David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

Tentative Ruling

NOTICE: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to “Public Notice – Civil Division – Wednesday Law and Motion Calendar” any oral arguments regarding this tentative ruling will be heard in Department 8D, located at 500 G Street, Sacramento, CA, the Hon. Julie G. Yap presiding. Should argument be requested by either party, the requesting party must call the Law and Motion Oral Argument Request Line at (916) 874-2615, by 4:00 p.m. the Court day before the hearing, request the hearing, and notify the opposing party of the location and time of hearing pursuant to Local Rule 1.06.

At the time of requesting oral argument, the requesting party shall leave a voice mail message: a) identifying themselves as the party requesting oral argument; b) indicating the specific matter/motion for which they are requesting oral argument; and c) confirming that it has notified the opposing party of its intention to appear and that opposing party may appear via Zoom using the Zoom link and Meeting ID indicated below. If no request for oral argument is made, the tentative ruling becomes the final order of the Court.

The Court encourages parties to appear remotely for the hearing on the tentative ruling through the Court’s Zoom Application. But, any party wishing to appear in person may do so, provided that party notifies the Court by 4:00 the Court day before the hearing. The parties may join the Zoom session for hearing on the tentative ruling by audio and/or video through the following link: https://saccourt-ca-gov.zoomgov.com/j/16113421868 SIP Address: 16113421868@sip.zoomgov.com (833) 568-8864 ID: 16113421868 Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government code §68086 and California Rules of Court, Rule 2.956.

Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf. Parties may contact Court- Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.Pdf A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant’s Notice of Motion does not provide notice of the Court’s tentative ruling system, as required by Local Rule 1.06(D). Defendant’s counsel is directed to contact opposing counsel forthwith to advise counsel of Local Rule 1.06 and the Court’s tentative ruling procedure. If Defendant’s counsel is unable to contact opposing counsel prior to the hearing, Defendant’s counsel shall be available at the hearing, in person or remotely (telephonically or by video conference via Zoom as stated in the introductory notice to today’s tentative rulings), in the event opposing counsel appears without following the procedures set forth in Local Rule 1.06(B).

Defendant the Regents of the University of California’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Quash Plaintiff David Sahar’s (“Plaintiff”) subpoena for the deposition of Kirsten Stevenson (“Deponent”), or in the alternative, for a protective order is ruled upon as follows.

Factual Background

In this action, Plaintiff alleges discrimination and other employment related claims based

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

on Defendant's reassigning him to a lesser office and clinical workspace following his surgery. Plaintiff alleges, in part, that he was wrongfully forced to participate in Defendant's Physician Assessment and Clinical Education (“PACE”) program. (Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) ¶¶ 29-31.) Plaintiff contends the PACE program is designed for physicians with anger management issues, clinical incompetencies, medical record keeping issues, prescriptions abuses, or those unable to maintain professional boundaries, none of which applied to him. As a result, Plaintiff alleges the PACE program was not right for him and would mark him with the stigma of having lost competency in his field. (SAC ¶ 29.)

On March 20, 2026, Plaintiff served a deposition subpoena for the personal appearance of Defendant’s former legal counsel Kirsten Stevenson. (Lallite Decl., ¶ 4, Ex. C.)

Defendant moves to quash the deposition subpoena, or in the alternative, for a protective order, on the grounds that the subpoena is improper as it seeks information protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work produce doctrine, and because the information may be obtained from non-privileged sources. Plaintiff opposes.

Legal Standard

A party seeking discovery from a nonparty to the action may obtain discovery by oral or written deposition, or deposition subpoena for production of business records. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.010.) A deposition subpoena may command: (1) only the attendance and testimony of the deponent, (2) only the production of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony of the deponent, as well as the production of business records, other documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2020.020.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 1985.3, subdivision (g) provides the following:

Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

for improper release of records.

Discussion

Defendant argues that depositions of opposing counsel are “presumptively improper,” requiring “extremely” good cause to compel. (Citing to Carehouse Convalescent Hospital v. Superior Court (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1558, 1562.) In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the sought testimony is crucial to the case. Plaintiff further argues that the deposition of Deponent is not subject to heightened scrutiny, as she is no longer counsel for Defendant, and has never served as litigation counsel in the instant matter.

As noted by Defendant, “Depositions of opposing counsel are presumptively improper, severely restricted, and require ‘extremely’ good cause—a high standard.” (Ibid.) “California applies a three-prong test in considering the propriety of attorney depositions. First, does the proponent have other practicable means to obtain the information? Second, is the information crucial to the preparation of the case? Third, is the information subject to a privilege?” (Id. at p. 1563, citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 1487, 1494-1495.) “Each of these prongs poses an independent hurdle to deposing an adversary's counsel; any one of them may be sufficient to defeat the attempted attorney deposition.” (Ibid.)

Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that Deponent is entitled to the benefit of the presumption that taking his deposition is improper. The Court does not find that Carehouse or Spectra-Physics limit the presumption to only litigation counsel. Here, even though Deponent is not litigation counsel, it is not clear that her knowledge of any of the underlying facts of this lawsuit is separable from her duties as an attorney for Defendant.

Plaintiff contends that under the Carehouse and Spectra-Physics test, he is nevertheless entitled to take Deponent’s deposition. On the first prong, whether there are other means to obtain the information sought, Plaintiff argues that there is no other means to obtain testimony pertaining to Deponent’s communications with Plaintiff or Deponent’s motivations/decision-making process. Plaintiff argues that during his employment for Defendant, Deponent offered Plaintiff via email “options for work off site and advising Plaintiff that he must participate in the PACE program.” (Opp., p. 2:12-13.) Plaintiff further argues that in another email to Plaintiff, Deponent incorrectly stated that Plaintiff had failed to take all necessary steps to participate in the PACE program. Plaintiff argues that he has no alternative means to authenticate these email

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

correspondences without taking the deposition of Deponent, and no other means to ascertain Deponent’s basis for the statements made in her emails to Plaintiff.

On the second prong, Plaintiff contends that this information is crucial to his case because Deponent “was the individual who communicated Defendant’s position that Plaintiff had failed to take the actions necessary to participate in the PACE process and who advised Plaintiff that Defendant was proceeding toward medical separation.” (Opp., p. 7:10-12.)

Finally, on the third prong, Plaintiff argues that the basis for Deponent’s statements that Defendant had decided to “medically separate” Plaintiff is not privileged. According to Plaintiff, no privilege applies, as the “dominant purpose” of the communications from Deponent to Plaintiff were not to render legal advice. (Citing Wellpoint Health Networks, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 110, 121–123.)

On reply, Defendant counters that Plaintiff has already taken numerous depositions of Defendant employees, and that a number of further depositions are noticed with respect to the issue of “Plaintiff’s return to work process and the breakdown of the PACE evaluation process.” (Reply, p. 4:12.) Defendant argues that “Plaintiff has offered no coherent or legally sound reason why Ms. Stevenson’s testimony as to “whether Plaintiff cooperated with the return-to-work requirements” is crucial-aka essential when this exact same information has already been discovered from multiple other non-privileged, and equally probative sources.” (Id., at p. 4:19-22.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has not shown that there is no other means to obtain the information it seeks from Deponent. Plaintiff’s own opposition acknowledges that more individuals than Deponent were involved in the presentation of the PACE options to Plaintiff. (See Opp., p. 2:14-15 [“stating Stevenson, among others, presented options to Plaintiff”].) Plaintiff further has presented no argument which would persuade the Court why Deponent’s purported ignorance of Plaintiff’s application to the PACE program or false statements regarding Plaintiff’s rejection of the PACE program are crucial to the instant matter. Plaintiff argues that:

[Deponent] was the individual who communicated Defendant’s position that Plaintiff had failed to take the actions necessary to participate in the PACE process and who advised Plaintiff that Defendant was proceeding toward medical separation. Those statements go directly to the central factual dispute in this case: whether Plaintiff cooperated with Defendant’s return-to-work requirements

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2022-00316220-CU-OE-GDS: David Sahar vs. The Regents of the University of California 06/01/2026 Hearing on Motion to Quash and/or for Protective Order Regarding Plaintiff's Deposition Subpoena of Kirsten Stevenson in Department 8D

or whether Defendant improperly halted the process and then blamed Plaintiff for the resulting breakdown.

(Opp., p. 7:9-15.)

While the purported statements identified by Plaintiff may be crucial to the instant matter, Plaintiff has not shown why Deponent’s impressions of these statements is crucial. Whether Plaintiff cooperated with Defendant’s requirements or if Defendant halted the process certainly may be shown through other sources than the deposition of Defendant’s in-house counsel.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not rebutted the presumption against taking the deposition of Deponent, as former counsel for Defendant.

Disposition

Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion to quash the deposition subpoena for Kirsten Stevenson is GRANTED.

The minute order is effective immediately. No formal order pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312 or further notice is required.