SOLARCYCLE, INC. vs PILLAI

Solarcycle filed a reply on 5/22/2026. The Court has considered the relevant filings of the parties 26CV182073: SOLARCYCLE, INC. vs PILLAI 06/02/2026 Hearing on Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Department 514 and for the reasons discussed below, GRANTS Solarcycle’s petition to confirm the award.

TIMING OF FILINGS

A petition to confirm an award must be served and filed within four years after the date of service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner. According to the petition, the Award was served on 2/9/2026. Solarcycle filed this petition to confirm the Award on 4/13/2026.

A petition to vacate an award must be served and filed within 100 days after the date of the service of a signed copy of the award on the petitioner. Pillai did not file a separate petition to vacate the Award, but rather, seeks to vacate the Award in response to Solarcycle’s petition. When, as here, a “party petitions the court to confirm the award before the expiration of the 100- day period, respondent may seek vacation or correction of the award by way of response only if he serves and files his response within 10 days after the service of the petition (§ 1290.6). Unless the response is duly served and filed, under section 1290 the allegations of the petition are deemed to be admitted by respondent [citation].” (Rivera v. Shivers (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 82, 93.)

By waiting until after the 10-day period under section 1290.6 expired and filing this response on 5/21/2026, Pillai effectively admitted the allegations in the petition. (Rivera, 54 Cal.App.5th at 93.) Thus, the Court cannot properly consider Pillai’s response.

DISCUSSION

Even if the Court could consider the merits of Pillai’s request, it would deny the request because Pillai has not established a basis for vacating the Award. The grounds for vacating an arbitration award are limited by CCP section 1286.2. Under section 1286.2, the court “shall vacate the award” if it is determined that (1) “[t]he award was obtained by corruption, fraud or other undue means”; (2) “[t]here was corruption in any of the arbitrators”; (3) “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator”; (4) “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted”; (5) “[t]he rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title”; or (6) “[a]n arbitrator making the award either: (A) failed to disclose within the time required for disclosure a ground for disqualification of which the arbitrator was then aware; or (B) was subject to disqualification upon grounds specified in Section 1281.91 but failed upon receipt of timely demand to disqualify himself or herself as required by that provision.” (CCP § 1286.2(a); see also Moncharsh v.

Heily & Blasé (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 12-13 [“Absent a clear expression of illegality or public policy undermining this strong presumption in favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune from judicial scrutiny.”].)

Before addressing Pillai’s arguments, the Court provides a summary of the dispute as gleaned

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV182073: SOLARCYCLE, INC. vs PILLAI 06/02/2026 Hearing on Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Department 514 from the underlying contract and the Award. This dispute arises from a Consulting Agreement (“Agreement”) between Solarcycle and Pillai. (Pet. Att. 4b.) Under the Agreement, Pillai agreed to provide services, and Solarcycle agreed to pay Pillai, as described in Exhibit A. Exhibit A stated that Pillai would “assist in implementing the Company’s plans to manufacture rolled, patterned glass for solar PV modules as well as potentially establishing and funding a solar glass manufacturing facility in the United States.” (Id.)

Exhibit A further stated that Pillai would perform these services “as a Foreign Independent contractor, based in India.” (Id.) Solarcycle agreed to pay Pillai $25,000 per month excluding taxes, fees, and expenses; gave Pillai the option to purchase shares of common stock to vest over a four-year period; and agreed to reimburse Pillai for reasonable expenses incurred in performing the services subject to written consent from an authorized company agent and the submission of documentation. (Id.) Under section 6 of the Agreement, either party could terminate the Agreement upon three months’ prior written notice. (Id.)

Solarcycle gave Pillai three months’ notice of termination on 12/27/2024; however, it appears that Solarcycle subsequently terminated the Agreement effective 1/31/2025 and paid Pillai through that date. (Pet. Att.10g [“Award” at p. 3, ¶¶ 12, 46].) Section 10 of the Agreement contained an arbitration provision. (Award at ¶ 10.)

In arbitration, Pillai argued that (1) the arbitration provision was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable; (2) Solarcycle misclassified him as an independent contractor instead of an employee; and (3) the Agreement at issue in the arbitration was invalid because (a) it had been reformed by an unsigned new version of the agreement that incorporated a $2 million technical fee for Pillai, and (b) Solarcycle had “tampered with” the signed Agreement. (Award at pp. 10- 12.) Shinn requested additional evidence and briefing on issues including whether the arbitration clause was unconscionable, which both parties timely submitted. (Id. at p. 2.)

Arbitrator Shinn considered the evidence and arguments of both parties and concluded that the arbitration provision was enforceable against Pillai, and was not unconscionably one-sided. (Award at p. 14.) Applying the “ABC” test to Pillai’s misclassification argument, Shinn concluded that the evidence showed Pillai was an independent contractor and was not misclassified. (Id. at 14-16.) Applying California law on contract reformation to the evidence before him (or lack thereof), Shinn concluded that the evidence did not support Pillai’s contention that Solarcycle agreed to pay Pillai a $2 million technical know-how fee or tampered with the Agreement, but did indicate that the Agreement was binding and enforceable, and therefore valid. (Id. at pp. 16-19.)

However, Shinn concluded that Solarcycle had not properly terminated the Agreement pursuant to the notice provision or established waiver, and had hindered Pillai’s ability to continue working during the three-month period after Solarcycle gave notice of termination. Shinn therefore awarded Pillai consulting fees for February and March 2025 in the amount of $50,000, plus interest, pursuant to the Agreement. (Id. at pp. 19-28.)

Pillai contends that the Award should be vacated because (1) Shinn engaged in prejudicial misconduct (§ 1286.2(a)(3)); (2) Shinn exceeded his powers (§ 1286.2(a)(4)); and (3) Shinn refused to hear material evidence (§ 1286.2(a)(5)). (See Pillai Memo. of Points & Auth. (“Pillai Memo.”) at p. 6.) Pillai also cites generally to the Federal Arbitration Act and the 1958 New York Convention.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV182073: SOLARCYCLE, INC. vs PILLAI 06/02/2026 Hearing on Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Department 514

Refusal to hear material evidence or claim(s): This argument appears to be based upon Pillai’s assertion that he provided “free work” to Solarcycle by agreeing to assist with a Department of Energy grant application (see Pillai Memo. at pp. 6-7, 10) and/or that the parties had a separate agreement under which Pillai was entitled to a $2 million technical fee (see id. at pp. 11-12). The former issue does not appear to have been raised as a separate “material claim” during arbitration; even if it had been raised as such, Shinn considered evidence of the DOE grant application in the context of Pillai’s argument regarding contract reformation and rejected that argument. (See Award at pp. 4 (¶¶ 20, 22).)

The latter issue was raised at arbitration and as noted above, Shinn considered and rejected Pillai’s theory that a new or additional binding agreement existed that entitled Pillai to the $2 million fee. Pillai fails to show that Shinn refused to hear material evidence or decide material claims.

Misconduct: Pillai next argues that Shinn “misapplied governing legal standards” and “relied on incorrect factual assumptions.” (Pillai Memo. at pp. 7-8.) It is not clear whether these arguments form part of Pillai’s assertion that Shinn engaged in misconduct; the Court assumes that they do. On the legal side, Pillai argues that Shinn misapplied California law regarding misclassification. On the factual side, Pillai seems to disagree with Shinn’s conclusion that the Agreement was enforceable against Pillai as a signatory. (Compare Pillai Memo. at pp. 7-8 with Award at p. 14, ¶¶ 64-65.) The record does not reflect that Shinn misapplied the law or relied on incorrect factual assumptions. Even if he had, this is not a valid basis to vacate the award because “with narrow exceptions, an arbitrator's decision cannot be reviewed for errors of fact or law.” (Moncharsh, 3 Cal. 4th at 11.)

Pillai also contends that the arbitration was “procedurally defective” because Shinn ignored “arguments and evidences of Mr. Pillai,” “agreed with” Solarcycle regarding witnesses for the final hearing and “exonerated the absence of” most of Pillai’s witnesses; did not give Pillai as much time to present his case as Solarcycle received; and turned off the videoconference during the lunch period which purportedly deprived Pillai of an opportunity “to have discussions with [Solarcycle].” (Pillai Memo. at pp. 8-9.) Pillai cites no evidence for these assertions, nor is the Court aware of any legal authority that supports vacating the Award on these grounds.

Pillai further contends that his due process rights were violated because (1) Solarcycle did not produce executive assistant Katrina Elliott Grimes as a witness; (2) not all summoned witnesses attended the evidentiary hearing; (3) Pillai did not receive equal time to Solarcycle, a point Pillai states he raised with Shinn by email; (4) the arbitration proceedings were not recorded; (5) Pillai’s access to “IT systems” was “blocked”; and (6) Solarcycle’s post-arbitration payment of approximately $59,000 was “unilateral” and “does not constitute satisfaction of the award or waiver of Mr. Pillai’s rights.” (Id. at pp. 13-15.) The Court finds no basis to conclude that these issues were caused by Shinn or that they constitute the misconduct necessary to vacate the award.

Acting in excess of authority: Pillai argues that Shinn exceeded his power by “unilaterally substitute[ing] Solarcycle as respondent” in the arbitration, effectively “rewrit[ing] parties” to the

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

26CV182073: SOLARCYCLE, INC. vs PILLAI 06/02/2026 Hearing on Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award in Department 514 Agreement. (Id. at p. 9.) Solarcycle CEO Suvi Sharma signed the Agreement. (See Agreement.) On 10/21/2025, Shinn issued an Order re Jurisdiction over Sharma, finding that a court, not an arbitrator, had jurisdiction to decide whether Sharma, a non-signatory to the Agreement, could be compelled to participate in arbitration, and dismissed Sharma from the arbitration. Pillai appears to argue that Shinn overreached by finding Solarcycle rather than Sharma to be the proper respondent regarding Pillai’s contract-based claims. Pillai provides no legal authority for this assertion. Furthermore, the Agreement plainly shows that Sharma signed the Agreement in his capacity as CEO and not as an individual. This is not a valid basis to vacate the Award.

CONCLUSION

If a petition to confirm an arbitration award is filed, the court “shall confirm the award as made. . . unless in accordance with this chapter it corrects the award and confirms it as corrected, vacates the award or dismisses the proceeding.” (CCP § 1286.) For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds no valid basis to vacate the award. Accordingly, the petition of Solarcycle to confirm the award is GRANTED.

The Court will sign the proposed order and the attached proposed judgment lodged on 5/7/2026.

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