Motion to compel discovery; Motion to compel production
rather than an agent of Sutton. Thus, Plaintiff again fails to meet the pleading standard to maintain the second cause of action for negligent misrepresentation as to Defendant Sutton.
Third Cause of Action – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (“NIED”)
Defendants’ demurrers to the Third Cause of Action for NIED are sustained without leave to amend. This claim also fails to state sufficient facts in the same fashion Plaintiff fails to state sufficient facts in support of the Second Cause of Action. It is well settled NIED is not a separate tort, but rather, part of the law of negligence with the usual elements for negligence applying including duty and negligent breach. NIED is solely a claim stemming from a cause of action for negligence. Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Assn (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182.
Further, Sutton owes no duty of good faith and fair dealing and thus, cannot owe a duty giving rise to this claim. Coleman v. Republic Indem. Ins. Co. of Calif. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 403, 415416. Moreover, the Second and Third causes of action relate to the handling of the claim, and it is well settled an action for negligent claim handling is not a legally cognizable theory under California law. Plaintiff has failed to plead any bad faith handling.
Leave to Amend
“Where a demurrer is sustained or a motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted as to the original complaint, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion if the pleading does not show on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852. At bar, Plaintiff has now filed a second amended complaint and, as to the instant demurrers, has not shown he is capable of amending the complaint a third time to sufficiently allege the foregoing causes of action against Bamboo and/or Sutton.
Plaintiff has only alleged his own insurance agent from Gary E Krouse Insurance Services, Inc, Steve Feig, represented his policy would cover the expenses of the damage done by water leakage. See Defendants’ RJNs, Ex. A. However, as discussed above, Mr. Feig is not a representative of either Bamboo or Sutton. As such, Mr. Feig’s statements cannot be attributable to either Defendant. Therefore, leave to amend is denied.
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Where a demurrer is sustained, without leave to amend, as to all causes of action of a pleading against a party, the Court is to enter a judgment of dismissal, upon an informal request of a party. CCP §581(f)(1); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1996) 47 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1115 (an order of dismissal as to a party, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 581(f)(1), is an independently appealable, final judgment); Beazell v. Schrader (1963) 59 Cal. 2d 577, 579-80 (“‘[w]hen a demurrer to a complaint has been sustained without leave to amend, the only judgment which properly may be entered is a dismissal of the action.’"); Berri v. Sup. Ct. (1955) 43 Cal. 2d 856, 860 (“after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend..., no formal motion to dismiss the action is necessary. The entry of a judgment of dismissal follows as a matter of course.”).
In that the Court has sustained all causes of action against Defendant Bamboo without leave to amend, the Court hereby enters judgment of dismissal solely as to Bamboo.
8. CU0002143 Joan Donaldson vs. Albertsons Companies, Inc. et al
Plaintiff Joan Donaldson’s motion to compel Defendant Safeway Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Safeway”) initial responses to her Special Interrogatories, Set One (“SIs”) is granted in part and denied as moot in part. Plaintiff’s motion to compel initial responses to her Requests for Production of Documents, Set One (“RFPs”) from Safeway is granted in part and denied as moot in part. Defendant is ordered to provide verifications to the Special Interrogatories, Set One, within ten (10) days of service of the Notice of Entry of Order stemming from this hearing. Defendant shall pay $1,935.00 in court-ordered sanctions within ten (10) calendar days of service of the Notice of Entry of this Order.
Special Interrogatories
If a party to whom interrogatories are directed fails to serve a timely response, the propounding party may move for an order compelling response and for a monetary sanction. Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(b). The statute contains no time limit for a motion to compel where no responses have been served. All that need be shown in the moving papers is that a set of interrogatories was properly served on the opposing party, that the time to respond has expired, and that no response of any kind has been served. See Leach v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905-906. Moreover, “[w]here no objections have been made within the statutorily permitted time, they are deemed waived.” Id. Unverified responses are “tantamount to no response at all”. Appleton v. Superior Court (1998) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.
Here, Plaintiff propounded her SIs, Set One on Defendant via email to Safeway’s counsel on September 12, 2025. Porat Decl., ¶ 3; Exh. A. Defendant’s responses to these discovery demands were originally due by October 14, 2025. Id. Defendant requested, and Plaintiff granted, two extensions, making the SIs due on November 7, 2025, but Safeway failed to serve any responses by that date. Porat Decl., ¶¶ 4-5. After meeting and conferring with Defendant’s counsel, Plaintiff extended the deadline for responses to Plaintiff’s SIs to December 1, 2025.
Porat Decl., ¶ 14. Defendant’s counsel declares it served responses and verifications on November 17, 2025, but subsequently discovered the responses were to a withdrawn set of Special Interrogatories. Norris Decl., ¶ 13. Defendant’s counsel states she subsequently attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel to clear up any misunderstanding and served amended responses to the revised Special Interrogatories, Set One on January 8, 2026. Norris Decl., ¶¶ 14-15. Plaintiff’s counsel acknowledges receiving responses to Special Interrogatories, Set One, but declares no verifications have been served.
Reply Br., 2:27-3:1. Therefore, an order compelling verifications is warranted.
“The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel motions for interrogatories or requests for production, unless the Court finds the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(c). The amount of sanctions awarded centers on two main principles: causation, and reasonableness. See Cornerstone Realty Advisors, LLC. V. Summit Healthcare Reit, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 771. First, monetary sanctions may only be imposed based on attorney’s fees and costs incurred “as a result” of the
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