Rigoberto Murillo Lujano, et al. v. Subaru of America, Inc., et al.

Rigoberto Murillo Lujano, et al. v. Subaru of America, Inc., et al.

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

Hearing Date: June 5, 2026

**NOTE: In light of the Court’s rulings, the Case Management Conference set for June 5, 2026, is CONTINUED to September 8, 2026, at 9 a.m. in Department 14.

NOTE RE TENTATIVE RULINGS

Each of these tentative rulings becomes the court’s order, and no hearing shall be held unless one of the parties contests it by following Rule 3.1308 of the California Rules of Court and Monterey County Local Rule 7.9. Those parties wishing to present an oral argument must notify all other parties and the Court no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing; otherwise, NO ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE PERMITTED, AND EACH TENTATIVE RULING WILL BECOME THE ORDER OF THE COURT AND THE RELATED HEARING VACATED. You must notify the court by email or by calling the Calendar Department at 831- 647-5800, extension 3040, before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing.

Defendant’s Demurrer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

The general demurrer filed by Defendant Santa Cruz Subaru (“Defendant”) to the Third Cause of Action for negligent repair in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiffs Rigoberto Murillo Lujano and Susana Murillo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) on grounds of uncertainty and sufficiency is OVERRULED. [Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).]

Meet and Confer Requirement.

Defense counsel Ani Tankazyan’s declaration indicates that the meet-and-confer requirement was satisfied. [Tankazyan Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6 and Exh. C; Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41.]

Legal Standard.

A demurrer for sufficiency assesses whether the complaint properly states a cause of action. [Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.] A demurrer based on uncertainty will only be sustained if the complaint is so deficient that the defendant cannot reasonably respond. [Khoury v. Maly’s of Cal., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.] When courts evaluate demurrers, they interpret the allegations broadly and in context. [Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.] In a demurrer, defects must be visible on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. [Code Civ. Proc. § 430.30, subd. (a).] A demurrer examines only the pleadings, not the evidence, counsel’s arguments, or external facts. [SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905; Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.]

Discussion.

1. Uncertainty.

Defendant’s demurrer to the Third Cause of Action for Negligent Repair, claiming it is uncertain, meaning it is “ambiguous and unintelligible,” is OVERRULED. [Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10, subd. (f).] Demurrers based on uncertainty are disfavored, strictly construed, and usually overruled unless the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond. [Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 821; Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 292.] In examining the Third Cause of Action, the Court OVERRULES the demurrer because the cause of action is not so incomprehensible that Defendant could not reasonably respond.

2. Sufficiency.

Defendant demurs to the FAC’s Third Cause of Action for Negligent Repair on the grounds of sufficiency, arguing that (1) the economic loss rule prevents the claim [Demurrer Memorandum at 3-5], and (2) Plaintiffs did not allege any personal injury or other property damages caused by Defendant’s actions [Reply Memorandum at 2-3].

A plaintiff asserting a negligent repair claim generally must allege that (1) a duty of care exists, (2) that duty was breached, and (3) the breach caused an injury. [Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.] Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a negligent repair claim by asserting that Defendant:

1. Is in the business of repairing and diagnosing malfunctions of motor vehicles; 2. Has a duty to perform services “in a good and workmanlike manner”; 3. Received from Plaintiffs the Subject Vehicle1 on June 19, 2024, to diagnose and repair certain issues with the vehicle’s malfunctioning EyeSight system and sudden acceleration during long trips; 4. Returned the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs without any repairs performed due to its technicians finding no problems with the vehicle; 5. Exposed Plaintiffs to “a significant safety risk,” as a result of these issues; 6. Exacerbated Plaintiffs’ safety “by returning the Subject Vehicle to them with no repairs performed”; 7. Breached its duty to Plaintiffs by returning the Subject Vehicle to them in an unrepaired and potentially dangerous condition; and 8. Proximately caused Plaintiffs’ damages based on the negligent breach of its duties.

[FAC at ¶¶ 42-49, 51.]

Defendant argues that the economic loss rule bars the Third Cause of Action against it. Under that rule, there “is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.” [Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 923.] Furthermore, “[n]ot all tort claims for monetary losses between contractual parties are barred by the economic loss rule. But such claims are barred when they arise from — or are not independent of — the parties’ underlying contracts.” [Ibid.]

Unlike the initial Complaint, Plaintiffs’ negligent repair claim against Defendant here neither arises from nor depends on a contract: “No contract was formed between Plaintiffs and [Defendant] as part of the June 19, 2024, repair presentation.” [FAC at ¶ 50; see also id. at ¶¶ 46-47.] For purposes of ruling on the demurrer, this Court must accept Plaintiff’s allegation as true, regardless of how unlikely or improbable it may be. [Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280; see also Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v.

General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 213-214 (a plaintiff’s ability to prove their allegations, or potential difficulties in doing so, is irrelevant in ruling on a demurrer).] Without an allegation of a contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Court cannot find that the economic loss rule bars their negligent repair claim against Defendant.

Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs have not alleged any damages to personal injury or property other than the Subject Vehicle itself. [Reply at 2.] That argument assumes that the negligent repair claim is subject to the economic loss rule. [Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 289, 294 (the economic loss rule does not bar claims

1 “Subject Vehicle” refers to the 2022 Subaru Outback, which Plaintiffs purchased on July 4, 2022, for $53,570.88. [FAC at ¶¶ 4-5.] 3

for personal injury or for damage to other property).] As previously discussed, Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant is not within the ambit of that rule. Beyond that, the FAC states that Defendant’s “negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiffs was a proximate cause of [Plaintiffs’] damages.” [FAC at ¶ 51.] Defendant cites no authority indicating that damages require more specific pleading in a negligent repair claim at this stage.

Conclusion.

Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant has 10 days from the date of the Court’s signed order to file and serve their Answer to the FAC. [Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1320, subd. (g).]

The Case Management Conference set for June 5, 2026, is CONTINUED to September 8, 2026, at 9 a.m. in Department 14

Plaintiff shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint

The motion of Defendant Santa Cruz Subaru (“Defendant”) to strike the Third Cause of Action for negligent repair and the related prayer for relief in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) of Plaintiffs Rigoberto Murillo Lujano and Susana Murillo (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) is DENIED.

Meet and Confer Requirement.

Initially, defense counsel Ani Tankazyan’s declaration indicates that the meet-and-confer requirement was met. [Tankazyan Decl. at ¶¶ 3-6 and Exh. C; Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.]

Legal Standard.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).] The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading that is not drawn or filed in compliance with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).] The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading contains irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in accordance with the laws. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436.] The grounds for moving to strike must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437.]

Discussion.

Defendant moves to strike the entirety of the FAC’s Third Cause of Action against it and the related prayer for relief. [See Notice of Motion at 2 (moving to strike ¶¶ 42-51 of the FAC and the Prayer for Relief at page 7, line 17).] In doing so, Defendant relies on the same arguments it raised on demurrer, namely that (1) the economic loss rule bars the cause of action [Motion at 2-3], and (2) Plaintiffs failed to allege any personal-injury or other-property damages as a result of Defendant’s conduct [Reply 2-3].

A plaintiff asserting a negligent repair claim generally must allege that (1) a duty of care exists, (2) that duty was breached, and (3) the breach caused an injury. [Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072.] Here, Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a negligent-repair claim by asserting that Defendant:

1. Is in the business of repairing and diagnosing malfunctions of motor vehicles; 2. Has a duty to perform services “in a good and workmanlike manner”; 3. Received from Plaintiffs the Subject Vehicle1 on June 19, 2024, to diagnose and repair certain issues with the vehicle’s malfunctioning EyeSight system and sudden acceleration during long trips;

1 “Subject Vehicle” refers to the 2022 Subaru Outback which Plaintiffs purchased on July 4, 2022, for $53,570.88. [FAC at ¶¶ 4-5.] 5

4. Returned the Subject Vehicle to Plaintiffs without any repairs performed due to its technicians finding no problems with the vehicle; 5. Exposed Plaintiffs to “a significant safety risk,” as a result of these issues; 6. Exacerbated Plaintiffs’ safety “by returning the Subject Vehicle to them with no repairs performed”; 7. Breached its duty to Plaintiffs by returning the Subject Vehicle to them in an unrepaired and potentially dangerous condition; and 8. Proximately caused Plaintiffs’ damages based on the negligent breach of its duties.

[FAC at ¶¶ 42-49, 51.]

Defendant argues that the economic loss rule bars the Third Cause of Action against it. Under that rule, there “is no liability in tort for economic loss caused by negligence in the performance or negotiation of a contract between the parties.” [Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 923.] Furthermore, “[n]ot all tort claims for monetary losses between contractual parties are barred by the economic loss rule. But such claims are barred when they arise from — or are not independent of — the parties’ underlying contracts.” [Ibid.]

Unlike the initial Complaint, Plaintiffs’ negligent repair claim against Defendant here neither arises from nor depends on a contract: “No contract was formed between Plaintiffs and [Defendant] as part of the June 19, 2024, repair presentation.” [FAC at ¶ 50; see also id. at ¶¶ 46-47.] For purposes of ruling on this motion, the allegations in the FAC are considered in context and presumed to be true. [Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.] Without an allegation as to a contract between Plaintiffs and Defendant, the Court cannot find that the economic loss rule precludes their negligent repair claim against Defendant.

Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs have not alleged any damages to personal injury or property other than the Subject Vehicle itself. [Reply at 2.] That argument assumes that the negligent repair claim is subject to the economic loss rule. [Sacramento Regional Transit Dist. v. Grumman Flxible (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 289, 294 (the economic loss rule does not bar claims for personal injury or for damage to other property).] As previously discussed, Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendant is not within the ambit of that rule. Beyond that, the FAC states that Defendant’s “negligent breach of its duties owed to Plaintiffs was a proximate cause of [Plaintiffs’] damages.” [FAC at ¶ 51.] Defendant cites no authority indicating that damages require more specific pleading in a negligent repair claim at this stage.

Conclusion.

Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED. Defendant has 10 days from the date of the Court’s signed order to file and serve their Answer to the FAC.

The Case Management Conference set for June 5, 2026, is CONTINUED to September 8, 2026, at 9 a.m. in Department 14

Plaintiff shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling.

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