RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Defendant Greentec Auto’s demurrer to Plaintiff Jorge Rivera Salas’ complaint is ruled upon as follows.

In this employment action, Plaintiff alleges causes of action for violations of the Labor Code, violations of FEHA, wrongful termination of public policy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).

Defendant now demurs to the complaint.

A demurrer “tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) The purpose of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a claim. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) For the purpose of determining the effect of a complaint, its allegations are liberally construed, with a view toward substantial justice. (CCP § 452; Amarel v. Connell (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 137, 140-141; Quelimane Co. v.

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 43, fn. 7.) The Court treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law, and considers matters which may be judicially noticed. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d at 318; Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1111-1112.) A general demurrer does not admit contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law alleged in the complaint; facts impossible in law; or allegations contrary to facts of which a court may take judicial notice. (Blank, supra, 39 Cal. 3d at 318, William S.

Hart Union High School Dist. v. Regional Planning Com. (1991) 226 Cal. App. 3d 1612, 1616

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

fn.2.) Extrinsic evidence may not properly be considered on demurrer or on a motion to strike. (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 881; Hibernia Savings & Loan Soc. v. Thornton (1897) 117 Cal. 481, 482.)

A demurrer may be sustained only if the complaint lacks any sufficient allegations to entitle the plaintiff to relief. (Financial Corp. of America v. Wilburn (1987) 189 Cal. App. 3d 764, 778.) “Plaintiff need only plead facts showing that he may be entitled to some relief . . ., we are not concerned with plaintiff's possible inability or difficulty in proving the allegations of the complaint.” (Highlanders, Inc. v. Olsan (1978) 77 Cal. App. 3d 690, 696-697.) “[Courts] are required to construe the complaint liberally to determine whether a cause of action has been stated, given the assumed truth of the facts pleaded.” (Picton v.

Anderson Union High School Dist. (1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 726.) A demurrer admits the truth of all material facts properly pled and the sole issue raised by a general demurrer is whether the facts pled state a valid cause of action - not whether they are true. (Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal. 3d 584, 591.)

At the outset the Court rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the demurrer should be overruled because it is untimely. “A person against whom a complaint or crosscomplaint has been filed, may, within 30 days after service of the complaint or crosscomplaint, demur to the complaint or cross-complaint.” (CCP § 430.40(a).) Defendants were served with the complaint on June 10, 2025, and the demurrer was filed on July 30, 2025, outside the 30-day limit. Even assuming that the demurrer was technically untimely, the Court has the discretion to consider the demurrer and does so here especially in light of the fact that Plaintiff took no steps to obtain a default, and made no argument that she was prejudiced by any delay. (Jackson v. Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 742, 749-750; McAllister v. County of Monterey (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 253, 281-282.)

First Cause of Action (Unpaid Overtime Wages—Labor Code § 1194)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has alleged impermissibly conclusory allegations. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “regularly Plaintiff to work hours in excess of 8 hours in a workday or 40 hours in a work week without the payment of proper overtime wages, in violation of California Labor Code § 1194 and IWC Wage Orders. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges “[c]onsistently, during his employment, Defendants, and each of them, required and/or permitted Plaintiff to work hours substantially in excess of 8 hours per day, and 40 hours per work week, without payment of overtime wages. (Comp. ¶¶ 10, 18.) He further alleges that he was “regularly required to overtime hours without payment of overtime wages.” (Comp. ¶ 20.) While Defendant contends

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

that Plaintiff was required to allege the specific number of hours of overtime worked and what Plaintiff was paid, Defendant cites no authority requiring this level of specificity. The federal cases cited in the demurrer do not contain such a requirement. In fact, relevant authority from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals makes clear that “factual allegations regarding the number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a plausible claim.” “[A]t a minimum, a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week.” (Landers v. Quality Communications, Inc. (9th Cir. 2014) 771 F.3d 638, 644-645.) Plaintiff has made such allegation. Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes.

Second Cause of Action (Violation of Labor Code §§ 201-203)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

As with the demurrer to the first cause of action, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s allegations are impermissibly conclusory. Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to allege the dates he was sick, the total dates of sick pay due, that Plaintiff did not receive sick pay in his final pay check or how Plaintiff calculated the amount of sick pay allegedly due. Once again, Defendant provides no authority that these are required allegations.

Plaintiff was terminated on June 23, 2025 and alleges that at the time of termination, “Plaintiff had available sick days to utilize” and “intended on using his accrued PTO, which included sick days that were available to be used.” (Id. ¶ 14). Despite having accrued PTO available, “Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff for accrued PTO at the time of termination.” (Id. ¶ 16.) All of these allegations are incorporated into the second cause of action. (Id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff alleges that “[p]ursuant to Labor Code § 246, Plaintiff was entitled to accrued sick pay wages. Plaintiff requested payment of sick pay wages, but was denied payment of the same.” (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

Defendant argues in reply that accrued sick days do not constitute wages for purposes of Labor Code §§ 201-203 and that there is no private right of action for any violation of Labor Code § 246. However, Defendant did not make this argument in the demurrer and it is impermissible to raise it for the first time in reply. The Court declines to consider any argument in this regard because the general rule in California is that new arguments and evidence presented for the first time on reply are not permitted as the opposing party had no opportunity to address these new matters in the opposition papers. (See, e.g., Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 241; Jay v. Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1537; Tyler v. Children's Home Society (1994)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

29 Cal.App.4th 511, 526, n.8.)

Defendant also argues that the second cause of action is dependent on the first cause of action and thus fails for the same reasons as the first. However, as seen above, the Court overruled the demurrer to the first cause of action.

Third Cause of Action (Violation of Labor Code § 226)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Defendant again contends that Plaintiff’s allegations are impermissible legal conclusions and again fails to provide any authority demonstrating that the allegations are deficient. Defendant provides no authority discussing the pleading standards for a violation of Labor Code § 226. That section requires employers to provide an “accurate itemized statement” showing certain enumerated items. (Labor Code § 226.)

Plaintiff has alleged that Defendant failed to provide accurate wage statements. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant “failed to provide accurate records of rates of pay, wages earned, net wages, overtime rates of pay, hours worked at each rate of pay, and total hours worked.” (Comp. ¶¶ 40, 41.) These allegations are sufficient for pleading purposes.

Defendant also argues that the third cause of action is dependent on the first and second causes of action and thus fails for the same reasons. However, as seen above, the Court overruled the demurrer to the first and second causes of action.

Fourth Cause of Action (Disability Discrimination in Violation of FEHA)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

Defendant contends that Plaintiff has not alleged that he asked for a medical accommodation or that he was experiencing anything that required a medical accommodation. Defendant also appears to argue that Plaintiff did not allege that any disability was known to Defendant.

“The elements of a disparate treatment disability discrimination claim are that the plaintiff (1) suffered from a disability or was regarded as suffering from a disability, (2) could perform the essential duties of a job with or without reasonable accommodations, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of the disability or perceived disability.” (Zamora v. Security Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal. App. 5th 1, 31.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

Plaintiff alleged that on June 19, 2025 he was assaulted and suffered serious injuries. (Comp. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff allegedly that he texted his manager to tell them that he did not feel well and that the manager told him to come to work. (Id. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff went to the emergency room on June 23, 2025, and the doctor recommended that Plaintiff have surgery for his dislocated and fractured jaw. (Id. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff texted his supervisor regarding the same and the need to take a day off. Plaintiff intended to use accrued PTO. “In response to Plaintiff’s notification of the need to take a day off to receive treatment for his personal medical disability, his supervisor stated that he decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.)

These allegations are incorporated into the instant cause of action. (Id. ¶ 43.) Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated as a result of his disability. (Id. ¶ 46.) Plaintiff has alleged a disability, namely his dislocated and fractured jaw requiring surgery, that he could perform, and that he was terminated because of the disability. Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff never actually disclosed a disability are factual ones which can not be resolved on demurrer.

Contrary to Defendant’s argument, there was no need for Plaintiff to allege that he required a reasonable accommodation as his claim is not based on the need for a reasonable accommodation. In addition, Plaintiff alleged that he notified Defendant of the disability.

Fifth Cause of Action (Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy)

Defendant’s demurrer is overruled.

“The elements of a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy are (1) an employer-employee relationship, (2) the employer terminated the plaintiff's employment, (3) the termination was substantially motivated by a violation of public policy, and (4) the discharge caused the plaintiff harm.” (Yau v. Allen (2014) 229 Cal. App. 4th 144, 154.) The public policy alleged to have been violated must be “public in that it affects society at large rather than the individual, must have been articulated at the time of discharge, and must be fundamental and substantial.” (Green v. Ralee Engineering Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 66, 76 [citations omitted].) Employees “must show that the important public interests they seek to protect are ‘tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions’ or administrative regulations. (Id. at 71-72.)

Defendant argues that the instant cause of action is deficient because Plaintiff did not identify a specific statute, regulation, or constitutional provision articulating a fundamental public policy. Defendant is incorrect. Plaintiff specifically alleged that Defendant violated the public policies set forth in Labor Code §§ 246 and 246.5(c)(1) regarding an employee’s right to use accrued sick time. (Comp. ¶¶ 52, 53.) Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

alleged that Defendant terminated Plaintiff on June 23, 2025 when he requested to take a sick day. (Id. ¶ 53.) Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient.

Defendant’s attempt to argue that Labor Code § 246 does not set forth a public policy that would support a wrongful termination claim is rejected. First and foremost, Defendant never made such an argument in the opening papers and the Court will not consider it on reply. Though in any event, Defendant’s argument in reply only addresses whether Labor Code § 246 sets forth a public policy and does not discuss whether § 246.5(c)(1) does so. Indeed, “a demurrer cannot rightfully be sustained to a part of a cause of action or to a particular type of damage or remedy.” (Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1047.)

Defendant also attempts to raise yet another new argument in reply regarding whether Plaintiff engaged in any protected activity.

Defendant also argues that the fifth cause of action is dependent on the second cause of action and thus fails for the same reasons. However, as seen above, the Court overruled the demurrer to the second cause of action.

Sixth Cause of Action (IIED)

“A cause of action for [IIED] exists where there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.) Conduct is only 'extreme and outrageous' when it is 'so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.' (Davidson v.

City of Westminster,(1982) 32 Cal. 3d 197.) “Whether a defendant’s conduct can reasonably be found to be outrageous is a question of law that must initially be determined by the court; if reasonable persons may differ, it is for the jury to determine whether the conduct was, in fact, outrageous.” (Berkley v. Dowds (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 518, 534.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show extreme and outrageous conduct, that Defendant acted with the requisite intent, or that Defendant’s conduct cause Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress.

The Court rejects the argument that Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing extreme and outrageous conduct. Plaintiff alleged that he was assaulted and notified his manager that he could not come to work. The manager told Plaintiff to come to work. Plaintiff then alleged that he went to the emergency room and that he needed surgery for his

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

25CV021447: RIVERA SALAS vs GREENTEC AUTO, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, et al. 06/04/2026 Hearing on Demurrer to Plaintiff's Complaint in Department 16D

dislocated and fractured jaw. (Comp. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff texted his supervisor regarding the same and the need to take a day off. Plaintiff intended to use accrued PTO. “In response to Plaintiff’s notification of the need to take a day off to receive treatment for his personal medical disability, his supervisor stated that he decided to terminate Plaintiff’s employment.” (Id. ¶¶ 14-15.) These allegations are incorporated into the instant cause of action. (Id. ¶ 56.) Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant intended to cause Plaintiff “humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress” and that Defendant’s conduct in fact caused such distress. (Id. ¶¶ 57, 58.)

Construing the allegations liberally as the Court must do on this demurrer, at a minimum, reasonable persons could reach different conclusions as to whether the conduct was extreme and outrageous. Thus, the issue is a factual one for the trier of fact. (Berkley, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 534.)

Defendant attempts to raise a new argument and cite new authority in reply, specifically, that Plaintiff has done nothing more than allege mere personnel action which does not support an IIED cause of action. The Court will not consider this new argument.

Finally, while Plaintiff is correct that Defendant did not file a declaration showing that they met and conferred with Plaintiff prior to filing the demurrer according to the requirements of CCP § 430.41(a), this does not affect the merits of the demurrer. (CCP § 430.41(a)(4).)

The demurrer is overruled in its entirety.

Defendant shall file and serve its answer to the complaint no later than June 18, 2026.

The notice of demurrer does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is ordered to notify Plaintiff’s counsel immediately of the tentative ruling system and to be available at the hearing in person, via Zoom or by telephone, in the event Plaintiff’s counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.