RAMIREZ vs GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SACRAMENTO VALLEY & NORTHERN NEVADA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

24CV014243: RAMIREZ vs GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SACRAMENTO VALLEY & NORTHERN NEVADA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel the Second Deposition Session of Defendant Driver Lamanz Cummings in Department 16D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

Tentative Ruling:

Moving party’s notice of motion does not provide full notice of the Court’s tentative ruling procedures as required by Local Rule 1.06. Moving party is directed to contact Defendant’s counsel and advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure and the manner to request a hearing. If moving party is unable to contact Defendant’s counsel prior to hearing, moving counsel is ordered to appear at the hearing.

Plaintiff’s “Motion to Compel the Second Deposition Session of Defendant Driver Lamanz Cummings” is GRANTED IN PART as follows.

BACKGROUND

This is a personal injury action arising from a collision between a motorcycle operated by Plaintiff and a truck operated by Defendant Lamanz Cummings while working for Defendant Goodwill Industries of Sacramento Valley & Northern Nevada, Inc. (“Goodwill”). The first cause of action alleges negligent operation and maintenance of the truck by both of the defendants. The second and third causes of action allege, respectively, that Goodwill negligently hired Cummings and that Goodwill negligently entrusted the truck to him. Goodwill, through discovery responses, has already admitted vicarious liability for any negligence by Cummings.

Plaintiff moves under Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.480 to compel answers to

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014243: RAMIREZ vs GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SACRAMENTO VALLEY & NORTHERN NEVADA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel the Second Deposition Session of Defendant Driver Lamanz Cummings in Department 16D

three categories of questions that Cummings refused to answer during his deposition upon his counsel’s instructions not to answer them.[1] The questions at issue relate to (1) what documents Cummings reviewed prior to the deposition, (2) Cummings’s eye prescription, and (3) Cummings’s driving history including prior accidents, traffic violations, license suspensions and revocations, and lawsuits.[2]

DISCUSSION

“If a deponent fails to answer any question or to produce any document . . . under the deponent’s control that is specified in the deposition notice or a deposition subpoena, the party seeking discovery may move the court for an order compelling that answer or production.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.480, subd. (a).)

I. Questions Regarding the Documents Cummings Reviewed Prior to the Deposition

The motion omits that during meet-and-confer efforts prior to the filing of this motion, Cummings already offered to be available “to answer additional questions regarding . . . documents he reviewed in preparation for his deposition.” (Tanouye Decl., Exh. D.) The motion is moot and should not have been brought as to this category of questions.

II. Questions Regarding Cummings’s Eye Prescription

The motion also omits that at the deposition, Cummings did answer questions regarding his eye prescription. The transcript shows that Cummings’s counsel initially objected to a question regarding Cummings’s eye prescription, but after a brief discussion with opposing counsel, withdrew the objection and directed Cummings to answer. (Tanouye Decl., Exh. C, pp. 88:11-90:13.) Cummings then answered the question as well as two more follow-up questions regarding his eye prescription. (Id., p. 90:14-23.) The motion is moot and should not have been brought as to this category of questions.

III. Questions Regarding Cummings’s Driving History

At the deposition, regarding this category of questions, Cummings raised a privacy objection and a relevance objection based on Diaz v. Carcamo (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1148, which held that an employer’s offer to admit vicarious liability for any negligence of its employee-driver renders inadmissible various types of evidence that tends to prove negligent hiring or retention by the employer but not negligent driving by the employeedriver, such as evidence of the employee-driver’s history of prior accidents.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014243: RAMIREZ vs GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SACRAMENTO VALLEY & NORTHERN NEVADA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel the Second Deposition Session of Defendant Driver Lamanz Cummings in Department 16D

Plaintiff argues discovery nonetheless should be allowed into this area because it is relevant to potential punitive damages allegations against Goodwill, and Diaz only dealt with admissibility—not discoverability—of such evidence. Cummings argues discovery into this area would constitute an impermissibly broad fishing expedition in light of Diaz and the fact that the operative complaint neither seeks punitive damages nor alleges any facts that would support punitive damages.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. A party may obtain discovery regarding any matter “relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action . . . if the matter . . . appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) This standard is to be applied liberally, and “doubts as to relevance should generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery.” (Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 161, 173.) “It is settled that admissibility is not prerequisite to discovery.” (Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1490-1491.)

When “an employer offers to admit vicarious liability for its employee's negligent driving, then claims against the employer based on theories of negligent entrustment, hiring, or retention become superfluous,” and evidence to support those theories such as past accidents become inadmissible. (Diaz, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1160, 1161-1162.) But when punitive damages are sought against such employer who “admits vicarious liability, neither the complaint's allegations of employer misconduct relating to the recovery of punitive damages nor the evidence supporting those allegations are superfluous.” (CRST, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1264.)

Here, Plaintiff seeks discovery regarding Cummings’s driving history that could support allegations for punitive damages against Goodwill. Evidence obtained in this area would be potentially relevant and admissible to prove the severity of Goodwill’s conduct to establish punitive damages. Although the operative complaint does not seek punitive damages, Plaintiff may seek to amend it to add such allegations. Questions regarding Cummings’s driving history are within the scope of allowable discovery.

Cummings’s assertion of privacy does not compel a different conclusion. “[T]he party asserting a privacy interest” has the burden “to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion,” which the court “must weigh [against] the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies.” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.) Here, Cummings has made only a bare assertion of privacy against general questions about prior lawsuits, prior car accidents, license suspensions or revocations, and traffic violations. The Court does not find here a privacy interest that would override Plaintiff’s right to discovery.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

24CV014243: RAMIREZ vs GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SACRAMENTO VALLEY & NORTHERN NEVADA, INC., A CORPORATION, et al. 06/02/2026 Hearing on Motion to Compel the Second Deposition Session of Defendant Driver Lamanz Cummings in Department 16D

CONCLUSION

The motion is GRANTED IN PART to compel answers on the topic of Cummings’s driving history.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.

[1] The motion also seeks to compel production of “documents responsive to Plaintiff’s request

[f]or production of documents at time of deposition notice, specifically requests numbered 1-3, 15.” (Pl. Mot., at p. 2:2-3.) However, Plaintiff did not provide the text or a summary of the production requests anywhere in the moving papers, and did not provide a separate statement as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1345. The motion is denied as to the production requests, as the Court has not been provided any information about them. [2] The motion also seeks relief on the ground that Cummings refused to answer whether he had

any injuries from the crash. However, Plaintiff’s meet-and-confer letter did not raise this issue. (See Saroian Decl., Exh. 2.)