CMC; Demurrer
where receivers have heretofore been appointed by the usages of courts of equity." (Id. at p. 598.) The court noted that the provision in the deed of trust allowing for a receiver was by itself insufficient: "It is a corollary that, where one's entitlement to a receiver is not otherwise established, a mortgagee or beneficiary of a trust deed may not by stipulation or consent, however manifested, confer jurisdiction upon the superior court to appoint such a receiver." (Id. at p. 600.) The court concluded that the trial court erred in basing its denial solely on the lack of proof that the value of the property was insufficient because the court had authority, but not the obligation, to appoint a receiver under this general authorization. (Ibid.)
Even so, consent to, or agreement for, appointment of a receiver may be persuasive: "We therefore hold it to be the law of California that although a trust deed's recital that upon default the beneficiary shall be entitled to the appointment of a receiver is not binding upon the courts, such a recital nevertheless has some evidentiary weight." (Barclays Bank, supra, 69 Cal.App.3d at p. 602.)
There are many disputed issues here, including the scope of the financial obligations, the time when repayment was or is required, and whether, or to what extent, there are nonmonetary defaults. The evidence presented is conflicting. The court notes that the evidence is sufficient for the court to find Borrowers in default.
The evidence shows that Hart has substantial security interests in Borrowers' property, providing a level of protection for Hart's financial interests that weighs against the appointment of a receiver. As noted in Barclays Bank, however, the existence of security, even in a value sufficient to fully securitize the debt, does not prohibit appointment of a receiver where otherwise appointment may be proper. The provision in the Security Agreement authorizing appointment of a receiver weighs in favor of appointment of a receiver, notwithstanding substantial security interests.
At the same time, the court is not persuaded from the evidence presented that Borrowers are, collectively or individually, insolvent or that there is a reasonable danger that Hart's security would be impaired. Based on the evidence and arguments presented, the court finds that Hart has not shown that the balance of the equities meets the standards for appointment of a receiver. Among other things, Hart is not without recourse both provisionally and after judgment (if ultimately successful) to protect his interests without the appointment of a receiver.
Under the totality of the circumstances presented here, the court finds that a receiver is not warranted. Accordingly, the application for appointment of a receiver will be denied. Because the application for a preliminary injunction is solely for injunction orders in aid of an appointed receiver, the application for such a preliminary injunction is moot and will be denied on that ground.
Tentative Ruling: Marc Dranchak vs Invoca Inc Tentative Ruling: Marc Dranchak vs Invoca Inc Case Number
Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Fri, 05/08/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings CMC; Demurrer Tentative Ruling On the Court's own motion, the Case Management Conference and Demurrer on calendar for Friday, May 8, 2026, at 10 am in Dept. 4 are continued to Friday, July 10, 2026, at 10 am in Dept.
4.
Tentative Ruling: Theresa Colosi vs Mindi Boulet et al Tentative Ruling: Theresa Colosi vs Mindi Boulet et al Case Number
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