MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with

24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 05/07/2026 Hearing on Motion to Disqualify Counsel in Department 16D

a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

*** NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 53 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 16D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION. PARTIES MAY CONTINUE TO APPEAR REMOTELY IN DEPARTMENT 16D UNLESS SPECIFICALLY ORDERED OTHERWISE. ***

TENTATIVE RULING: Self-represented Defendant Helina Hidalgo’s motion to disqualify Plaintiffs Brandon Miller and KDC Holdings, LLC’s counsel is denied.

In this action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant and others forged signatures and fraudulently transferred title of a 1972 Chevy Blazer to Defendant. Apparently, Defendant is also involved in a family law action against Russell Cornett in Placer County Superior Court. Daniel Karalash represents Cornett in the family law action and also represents Plaintiffs in this action.

Defendant moves to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel Stephan Brown, Daniel Karalash, and any attorney from Newpoint Law Group, LLC from representing any party in this action. As best the Court can tell, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel represent adverse parties in related cases, have breached fiduciary duties, are using the instant lawsuit for harassment purposes, and violated a temporary restraining order in the family law case. As seen below, Defendant has failed to set forth any basis to disqualify Plaintiffs’ counsel.

A trial court's authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every court '[t]o control in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before it, in every matter pertaining thereto. (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.) It has been stated that '[a] motion to disqualify a party's counsel may implicate several important interests. Consequently, judges must examine these motions carefully to ensure that literalism does not deny the parties substantial justice. Depending on the circumstances, a disqualification motion may involve such considerations as a client's right to chosen counsel, an attorney's

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24CV025212: MILLER vs HIDALGO, et al. 05/07/2026 Hearing on Motion to Disqualify Counsel in Department 16D

interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client to replace disqualified counsel, and the possibility that tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion.' (Id. at pp. 1144-1145.)

The paramount concern must be to preserve public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and in the integrity of the bar. The important right to counsel of one's choice must yield to ethical considerations that affect the fundamental principles of our judicial process.' (Id. at p. 1145; see also Kirk v. First American Title Insurance (2010) 183 Cal App 4th 776, 791.) While these standards are oft-repeated and express the general considerations that bear on a motion to disqualify counsel, their application necessarily occurs within the context of the specific facts of each case. It is rarely productive to generalize, because the rules pertaining to attorney disqualification differ depending on the factual circumstances of each specific case.

Here, Defendant does not assert that it had an attorney-client relationship with Plaintiffs’ counsel. Generally, “before the disqualification of an attorney is proper, the complaining party must have or must have had an attorney-client relationship with that attorney.” (Great Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1356.) Though, “where the ethical breach is ‘ “manifest and glaring” ’ and so ‘infects the litigation in which disqualification is sought that it impacts the moving party’s interest in a just and lawful determination of [his or] her claims’ [citation], a nonclient might meet the standing requirements to bring a motion to disqualify based upon a third party conflict of interest or other ethical violation.” (Id. at 1357.) “Accordingly, we conclude that where an attorney’s continued representation threatens an opposing litigant with cognizable injury or would undermine the integrity of the judicial process, the trial court may grant a motion for disqualification, regardless of whether a motion is brought by a present or former client of recused counsel.” (Kennedy v.

Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205.) Here, there is no attorney-client relationship between Defendant and Plaintiffs’ counsel. Thus, Defendant was required to demonstrate a “manifest and glaring” ethical breach by Plaintiffs’ counsel in their representation of Plaintiffs which threatens her with a cognizable injury or which undermines the integrity of the judicial process. Defendant has failed to do so.

Conflict of Interest

Again, Defendant does not claim that she had any attorney-client relationship with Plaintiffs’ counsel. As set forth above, given this absence, she must show a “manifest and glaring” ethical breach by Plaintiffs’ counsel in their representation of Plaintiffs which threatens her with a cognizable injury or which undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

In a merely a single paragraph, Defendant cites to CRPC Rule 1.7 and asserts that

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counsel cannot represent both her adversary in the family law matter and Plaintiffs in this case. Rule 1.7 does not support Defendant’s contention. The relevant portion of Rule 1.7 provides: “A lawyer shall not, without informed written consent from each client and compliance with paragraph (d), represent a client if the representation is directly adverse to another client in the same or a separate matter.” (Rule 1.7(a).) While Plaintiffs’ counsel, Daniel Karalash, represents Russell Cornett, Cornett is not a party to this action.

There is no indication on this record that Plaintiffs’ counsel are representing clients with directly adverse interests and even if they were, Rule 1.7 requires informed written consent from the clients and does not necessarily prohibit such representation. In any event, Defendant has failed to establish any conflict of interest which threatens her with a cognizable injury or which undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty

Defendant also argues that disqualification is proper because certain attorneys at Newpoint Law Group are trustees on a deed of trust which is a community property asset apparently involved in the family law action. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs’ counsel owes her fiduciary duties as a result and that they are breaching those duties through representing her adversary in this action. Defendant cites no law that imposes a fiduciary duty upon a trustee of a deed of trust and the law is to the contrary. “A trustee under a deed of trust has neither the powers nor the obligations of a strict trustee; rather, he serves as a kind of common agent for the trustor and the beneficiary.

His agency is a passive one, for the limited purpose of conducting a sale in the event of the trustor's default or reconveying the property upon satisfaction of the debt. Often the trustee is a title company, which is unaware of its selection as trustee and has no knowledge of either the transaction or the identity of the beneficiary. Consequently, [t]he use of the term trustee in the deed of trust is unfortunate and misleading. The trustee of a deed of trust is not a trustee at all in a technical or strict sense He does not assume the obligations which are imposed on a trustee by operation of law, and the statutes applicable to trustees of express trusts do not apply to deeds of trust.

The trustee of a deed of trust does not possess the personal confidence for the benefit of another required for a true trust relationship. A trustee therefore, while an agent for both the beneficiary and the trustor, does not stand in a fiduciary relationship to either.” (Hatch v. Collins (1990) 225 Cal. App. 3d 1104, 1111-1112.) Plaintiffs’ counsel owed no fiduciary duties to Defendant as result of being named trustee in a deed of trust as to which she may be a beneficiary. This is no basis for disqualification.

Abusive and Improper Motives

Defendant next contends that the subject lawsuit is without merit and instead is used to harass Defendant. Putting aside the question of whether Defendant’s evidence in support of this argument is admissible (indeed, it appears premised on inadmissible

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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hearsay), this too is no basis for disqualification. To the extent that Defendant believes this lawsuit lacks merit or is being used for improper purposes, she can challenge the merits of the action or seek sanctions pursuant to CCP §§ 128.5 or 128.7. Disqualification, however, is not a remedy.

Violation of Temporary Restraining Order

Lastly, Defendant claims that Plaintiffs’ counsel violated a restraining order in the family law action. It is not clear how Plaintiffs’ counsel violated any order. Further, to the extent that there were a violation, any remedy would lie with the Placer County Superior Court, not through a request for disqualification in this action.

In sum, the Court finds Defendant has failed to establish any basis for disqualification.

Defendant did not establish any attorney-client relationship with Plaintiffs’ counsel, or a “manifest and glaring” ethical breach by Plaintiffs’ counsel in their representation of Plaintiffs which threatens Defendant with a cognizable injury or which undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

Finally, the Court notes that in evaluating a motion such as this, the Court must be aware of the possibility that “tactical abuse underlies the disqualification motion.” (People ex rel. Dept. of Corporations v. SpeeDee Oil Change Systems, Inc. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1135, 1145.)

The motion is denied.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to CRC Rule 3.1312 or other notice is required.