JAVIER GONZALEZ GARAY v. FCA US LLC, et al.

"A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the¿evidence or other extrinsic matters.¿Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed." (SKF Farms v. Superior Court ¿(1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Accordingly, "[w]hether the plaintiff will be able to prove the pleaded facts is irrelevant to ruling upon the demurrer." (Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609-10.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 subdivisions (e) and (f), a demurrer may be filed if the pleading is uncertain or does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment, otherwise, it is abuse of discretion. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

Discussion

FCA demurs to Plaintiff's sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement - concealment because the complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to state a cause of action. Specifically, FCA asserts that the cause of action is not pled with the requisite specificity, and Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a duty to disclose.

A. Allegations of the FAC Plaintiff alleges that "[o]n or about January 1, 2023, Plaintiff entered into a warranty contract with Defendant FCA regarding a 2022 Jeep Compass, . . . which was manufactured and/or distributed by Defendant FCA." (Compl., P. 7.) Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he warranty contract contained various warranties, including but not limited to the bumper-bumper warranty, powertrain warranty, emission warranty, etc." (Compl., P. 8.) Plaintiff alleges that "[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to, transmission defects, engine defects, electrical defects; among other defects and non-conformities." (Compl., P. 12.)

Plaintiff pleads that the defects rendered the vehicle "worthless and/or de minimis." (Compl., P. 14.) Thus, FCA "had an affirmative duty to promptly offer to repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle at the time it failed to conform the Subject Vehicle to the terms of the express warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts," but "failed to either promptly replace the Subject Vehicle or to promptly make restitution." (Compl., P.P. 27-28.)

B. Sixth Cause of Action for Fraudulent Inducement - Concealment FCA first demurs to the complaint on the ground that Plaintiff did not establish the existence of a duty to disclose for the fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action because it lacks the requisite specificity. "There are four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts." (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276, 311 (Bigler-Engler) .)

When a fiduciary relationship does not exist, "only the latter three circumstances may apply;" however, those circumstances "'presuppose[] the existence of [a] relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise." (Ibid.) In the absence of a fiduciary duty, "[a] duty to disclose facts arises only when the parties are in a relationship that gives rise to the duty, such as seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual arrangement." (Ibid.) "[A] duty to disclose may also arise when a defendant possesses or exerts control over material facts not readily available to the plaintiff." (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1198, 1199.)

In the complaint, Plaintiff pleads that "FCA acquired its knowledge of the Transmission Defect and its potential consequences prior to Plaintiff acquiring the Vehicle, through sources not available to consumers such as Plaintiff, including but not limited to pre-production testing data, early consumer complaints about the Transmission Defect made directly to Defendant FCA and its network of dealers, aggregate warranty data compiled from Defendant FCA's network of dealers, testing conducted by Defendant FCA in response to these complaints, as well as warranty repair and part replacements data received by Defendant FCA from Defendant FCA's network of dealers, amongst other sources of internal information." (Compl., P. 67a.)

Plaintiff also pleads that "FCA was in a superior position from various internal sources to know (or should have known) the true state of facts about the material defects contained in vehicles equipped with 9-speed transmission." (Compl., P. 67b.) Plaintiff states that he "could not reasonably have been expected to learn or discover of the Vehicle's Transmission Defect and its potential consequences until well after Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle." (Compl., P. 67c.)

Plaintiff pleads that FCA had exclusive knowledge of non-public and internal facts, how and why FCA had this knowledge, and that this occurred prior to the sale of Plaintiff's vehicle. The Court finds that these statements sufficiently demonstrate that Plaintiff pleaded that FCA possessed or exerted control over material facts not readily available to him, which demonstrates the existence of a duty.

However, a cause of action for fraud has a heightened pleading standard, and as FCA contends, Plaintiff's complaint "rests on boilerplate allegations rather than concrete facts." (Dem., 4:12-13.) "[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit based on concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed a material fact, (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff, (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff, (4) the plaintiff must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed or suppressed fact, and (5) as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained damage." (Marketing West, Inc. v.

Sanyo Fisher (USA) Corp. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 603, 612-613.) Less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties.¿(Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc.¿ (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385 (Alfaro) .)

FCA further contends that Plaintiff's "broad allegations do not describe the defect with the specificity required to inform FCA US what fact was concealed. Moreover, the allegations do not state when FCA US knew of the alleged defect, or why Plaintiff could not discover it. It is conceded that Plaintiff need not know every technical detail of the alleged concealed defect beforehand. However, the law requires Plaintiff to allege with sufficient particularity the nature of the material fact concealed (i.e., the who, what, where, when and how), which Plaintiff failed to do." (Dem., 7:14-19.)

In opposition, Plaintiff contends that he pleads with the requisite specificity because when fraud occurs through non-disclosure, it is not practical to allege facts for something that did not happen. (Alfaro, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384 ["How does one show 'how' and 'by what means' something didn't happen, or 'when' it never happened, or 'where' it never happened?"].) Instead, such details, in the context of a fraudulent concealment claim, "are properly the subject of discovery, not demurrer." (Id., at pp. 1384-1385.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that he "alleged (1) misrepresentation/concealment, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3) intent to induce reliance, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damages." (Opp., 3:2-5.) However, in the complaint, Plaintiff only includes general, boilerplate assertions.

Thus, FCA's argument is persuasive because, although Plaintiff pleads general facts that fit the required elements for a fraud claim, they are not pled with the specificity that a fraud claim requires. Alfaro prescribes a lower standard for specificity, but Plaintiff must include some level of specificity, such as pleading what specific misrepresentations or omissions he relied on that induced his purchase. Accordingly, the demurrer is granted as to the sixth cause of action, with leave to amend.

Motion to Strike To succeed on a motion to strike punitive damages allegations, it must be said as a matter of law that the alleged behavior was not so vile, base, or contemptible that it would not be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people. (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1217, 1228-1229.) Civil Code section 3294 provides that punitive damages are available in non-contract actions where a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud, defined as follows: (c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) 'Malice' means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) 'Oppression' means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights. (3) 'Fraud' means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.

Here, FCA moves to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages. (See Compl., Prayer P. e.) Sustaining the demurrer as to the fraud cause of action makes punitive damages an improper remedy. Accordingly, FCA's motion to strike Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is granted.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, FCA's demurrer to the sixth cause of action is SUSTAINED with leave to amend. FCA's motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to amend. The Court orders Plaintiff to file and serve an amended complaint, if any, within 20 days of this Order. If no amended complaint is filed within 20 days of this Order, FCA is ordered to file and serve its answer within 30 days of this Order. FCA is ordered to give notice of this Order.

DATED: May 20, 2026 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court