Paula Ramsum v. 10850 LLC, et al.

Paula Ramsum v. 10850 LLC, et al., 22CVP-0173

Hearing: Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint; Motion to Continue Trial

Date: June 2, 2026

Paula Ramsum (Plaintiff) filed this action on June 27, 2022, alleging personal and property damage resulting from rainwater flooding her real property located at 920 La Costa Court, Atascadero, California (Plaintiff’s Property).

On December 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (SAC) alleging causes of action against 10850, LLC, Pacific Coast Investments, Inc., John Carnelale, Louis V. Carnesale, Pacific Coast Investments, Inc., and Tri-Counties Real Estate Advisors, LLC (collectively Defendants) for negligence, nuisance, and trespass. 1

Plaintiff now seeks leave to file a Third Amended Complaint to add allegations concerning the transfer of the property at 10850 El Camino Real, Atascadero, California (Development Property) from Defendant 10850, LLC to proposed Defendant Camino Street, LLC; expanding the alter ego allegations to include Camino Street, LLC and the transfer-related facts; adding a Seventh Cause of Action for Fraudulent Transfer; adding an Eighth Cause of Action for Constructive Fraudulent Transfer; and adding corresponding prayer language seeking the remedies authorized by Civil Code sections 3439.07 and 3439.08. 10850 LLC, John Carnewale, and Tri-Counties Real Estate Advisors (collectively Opposing Defendants) oppose the motion on the ground that the partial transfer was for purposes of obtaining construction financing and was not fraudulent.

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND

The Court may allow the amendment of any pleading at any time in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 473(a), 576.) The Court’s discretion is to be exercised liberally to permit the amendment of pleadings. (Nestle v. Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 939.) If the motion is timely and does not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend. (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530; Mabie v. Hyatt (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 581, 596.)

“Motions to amend are appropriately granted as late as the first day of trial (e.g., Higgins v. Del Faro (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 558, 176 Cal.Rptr. 704) or even during trial (Rainer v. Community Memorial Hosp. (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 240, 251–256, 95 Cal.Rptr. 901) if the defendant is alerted to the charges by the factual allegations, no matter how framed (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 489, 173 Cal.Rptr. 418) and the defendant will not be prejudiced.” (Honig

1 The SAC also alleged two causes of action against the City of Atascadero (City). On January 16, 2026, the Court entered a judgment in favor of City after granting its motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff has appealed that judgment.

v. Financial Corp. of America (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 960, 965.)

Notwithstanding the policy requiring great liberality in granting leave to amend a complaint, leave to amend should not be granted where the proposed amendment would be futile. (Rocha v. U- Haul Co. of California (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 65, 75.) A court properly denies a motion to amend a complaint if the proposed pleading on its face or from matters judicially noticed fails to state a viable cause of action. “The court, in effect, is in the same position as it would be in ruling on a demurrer and in deciding whether, after sustaining a demurrer, leave to amend the complaint should be allowed.” (Favila v. Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 189, 211 [as modified on denial of reh’g. (Sept. 22, 2010)].)

“Taking judicial notice of a document is not the same as accepting the truth of its contents or accepting a particular interpretation of its meaning.” (Joslin v. H.A.S. Ins. Brokerage (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 369, 374.) A court taking judicial notice of a public record, such as a recorded deed, does not take notice of the truth of the matters stated in the document. (Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

Opposing Defendants request judicial notice of a real property deed, a deed of trust, and a loan agreement. The court in Poseidon Dev., Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106 (Poseidon), explained how judicial notice is applied to documents such as deeds of trust as follows:

[T]he fact a court may take judicial notice of a recorded deed, or similar document, does not mean it may take judicial notice of factual matters stated therein. (See Kilroy v. State of California (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 140, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 109.) For example, the First Substitution recites that Shanley “is the present holder of beneficial interest under said Deed of Trust.” By taking judicial notice of the First Substitution, the court does not take judicial notice of this fact, because it is hearsay and it cannot be considered not reasonably subject to dispute.

(Poseidon, supra, 152 Cal.App.4th at 1117.)

Opposing Defendants’ request for judicial notice is granted but the content of the deed, deed of trust, and loan agreement cannot be considered because they are hearsay and are subject to dispute as to 10850 LLC’s intent in transferring an interest in the Development Property to Camino Street, LLC.

Even if the Court considered the content of those documents, it would not establish as a matter of law that the transfer was not fraudulent. Among the elements to be considered in determining a claim for fraudulent transfer is whether the transfer was made with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor and whether a reasonably equivalent value was given in exchange for the transfer. (Civ. Code § 3439.04, subds. (a)(1), (a)(2).) Factors considered in determining intent include whether the transfer was to an insider, whether the transferor retained possession despite the transfer, and whether the transfer was made after suit was filed against the debtor. (Civ. Code § 3439.04, subds. (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(4).)

Opposing Defendants have not shown that the proposed amendments are futile.

Opposing Defendants also argue that only a partial interest rather than 10850 LLC’s entire interest in the Development Property was transferred. (Opposition, p. 2.) However, a partial transfer may constitute a fraudulent transfer. Civil Code section 3439.01, subdivision (m) defines “transfer” expansively as “every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset.” This broad definition encompasses partial interests.

Opposing Defendants also argue that Plaintiff is seeking amendment for the improper purpose of obtaining a trial continuance. (Opposition, p. 5, § III.) However, granting leave to file an amended pleading may not necessitate a trial continuance. Further, Plaintiff asserts she sought to amend the SAC within a reasonable time after discovering and investigating the transfer which occurred in October of 2025. The motion is timely.

II. MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL

Trial is scheduled for July 28, 2026. Plaintiff seeks a continuance to allow time to conduct discovery concerning the transfer of an interest in the Development Property to Camino Street, LLC. Plaintiff contends that based on the current trial date the initial expert witness exchange is due by June 8, 2026, and the non-expert discovery cutoff date is June 28.

A trial continuance may only be granted upon a showing of good cause. (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332, subd. (c).) Good cause for a continuance may include the unavailability of an essential expert witness due to excusable circumstances; the addition of a new party and lack of a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery; a party’s excused inability to obtain essential evidence; and a significant, unanticipated change in the status of the case rending the case not ready for trial. (Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332, subds. (c)(1), (c)(5), (c)(6), and (c)(7).)

A court must also consider the following circumstances:

(1) The proximity of the trial date; (2) Whether there was any previous continuance, extension of time, or delay of trial due to any party; (3) The length of the continuance requested; (4) The availability of alternative means to address the problem that gave rise to the motion or application for a continuance; (5) The prejudice that parties or witnesses will suffer as a result of the continuance; (6) If the case is entitled to a preferential trial setting, the reasons for that status and whether the need for a continuance outweighs the need to avoid delay; (7) The court’s calendar and the impact of granting a continuance on other pending trials; (8) Whether trial counsel is engaged in another trial; (9) Whether all parties have stipulated to a continuance; (10) Whether the interests of justice are best served by a continuance, by the trial of the matter, or by imposing conditions on the continuance; and (11) Any other fact or circumstance relevant to the fair determination of the motion or application.

(Rules of Court, Rule 3.1332, subd. (d).)

The parties should come to the hearing prepared to discuss the request for a continuance.

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