Cross-Defendant Teichert, Inc.’s Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant County of Butte’s Cross-Complaint
Judge Mosbarger – Law & Motion – Wednesday, April 29, 2026 @ 9:00 AM TENTATIVE RULINGS
1. 23CV00692 HINOJOSA, ISAIAH V. FORD MOTOR COMPANY ET AL EVENT: Cross-Defendant Teichert, Inc.’s Demurrer to Defendant/Cross-Complainant County of Butte’s Cross-Complaint
Defendant/Cross-Defendant A. Teichert & Son, Inc. dba Teichert Construction, named as Teichert, Inc.’s (Doe 1) (“Teichert” herein) Request for Judicial Notice is granted.
The position taken by Teichert is that Code of Civil Procedure §337.15’s definition of the term “action” applies to Code of Civil Procedure §337.1. However, the Court disagrees. Code of Civil Procedure §337.15 explicitly defines "action" to include actions for indemnity, whether express or implied, arising out of a person's performance or furnishing of services or materials related to construction. This provision also allows for cross-complaints for indemnity to be filed in actions brought within the 10-year limitation period specified in Code of Civil Procedure §337.15.
In contrast, Code of Civil Procedure §337.1, which governs actions related to patent deficiencies in construction, does not include a similar definition of "action" that encompasses indemnity claims. The absence of such language in Code of Civil Procedure §337.1 indicates that the Legislature did not intend for indemnity actions to be included within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure §337.1. Courts have emphasized that when terms are expressly included in one statute but omitted in another related statute, those terms should not be implied into the statute from which they were excluded.
See, e.g., Valley Crest Landscape Development, Inc. v. Mission Pools of Escondido, Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 468. Therefore, the Court concludes that contractual indemnity claims are not included within the scope of Code of Civil Procedure §337.1’s 4-Year Patent Statute of Repose and the Demurrer is overruled on this basis.
The Court finds that the Encroachment Permit (and specifically the indemnity provision therein) [See Cross-Complaint at Exhibit A, Page 2, Paragraph 7] is an enforceable contract for purposes of the County of Butte’s (“the County” herein) Cross-Complaint and claims of indemnification. See, Robinson v. Magee (1858) 9 Cal. 81, 83
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Finally, the Court finds that the County is not required to plead compliance with the Brown Act in order to maintain a cause of action for indemnity. The Brown Act, codified in Government Code §54950, governs the open meeting requirements for local legislative bodies and provides remedies for violations of its provisions, such as mandamus, injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or nullification of actions taken in violation of the Act. However, the Brown Act does not address or impose requirements related to indemnity claims, which are governed by separate legal principles. Indemnity claims are based on the equitable or contractual allocation of liability among parties who share responsibility for damages. The elements of a cause of action for indemnity include (1) fault on the part of the indemnitor and (2) resulting damages to the indemnitee for which 1