Demurrer
Case No.: VCU328948 Date: June 2, 2026 Time: 8:30 A.M. Dept. 2-The Honorable Bret D. Hillman Motion: Demurrer Tentative Ruling: To sustain the demurrer with leave to amend; Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.
Facts In this matter, Plaintiff alleges he was, while wearing ankle restraints, in the process of boarding a transportation van at 300 E Olive Ave, Porterville belonging to Defendants City of Porterville, County of Tulare, State of California, California Department of Corrections, Los Angeles County Superior Court and/or Tulare County Superior Court, when Plaintiff, due to Defendant John Doe's stopping or parking of the transportation van at an unsafe distance from the curb or sidewalk, slipped or tripped causing severe injury. (Complaint.)
Defendant County of Tulare demurrers to each cause of negligence for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Amongst other arguments, the County argues the application of Government Code section 844.6 immunity applicable to prisoners. No opposition has been filed.
Authority and Analysis The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint "states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based." (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4 th 209, 220.
To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.)
The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if "the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4 th 857, 879-80)
To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4 th 634, 638.)
It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062
Looking for case law or statutes not cited here? Search published authorities
Examples: “Why did the court rule this way?” · “What were the procedural grounds?” · “Is appearance required?”
But "doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)
A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)
No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)
Government Tort Liability and Immunity "In California all government tort liability is dependent on the existence of an authorizing statute or 'enactment' (Gov. Code, Sec. 815, subd. (a), 815.6; [citations]) and to state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity, including the existence of a statutory duty." (Searcy v. Hemet Unified School District (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802.)
As noted above, Plaintiff here alleges causes of action for negligence under Government Code section 815.2 and Vehicle Code section 17001.
Government Code section 844.6 states: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, except as provided in this section and in Sections 814, 814.2, 845.4, and 845.6, or in Title 2.1 (commencing with Section 3500) of Part 3 of the Penal Code, a public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner. (2) An injury to any prisoner. (b) Nothing in this section affects the liability of a public entity under Article 1 (commencing with Section 17000) of Chapter 1 of Division 9 of the Vehicle Code. (c) Except for an injury to a prisoner, nothing in this section prevents recovery from the public entity for an injury resulting from the dangerous condition of public property under Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 830) of this part..."
As Government Code section 844.6 explicitly provides for a public entity's immunity in the context of an injury proximately caused to any prisoner, section 815.2 does not serve as a basis for a public liability in that context.
To hold otherwise would be to annul the protection of section 844.6: "If a specific immunity statute applies, it cannot be abrogated by a statute which simply imposes a general legal duty or liability." (Towery v. State of California (2017) 14 Cal.App.4th 226, 2333-234.)
Additionally, though "a public entity may be vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of its employees (Gov.Code, Sec. 815.2), that rule does not apply in the case of injuries to prisoners." (Lawson v. Superior Court (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1372, 1383.)
As to the pleading of an exception under Vehicle Code section 17001, the Court agrees that the allegation of parking a transport vehicle at an unsafe distance from a curb and/or sidewalk and a resulting fall does not constitute operation of a vehicle to impose liability.
"To meet this statutory requirement [of being 'in the operation of [a] motor vehicle'] 'it is not sufficient that a motor vehicle somehow be involved in the series of events that results in the injury.' (Ladd v. County of San Mateo (1996) 12 Cal.4th 913, 923.)
Instead, 'the vehicle must be in a 'state of being at work' or 'in the ... exercise of some specific function' by performing work or producing effects at the time and place the injury is inflicted." (Chilcote v. San Bernardino County (1933) 218 Cal. 444, 445 [23 P.2d 748], italics added [construing predecessor of Veh. Code, Sec. 17001, Civ. Code, former Sec. 1714 1/2].)" (Hernandez v. City of Pomona (2009) 46 Cal.4th 501, 520.)
The Court does not view the parked transport van as being in the state of being at work or in the exercise of some specific function and therefore does not find there is an operation of a vehicle in satisfaction of section 17001.
As such, the Court sustains the demurrer.
A demurrer cannot be sustained without leave to amend where it appears that the facts alleged establish a cause of action under any possible legal theory or it is reasonably possible that the plaintiff can amend the complaint to allege any cause of action. (Canton Poultry & Deli, Inc v. Stockwell, Harris, Widom, and Woolverton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4 th 1219, 1226.)
Therefore, the Court will grant leave to amend. Plaintiff shall have ten (10) days to file an amended complaint.
If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary.
The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.
Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division. The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.
Re: LVNV Funding LLC vs. Smith, Charles A