MOTION TO DETERMINE GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT ON COMPLAINT OF DONNA HOLMES BY AVONDALE GOLF CLUB
operated after execution of the Partnership Agreement, and that but for the Incorrect Legal Description the Corp. Grant Deed would have conveyed the true and correct lot, specifically the Property, to Plaintiff.”
Here, in present Third Amended Cross-Complaint, there is nothing requiring the correction of title to the property to imbue Bruce Auerbach with formerly missing standing to bring the first cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty.
Capacity of Bertha Wong: The capacity of Bertha Wong is not relevant to the present demurrer or motion to strike. The defect(s) at issue in these motions are on the face of the third amended cross-complaint. Bertha Wong is not submitting declarations, testifying or otherwise submitting evidence at this hearing.
Cross-Defendants’ Requests for Judicial Notice GRANTED. The court takes judicial notice of the following:
1. Cross-Complaint CVPS 2402052 2. First Amended Cross-Complaint CVPS 2402052 3. Second Amended Cross-Complaint CVPS 2402052 3. Third Amended Cross-Complaint CVPS 2402052 4. This Court’s ruling on 2.24.26 regarding the demurrer to the Second Amended Cross-Complaint CVPS 2402052 5. Verified Complaint from CVPS 2105040
Cross-Defendants Bertha Wong and Irene Weingarten Demurrer to the 1st Cause of Action of the Third Amended Cross-Complaint SUSTAINED without leave to amend.
4. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO STRIKE 3RD AMENDED CROSS-COMPLAINT OF BRUCE CVPS2402052 WONG VS AUERBACH AUERBACH BY CROSS-DEFENDANTS BERTHA WONG AND IRENE WEINGARTEN Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. Motion is MOOT in light of the court’s ruling as to the demurrers of Cross-Defendants Bertha Wong and Irene Weingarten.
5. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME MOTION TO DETERMINE GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT ON COMPLAINT OF CVPS2405849 HOLMES VS HERRIN DONNA HOLMES BY AVONDALE GOLF CLUB Tentative Ruling: No tentative ruling. A hearing shall be conducted.
6. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME COLTON VS BMW OF MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS FEES BY CVPS2406494 NORTH ALLISON COLTON, KYLE COLTON Tentative Ruling: Under Civil Code § 1794(d) (Song-Beverly Act), “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”
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Here, the parties settled through a written settlement agreement, with the Court to decide attorney fees upon separate motion. (Daghighian Decl. ¶ 39.) The matter of reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. (Bruckman v. Parliament Escrow Co. (1989) 190 Cal.App.3d 1051, 1062.)
Courts generally consider several factors in determining the reasonableness of a party’s attorney fees. These include “the nature of the litigation, the difficulty of the litigation, the attention given to the issues, the success of the attorney’s efforts, and time consumed. [Citation omitted.]” (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 693, 708.)
Although a fee request ordinarily should be documented in great detail, the court is entitled to make its own evaluation of the reasonable worth of the work done in light of the nature of the case and the credibility of counsel’s declaration, unsubstantiated by time records and billing statements. (See Weber v. Langholz (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 1578, 1587; see also Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)
Specifically in exercising its discretion, the Court may consider all the facts and the entire procedural history of the case in setting the amount of a reasonable attorney fee award. (Bernardi, supra, 167 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1394.)
Lodestar is the objective starting point to determine if attorney fees are reasonable. (Nichols v. City of Taft (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1242.)
Lodestar is calculated by assessing the reasonable rate for comparable services in the local community, multiplied by the reasonable number of hour spent on the case. (Ibid.)
Lodestar requires the court to determine what a reasonable rate and number of hours expended. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1320.)
Based on the time records, Declaration of Chad A. David, and motion (pp. 5-6), counsel spent:
Timekeeper Hours Rate / Hour Total Chad David, Attorney 5.5 $795.00 $4,372.50 Joshua Youssefi, Attorney 8.4 $745.00 $6,258.00 Nicolas Dillavou, Attorney 18.4 $745.00 $13,708.00 Christine Morano, Attorney 7.5 $495.00 $3,712.50 Lisa Tyler, Paralegal 14 $250.00 $3,500.00 Anna Costello, Paralegal 22.7 $250.00 $5,675.00 Inigo Gatus, Paralegal 1.4 $250.00 $350.00 Sierra Jacobs, Paralegal 3 $250.00 $750.00 Additional Wrap Up Fees 6 $745.00 $4,470.00 TOTAL 86.9 $42,796.00