Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473)
RG19036992: Shoker VS Ghuman 06/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473) CRS# 182887215774 in Department 25
Tentative Ruling - 06/02/2026 Jenna Whitman
The motion of Defendants Sukjinder Singh Ghumans and Jasbir Phangurehs (Defendants) Motion to Vacate the Judgment in this action entered on 1/23/2026 and subsequently amended nunc pro tunc most recently in March 2026 pursuant to CCP § 473(d) is DENIED.
Following a bench trial in 2024, the Court issued its Final Statement of Decision on 12/24/2024. The Judgment in the action, initially entered on 1/23/2025, has been subsequently amended two times to address what are essentially scriveners errors.
On 4/7/2025, this Court granted a motion for new trial, solely on the issue of Defendants financial condition and whether, in light of that condition, the punitive damages award comports with applicable constitutional limitations. Other aspects of the Final Statement of Decision (including the Courts factual findings, liability determinations, the amount of compensatory damages and restitution, and the orders re: injunctive relief) are not implicated by the new trial order.
CCP § 473(d), relied upon by Defendants, provides for the correction clerical mistakes in its judgment or orders as entered, so as to conform to the judgment or order directed, and/or for the setting aside of any void judgment or order. A judgment is void when the court lacked fundamental jurisdiction to enter it in the first place. (See, e.g., Aresh v. Marin-Morales (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 296, 303.) That was not the basis for the Courts new trial order, which vacated one part of the final statement of decision on other grounds. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 657.)
The Court previously found that its new trial order rendered the 1/23/2025 Judgment a split judgment and therefore had the effect of vacating the judgment and holding in abeyance the portions that are not subject to a new trial, pending further proceedings. (See 5/26/2025 Order, citing
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The orders with which Defendants are concerned (to transfer real properties to the Shokers), whether or not they were immediately appealable, are entirely distinct (and severable from) from the issue raised in the new trial motion, which is now the subject of a second phase of trial, that of defendants ability to withstand the punitive damages award. (See, e.g., Aresh, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at 303 [it is only where the portions of a judgment that are vacated are not severable from the remainder that the entire judgment must be set aside]; Code Civ.
Proc., § 904.1 [an order granting an injunction is independently appealable]; Guntert v. City of Stockton (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 203, 207209 [interlocutory order granting permanent injunction is appealable even RG19036992: Shoker VS Ghuman 06/05/2026 Hearing on Motion to Set Aside/Vacate Judgment (CCP 473) CRS# 182887215774 in Department 25 though damages claims have yet to be tried]; Daro v. Superior Ct. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1079, 1091, fn. 3 [same].) Defendants' arguments rooted in the single judgment rule therefore do not warrant further action.
To the extent prejudice plays any role in the analysis, the Court observes that the record is clear that the judgment is held in abeyance by operation of law and that Plaintiffs may not conduct further enforcement/collection efforts. To the extent Defendants ultimately seek to control the subject real properties in order to fund their defense, this risks violation of the very injunction Defendants acknowledge is final and no longer appealable (the prohibition on encumbering, selling or transferring those properties).
As the judgment is held in abeyance, it is not yet final including for purposes of appeal (except perhaps as to injunctive relief), thus, it is unclear how this it could have res judicata effect in other proceedings. Finally, to the extent the passage of time threatens prejudice to Defendants, this trial should have been completed over one year ago; the extensive delay bringing the last disputed issue to trial is principally, if not exclusively, attributable to Defendants' delays, including by resisting discovery into their financial condition.
This tentative ruling has been contested. Counsel may appear via Zoom.
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