Darryl Wayne Genis vs Daniel Henry Genis et al

Case Number

Case Type Civil Law & Motion Hearing Date / Time Mon, 06/08/2026 - 10:00 Nature of Proceedings CMC; Demurrer to Complaint Tentative Ruling Darryl Wayne Genis v. Daniel Henry Genis, et al. Case No. 25CV07144 Hearing Date: June 8, 2026 HEARING: Defendant Daniel Henry Genis' Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint ATTORNEYS: For Plaintiff Darryl Wayne Genis: Self-Represented For Defendant Daniel Henry Genis: Ashley R. Fickel, Kyle R. Besa, Stinson LLP For Defendant Guy Harlen Genis: No appearance For Defendant Jennifer Genis: No appearance TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Daniel Henry Genis' demurrer to complaint is sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff Darryl Wayne Genis shall file and serve his first amended complaint, if any, no later than June 22, 2026.

Background: This action commenced on November 14, 2025, by the filing of the complaint by plaintiff Darryl Wayne Genis (plaintiff) against defendants Daniel Henry Genis (Daniel), Guy Harlen Genis (Guy), and Jennifer Genis (Jennifer) (collectively "defendants") for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Note: as the parties have common surnames the court will refer to the defendants, and some other individuals, by their given names for clarity. No disrespect is intended.) As alleged in the complaint:

Plaintiff filed a civil fraud action against each of the defendants in Case No. 22CV03483. (Compl., P. 1.) Case No. 22CV03483 concluded with a settlement agreement on December 18, 2023, wherein Daniel agreed to pay the sum of $400,000.00 directly to Jackson Daniel Genis (Jackson) and Gillian April Genis (Gillian). (Compl., P. 3.) The case was thereafter dismissed. (Ibid.) In exchange for the $400,000.00 settlement amount, which was only paid to Jackson and Gillian, plaintiff, Jackson, Gillian and Cheryl Genis-Markham all agreed to waive any claim they might have in any estate assets of Arline Genis. (Compl., P. 4.)

However, Daniel only appeared in Case No. 22CV03483 as an individual defendant and never appeared as a representative of the Estate of Arline Genis or the Arline Genis Trust and had no authority to enter into agreements affecting the Estate of Arline Genis or the Arline Genis Trust. (Compl., P. 5.) Guy appeared in Case No. 22CV03483 as an individual defendant only, and never made an appearance in the case as a representative of the Estate of Arline Genis or the Arline Genis Trust. (Compl., P. 6.)

Jennifer never made any appearance in Case No. 22CV03483. (Compl., P. 7.) No appearance was ever made by a representative of the Arline Genis Trust or the Estate of Arline Genis in Case No. 22CV03484, and therefore, as a non-party, the Arline Genis Trust is not bound by the settlement agreement. (Compl., P. 8.) The complaint then quotes several portions of the settlement agreement.

By way of his prayer for relief, plaintiff seeks a declaration that: "1. The provisions contained within paragraphs 3 A and B of the Settlement agreement in Case Number 22-CV-03483 which purport to preclude Darryl Genis, Jackson Genis, Gillian Genis and Cheryl Genis-Markham be declared to be void or otherwise invalid because said provision violates public policy, because it frustrates the intent of Arline Genis in creating the Arline Genis Trust, and because Defendant Daniel Genis had no authority to bind the Arline Genis Trust; and because Defendant Guy Genis violated his fiduciary duties under the Arline Genis Trust; and because Jennifer Genis violated her fiduciary duties (if any) under the Arline Genis Trust; and "2.

All of the other terms, conditions and provisions of the Settlement Agreement in Case Number 22-CV-03483 shall remain in full force and effect to the same extent as if that part declared void or invalid had never been incorporated in the Agreement and in such form, the remainder of the Agreement shall continue to be binding upon the Parties." (Compl., p. 9, ll. 1-13.)

On February 4, 2026, Case No. 22CV03483 was ordered related to the present case. Daniel now demurs to the complaint. Plaintiff opposes the demurrer. The opposition is devoid of any legal authorities.

Analysis: Judicial Notice Daniel requests that the court take judicial notice of: (1) Plaintiff's complaint in Case No. 22CV03483; (2) Plaintiff's first amended complaint in Case No. 22CV03483; (3) Plaintiff's second amended complaint in Case No. 22CV03483; (4) The December 18, 2023, settlement agreement in Case No. 22CV03483, and (5) The court's December 8, 2023 minute order in Case No. 22CV03483. Plaintiff did not object to the request that the court take judicial notice of the documents. The court will take judicial notice of 1, 2, 3, and 5 pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d) as "[r]ecords of . . . any court of this state . . .."

The court will take judicial notice of 4 due to plaintiff's several references to the agreement in his complaint. Because plaintiff expressly refers to the agreement in his complaint and in fact the agreement is the primary object of the complaint, it is "appropriate matter of which the court could take judicial notice." (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 956, fn. 6.)

Standard on Demurrer "The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: "(a) The court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the pleading. "(b) The person who filed the pleading does not have the legal capacity to sue. "(c) There is another action pending between the same parties on the same cause of action. "(d) There is a defect or misjoinder of parties. "(e) The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. "(f) The pleading is uncertain.

As used in this subdivision, "uncertain" includes ambiguous and unintelligible. "(g) In an action founded upon a contract, it cannot be ascertained from the pleading whether the contract is written, is oral, or is implied by conduct. "(h) No certificate was filed as required by Section 411.35." (Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 430.10.) "When any ground for objection to a complaint, cross-complaint, or answer appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 430.30, subd. (a).) "[A] court must treat a demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, it does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law." (Travelers Indem. Co. of Connecticut v. Navigators Specialty Ins. Co. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 341, 358, citing Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

Release Daniel's first argument is that plaintiff's sole cause of action for declaratory relief fails to state a cause of action because plaintiff's claims are barred by the mutual settlement agreement and release in Case No. 22CV03484 (the "agreement"). The agreement defines the Genis defendants as: Daniel Genis, Mark Genis, Guy Genis, and Jennifer Genis. The agreement defines the Genis plaintiffs as: Darryl Genis, Jackson Genis, Gillian Genis, and Cheryl Genis Markham. The release in question is contained at paragraph 3 of the agreement and provides: "3.

Mutual Release. "A. Except for the obligations imposed by this Agreement, the Parties, on behalf of themselves and their agents, representatives, predecessors, successors, spouses, assigns, heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, attorneys, shareholders, officers, directors, and members hereby unconditionally releases and forever discharge and release each other and their agents, estates, representatives, predecessors, successors, spouses, assigns, heirs, devisees, executors, administrators, attorneys, and trusts from any and all existing or potential claims, demands, debts, obligations, damages, liabilities, complaints, indemnities, contracts, promises, suits, actions, causes of action, and right of appeal, both known and unknown, including but not limited to, those arising out of, connected with, or incidental to the Lawsuit and the Probate Claims. "B.

In connection with the mutual release described above, the Parties acknowledge that they have had the opportunity to be advised by counsel of the contents of Section 1542 of the California Civil Code and as so advised, expressly waive all rights they may have under that section. Section 1542 of the California Civil Code provides as follows: A GENERAL RELEASE DOES NOT EXTEND TO CLAIMS THAT THE CREDITOR OR RELEASING PARTY DOES NOT KNOW OR SUSPECT TO EXIST IN HIS OR HER FAVOR AT THE TIME OF EXECUTING THE RELEASE AND THAT, IF KNOWN BY HIM OR HER, WOULD HAVE MATERIALLY AFFECTED HIS OR HER SETTLEMENT WITH THE DEBTOR OR RELEASED PARTY. "The Parties understand and acknowledge the significance and consequence of this waiver of the provisions of Section 1542, and hereby assume full responsibility for any damage, loss, or liability which may hereafter incur by reason of such waiver."

Further provisions of the agreement provide: " Covenant Not to Sue. Except as called for herein, the Genis Plaintiffs agree not to cause claims to be made with any court or other forum against the Genis Defendants for any matter within the scope of the release contained within Section 3 above or by claims obtained by subsequent assignment. The Genis Plaintiffs acknowledge that the releases would provide a complete defense to the Genis Defendants from any claims within the scope of the release contained within Section 3 above." (Agreement, P. 5.) " Mutual Drafting.

This Agreement is the product of arms-length negotiations between the Parties, and all Parties have substantially and materially contributed to the preparation of this Agreement. This Agreement shall not be construed more strictly against one Party than another merely by virtue of the fact that the Agreement, or any part of it, may have been prepared by counsel for one of the Parties. The Parties acknowledge and agree that they have cooperated in the drafting and preparation of this Agreement. Therefore, this Agreement shall not be construed against either Party on the basis that the Party was the drafter of this Agreement." (Agreement, P. 13.)

In opposition to the demurrer, plaintiff does not deny the existence of the agreement or of any of its provisions. Further, plaintiff, in his opposition, fails to address the release contained in the agreement. Plaintiff does not even make a conclusory argument that the release is not a complete defense to his action. As the release agreement is only capable of one interpretation, that it operates as a complete defense to plaintiff's action, which is not disputed by plaintiff, the demurrer will be sustained. In the alternative, the demurrer will be sustained on the following other grounds raised by Daniel:

Rescission Daniel next argues that plaintiff's complaint for declaratory relief is actually a recission action and that plaintiff has not set forth the necessary facts to support a claim for rescission. "(a) A contract may be rescinded if all the parties thereto consent. "(b) A party to a contract may rescind the contract in the following cases: "(1) If the consent of the party rescinding, or of any party jointly contracting with him, was given by mistake, or obtained through duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, exercised by or with the connivance of the party as to whom he rescinds, or of any other party to the contract jointly interested with such party. "(2) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party fails, in whole or in part, through the fault of the party as to whom he rescinds. "(3) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party becomes entirely void from any cause. "(4) If the consideration for the obligation of the rescinding party, before it is rendered to him, fails in a material respect from any cause. "(5) If the contract is unlawful for causes which do not appear in its terms or conditions, and the parties are not equally at fault. "(6) If the public interest will be prejudiced by permitting the contract to stand. "(7) Under the circumstances provided for in Sections 39, 1533, 1566, 1785,1 1789,2 1930 and 2314 of this code, Section 2470 of the Corporations Code,3 Sections 331, 338, 359, 447, 1904 and 2030 of the Insurance Code or any other statute providing for rescission." (Civ.

Code, Sec. 1689.) "Subject to Section 1693, to effect a rescission a party to the contract must, promptly upon discovering the facts which entitle him to rescind if he is free from duress, menace, undue influence or disability and is aware of his right to rescind: "(a) Give notice of rescission to the party as to whom he rescinds; and "(b) Restore to the other party everything of value which he has received from him under the contract or offer to restore the same upon condition that the other party do likewise, unless the latter is unable or positively refuses to do so. "When notice of rescission has not otherwise been given or an offer to restore the benefits received under the contract has not otherwise been made, the service of a pleading in an action or proceeding that seeks relief based on rescission shall be deemed to be such notice or offer or both." (Civ.

Code, Sec. 1691.)

To the extent that plaintiff's complaint is actually a recission action mislabeled as a declaratory relief action, plaintiff only seeks to rescind the provisions set forth above, while keeping all other provisions in effect. Plaintiff, by way of his opposition offers no argument in response to Daniel's claims that plaintiff has failed to plead any facts demonstrating that plaintiff followed the statutory and common law procedures for a recission claim. The demurrer will also, and alternatively, be sustained on these grounds.

No Present or Actual Controversy Daniel argues that plaintiff's declaratory relief action fails to state a cause of action because there is no present or actual controversy. "Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, or with respect to the location of the natural channel of a watercourse, may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract.

He or she may ask for a declaration of rights or duties, either alone or with other relief; and the court may make a binding declaration of these rights or duties, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed at the time. The declaration may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect, and the declaration shall have the force of a final judgment. The declaration may be had before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 1060, italics added.)

Plaintiff, by way of his opposition, fails to address this argument and a review of the complaint does not disclose the existence of an actual controversy. At most, the complaint consists of a convoluted collection of allegations regarding the Arline Genis Trust and various individuals' actions with respect to the trust. Because there are no allegations supporting the existence of an actual controversy, the court will also, and in the alternative, sustain the demurrer on those grounds.

Indispensable Parties Daniel argues that the demurrer should be sustained because there are indispensable parties absent from this action, including Jackson, Gillian, Cheryl, and Mark. Plaintiff does not dispute that Jackson, Gillian, Cheryl, and Mark are indispensable parties to this action. Rather, plaintiff argues: "Jackson Genis will gladly enter this action as a party plaintiff if so required. Similarly, Gillian Genis will also gladly enter this action as a party plaintiff is so required. The only other party in question is Cheryl Genis-Markham, and I am informed and believe and thereupon allege that she will not join as a party Plaintiff, but I could add her as a party Defendant if so required, but it is not possible for a 25% interest to have veto power over the other 75% interest in the issue presented herein by Plaintiff in his action for Declaratory Relief.

Cheryl Markham would not be prejudiced if not included because she is free to refrain from making a claim in probate if she so desires." (Opp., p. 1, ll. 20-26.) (Note: Plaintiff does not mention Mark, who was also a signatory to the agreement.)

"(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.

If he has not been so joined, the court shall order that he be made a party. "(b) If a person as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed without prejudice, the absent person being thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered by the court include: (1) to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him or those already parties; (2) the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; (3) whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; (4) whether the plaintiff or cross-complainant will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. "(c) A complaint or cross-complaint shall state the names, if known to the pleader, of any persons as described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a) who are not joined, and the reasons why they are not joined. "(d) Nothing in this section affects the law applicable to class actions." (Code Civ.

Proc., Sec. 389.)

The mutual release and covenant not to sue are important provisions of the agreement. Any invalidation of those provisions would directly impact all of the signatories' rights with respect to that settlement. Thus, all signatories to the contract are indispensable parties. Because they are not, the demurrer will also, and alternatively, sustained on those grounds.

Leave to Amend Plaintiff requests leave to amend. As this is the first demurrer, plaintiff will be given an opportunity to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The demurrer will be sustained with leave to amend.

Tentative Ruling: Matter of Echo Trust Tentative Ruling: Matter of Echo Trust