on any given task. He has not done so. The court will continue the hearing on the motion and order Pence to either produce verified billing invoices, which may be redacted to remove any truly privileged communications contained therein, or to provide a detailed summary of all activities in the preparation and filing of the Anti-SLAPP motion.

Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file an additional opposition that solely relates to the submitted invoices or detailed summary. Finally, the court will note that it finds the hourly rates charged by Pence's attorneys to be reasonable. While the Laffey Matrix provided by Pence reflects rates for the San Francisco Bay Area, and reasonable rates need to be assessed using the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work (see PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095), the requested rates do align with the prevailing rates in Santa Barbara County.

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