Lakshmi Sambandham vs. Rebecca Diane Hill

34-2021-00299111-CU-PO-GDS: Lakshmi Sambandham vs. Rebecca Diane Hill 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 53

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

TENTATIVE RULING:

Defendant Rebecca Hill’s (“Hill”) motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication, is ruled upon as follows.

Moving counsel failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), requiring that each issue presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and then repeated verbatim in the separate statement.

Moving counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(d)(1)(a), which expressly requires the moving separate statement to “separately identify [e]ach cause of action, claim for damages, issue of duty, or affirmative defense that is the subject of the motion.”

Opposing counsel failed to comply with CRC Rule 3.1350(f)(2), requiring an opposing party who contends that a fact is disputed not only to describe “the nature of the dispute” but also provide citation to the supporting evidence by exhibit, title, page, and line numbers.

I. Overview

This is a personal injury action brought by Plaintiffs Lakshmi Sambandham (“Sambandham”) and Boominathan Ramanathan (“Ramanathan”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that while Sambandham was at 6736 Will Rogers Drive (Will Rogers Middle School) in Fair Oaks, California she was attacked by a dog “which is owned, controlled, harbored and/or kenneled by Defendants, who knew or should have reasonably known of his/her vicious and/or dangerous propensities and knew or should have reasonably known their dog was inclined to attack people in their vicinity.” (Complaint at p. 4.) Plaintiffs further allege that Sambandham was injured from said attack. (Ibid.)

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint on April 20, 2021. The Complaint brings causes of action

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for general negligence, strict liability, and loss of consortium against Defendants Hill and Jacklin Tibbetts. The third cause of action is brought only by Ramanathan. On May 31, 2022 Plaintiffs filed a request to dismiss Defendant Tibbetts only. The request for dismissal was entered that same day.

Defendant now moves for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, on the grounds that:

[t]here is no triable issue of material fact as to [Hill’s] non- liability for injuries and damages allegedly resulting from a dog bite that occurred on property she owned, but for which she had no actual knowledge of any alleged dangerous propensities of the subject dog. Therefore, [Hill] cannot, as a matter of law, be liable to Plaintiffs for any alleged damages.

(Notice of Motion at 1:27-2:2.)

This motion was originally noticed for and set to be heard on October 16, 2025. However, on the Court’s own motion, the hearing was continued to November 6, 2025. The Court’s minute order continuing the hearing date did not allow for any further briefing from the parties. Therefore, all filings were due pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c based upon the October 16, 2025 hearing date.

Moving Papers. Hill argues that Sambandham’s cause of action for general negligence fails as Hill owes no duty to Plaintiffs. (Moving MPA at 3:13-15.) To this end Hill argues that Plaintiff’s injuries were sustained as a result of her tenant’s dog, Dmitri, that Hill had no knowledge or belief that the subject dog was vicious or aggressive, that she had never received any complaints about the dog, and that she had replaced the fence and gate at the subject property before the subject incident. (Id. at 4:15-23.) Hill further argues that Sambandham cannot establish her second cause of action for strict liability because Hill is not the owner of the dog. Finally, Hill contends that because she bears no responsibility and liability to Sambandham, she also cannot be liable to Ramanathan for loss of consortium. (Id. at 5:18-19.)

Opposition. On September 29, 2025 Plaintiffs separately filed what appear to be two identical filings, both of which are titled “Plaintiff’s Opposition to Summary Judgement/Adjudication” (“Opposition”). Despite their title, based upon the format and content of these documents, they at most appear to constitute only Plaintiffs’ response to Hill’s Separate Statement. No other opposition papers accompanied these two filings.

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Reply. On October 2, 2025, Hill filed her reply to Plaintiffs’ Opposition. Hill first objects that Plaintiffs’ Opposition was untimely filed and served and thus should be stricken and not considered. (Reply at 1:20-23.) Hill also objects that Plaintiffs’ Opposition fails to cite any evidence to dispute any material fact in violation of California Rules of Court rule 3.1350(f)(2). (Id. at 1:24-20.) Finally, Hill contends that her motion should be granted because the undisputed material facts demonstrate she is entitled to judgment in her favor as a matter of law. (Id. at 2:22-3:10.)

Second Opposition. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 437c does not allow any filings subsequent to Hill’s reply (see Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(4)), Plaintiff, on October 3, 2025 (i.e., the day after Hill filed her reply), submitted a second batch of filings in opposition to this motion. These filings include a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition, an additional separate statement in opposition, and a declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel which not only attaches evidence related to the additionally filed opposition papers but also purports to seek relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d)

Sur-Reply. Again, although Code of Civil Procedure section 437c does not allow any filings beyond Hill’s reply, Hill, on October 6, 2025, filed yet another document styled as a “Sur-Reply” requesting that the Court strike the second opposition filed after Hill’s initial reply brief as untimely and prejudicial.

II. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, the Court engages in a three-step process.

First, the Court identifies the issues framed by the pleadings. The pleadings define the scope of the issues on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (FPI Dev. Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381-382.) Because a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is limited to the issues raised by the pleadings (Lewis v. Chevron (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 690, 694), all evidence submitted in support of or in opposition to the motion must be addressed to the claims and defenses raised in the pleadings.

The Court cannot consider an unpled issue in ruling on a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication. (Roth v. Rhodes (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 530, 541.) The papers filed in response to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication may not create issues outside the pleadings and are not a substitute for an amendment to the pleadings. (Tsemetzin v. Coast Federal Savings & Loan Assn. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1334, 1342.) Indeed, it has often been noted that “[i]t would be patently unfair to allow plaintiffs to defeat [defendant’s] summary judgment

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motion by allowing them to present a “moving target” unbounded by the pleadings.” (Melican v. Regents of University of California, (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 168, 176-177.)

Next, the Court must determine whether the moving party has met its burden. A defendant moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication bears the burden of persuasion that one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 [quoting Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2)].) A defendant is not required to conclusively negate one or more elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action. (Saelzer v.

Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal.4th 763, 780- 781). Rather, to meet its burden, the defendant is required to show only that the plaintiff cannot prove an element of its cause of action, i.e., that the plaintiff does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain evidence necessary to show this element. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 853-855.) Further, the initial burden requires a showing that the plaintiff “could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-940.)

At the same time, a defendant cannot shift the burden to the plaintiff simply by suggesting the possibility that the plaintiff cannot prove its case; a moving defendant must still make “an affirmative showing” in support of its motion. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 854-855, n.23; Addy v. Bliss & Glennon (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205, 214.) Once the moving party has met its burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to show that a material factual issue exists as to the cause of action alleged or a defense to it. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c, subd. (p); see generally Bush v. Parents Without Partners (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 322, 326-327.)

While a summary adjudication motion is treated largely the same as one for summary judgment, there are a few important differences. One of these differences is that California Rule of Court, Rule 3.1350, subdivision (b) mandates that issues presented for summary adjudication be stated in the notice of motion and repeated verbatim in the separate statement. Another difference is that summary adjudication cannot be granted unless it “completely disposes” of a cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for punitive damages, or question of duty. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) provides in its entirety:

A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if that party contends that the cause of action has no merit or that there is no affirmative defense thereto, or that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, or both, or that there

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is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty.

Additionally, according to Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not, and if there is a triable dispute relating to any one of these facts, the motion must be denied. (Id. at p. 252 [citing Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial, Ch.10:95.1].)

Finally, in ruling on the motion, the Court must consider the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)

III.

Discussion

Plaintiffs’ Various Opposition Papers

As discussed above, Hill objects to all of Plaintiffs’ opposition filings on the grounds that they were untimely filed and served.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ Opposition filed on September 29, 2025 (i.e., the two apparently identical documents which are formatted as a response to Hill’s separate statement) to be timely filed and served. Code of Civil Procedure section 437c subdivision (b)(2) requires that all opposition papers be filed and served at least 20 days before the noticed hearing date. Here, Hill’s motion was noticed for October 16, 2025. 20 days before this date is Friday, September 26, 2025. However, September 26, 2025 was Native American Day, a Court observed holiday.

Therefore, the last permissible date for filing of Plaintiffs’ opposition papers was Monday, September 29, 2025—the following business day. (See Code of Civil Procedure §§ 12a, 12c.) Here, Plaintiffs served the Opposition on September 26, 2025 and filed it on September 29, 2025. The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ service and filing of the Opposition was timely. While the Court need not address the timeliness of the Opposition further, it also notes that Hill was able to and did file a substantive reply on October 2, 2025 (which was one court day prior to its deadline given the intervening weekend).

Accordingly, the Court finds the Opposition filed on September 29, 2025 to be timely filed and it will be considered by this Court.

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The Court next turns to the second batch of opposition filings made by Plaintiffs on October 3, 2025. This batch of filings, which, again, consists of an additional separate statement in opposition as well as a memorandum in opposition and a supporting declaration from Plaintiffs’ counsel, appear intended to serve as additional documents in opposition to Hill’s motion. Unlike Plaintiffs’ September 29, 2025 filing, these documents are late-filed. Indeed, Plaintiffs filed these documents as much as four days after the opposition due date under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c.

If these documents were permitted to be filed so late, they would correspondingly have allowed only a single court day for Hill’s filing of a reply, which was statutorily due by October 6, 2025 (considering the intervening weekend). (See Code Civ. Proc. §§ 437c(b)(4), 12a, 12c, 13b.) Further, here, Hill elected to file her reply brief one court-day early, on October 2, 2025, which she is permitted to do given that the opposition due date had already passed and that Plaintiffs had already filed their September 29, 2025 Opposition.

Plaintiffs’ late filings deprived Hill of the statutorily permitted time to reply. Thus, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ October 3, 2025 filings impermissibly late under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and they shall not be considered.

While the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ October 3, 2025 filings any further, it notes that nothing stated thein provide justifiable grounds to consider such late filings. The Court observes that Plaintiffs’ counsel, Sara Rudorfer, avers in her October 3, 2025 declaration the following:

12. Plaintiffs’ opposition papers were submitted one court day late due to an office clerical mistake. Specifically, staff in my office inadvertently miscalendared [sic] the deadline for filing opposition papers. As a result, the papers were filed one day late.

13. Upon discovering the error, I acted promptly to finalize and submit the opposition and this declaration. Defendant has already filed a reply addressing the merits, and no prejudice will result from the Court considering the opposition. Plaintiffs would suffer substantial prejudice if the Court were to disregard the opposition based solely on a short delay.

14. I therefore respectfully request discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure §473(b) and, under CRC 3.1300(d), an order considering Plaintiffs’ late-filed opposition papers.

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(Declaration of Sara Rudorfer at ¶¶ 12-14 [emphasis added].)

First, Ms. Rudorfer’s statement that Plaintiffs’ opposition papers were submitted “one court day” late is simply false. Assuming this statement is in reference to the collection of Plaintiffs’ filings made on October 3, 2025, as the Court has already indicated, such filings are as much as four days late (and also four court days late), not court one day late. Second, this second batch of papers were submitted after Plaintiffs had already filed their initial Opposition on September 29, 2025, thus rendering inconsistent Plaintiffs’ counsel’s statement that it acted “promptly to finalize and submit the opposition and this declaration” “upon discovering the error.” Indeed, it remains unclear what “error” Plaintiffs’ counsel refers to given that its October 3, 2025 filings were not simply “one court day late” to begin with.

Third, its makes no sense how Hill would not suffer prejudice if Plaintiffs were allowed to file additional opposition papers after Hill had already filed its timely reply. Fourth, Plaintiffs request for discretionary relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 subdivision (b) is improper as no such affirmative relief is available through opposition papers. Finally, California Rules of Court rule 3.1300(d) provides that “[n]o paper may be rejected for filing on the ground that it was untimely” and further states that “[i]f the court, in its discretion, refuses to consider a late filed paper, the minutes or order must so indicate.” Here, Plaintiffs’ October 3, 2025 filings were not rejected and the Court has addressed its refusal to consider Plaintiffs’ late-filed papers in this order.

In short, given that the October 3, 2025 filings amount to a late and statutorilyimpermissible second opposition for which the Court finds no justifiable grounds for consideration, the Court declines to consider these filings in ruling on this motion.

Hill’s Alternative Motion for Summary Adjudication

“The language in Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f) makes it clear that a motion for summary adjudication cannot be considered by the court unless the party bringing the motion duly gives notice that summary adjudication is being sought.” (Gonzales v. Superior Court (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1542, 1545-1546.) “If summary adjudication is sought, whether separately or as an alternative to the motion for summary judgment, the specific cause of action, affirmative defense, claims for damages, or issues of duty must be stated specifically in the notice of motion and be repeated, verbatim, in the separate statement of undisputed material facts.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).) A movant’s failure to comply with the requirements of a separate statement, in the Court’s discretion, may constitute a sufficient ground for denying the motion. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(b)(1).)

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The Court finds that Hill has failed to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b). Hill’s notice of motion, while entitled as a motion for summary judgment, “or in the alternative, summary adjudication,” does not appear to seek in the alternative, summary adjudication of any specific causes of action. Indeed, the notice states:

This Motion is made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 437c and on the grounds that here [sic] is no triable issue of material fact as to [Hill’s] non-liability for injuries and damages allegedly resulting from a dog bite that occurred on property she owned, but for which she had no actual knowledge of any alleged dangerous propensities of the subject dog. Therefore, [Hill] cannot, as a matter of law, be liable to Plaintiffs for any alleged damages.

(Notice of Motion at 1:26-2:2.)

The notice does not specifically reference any specific cause of action Hill contends should be summarily adjudicated nor state the grounds upon which summary adjudication is sought as to any cause of action. To the extent Hill is seeking summary adjudication of more than one cause of action, Hill has failed to separately identify each issue for adjudication. This significant failure alone warrants denial of Hill’s motion for summary adjudication.

Additionally, Hill’s separate statement only further demonstrates the deficiency in Hill’s motion for summary adjudication in that it, for the first time, purports to present three issues for summary adjudication, including: (1) “THAT DEFENDANT HILL OWED NO DUTY TO PLAINTIFF SAMBANDHAM AS A MATTER OF LAW” (Separate Statement at 2:1-2); (2) “THAT DEFENDANT HILL IS NOT STRICTLY LIABLE AS SHE WAS NOT THE OWNER OF THE SUBJECT DOG” (Id. at p. 5:11-13); and (3) “THAT DEFENDANT HILL IS NOT LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF RAMANATHAN FOR LOSS OF CONSORTIUM” (Id. at p. 5:16-17.) Still, none of these purported issues reference any specific causes of action. And again, none of these purported issues are set forth in Hill’s notice of motion, much less “repeated, verbatim” as specifically required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b).

Accordingly, given Hill’s failure to comply with Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(b)(1) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(b), the Court finds that the deficiencies in Defendant’s notice of motion and separate statement warrant denial of Defendant’s motion for summary adjudication and the motion is denied on such

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grounds.

Given that Hill has failed to satisfy the procedural requirements and thus, her burden on summary adjudication, all that remains of Hill’s motion is that for summary judgment.

Hill’s Initial Burden on Summary Judgment

The threshold question here is whether the moving papers are sufficient to satisfy Hill’s initial burden of production under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(p)(2) with respect to the ground(s) advanced for summary judgment. As indicated earlier, on summary judgment or summary adjudication, a moving party must meet her initial burden regardless of whether the opposing party disputes any issues of material fact. (See Thatcher v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087 [moving party on summary judgment must meet his initial burden even if the motion is unopposed].)

Here, Hill’s separate statement includes 19 asserted undisputed material facts (“UMF”) in support of her request for summary judgment. As will be explained, the Court finds that Hill has failed to meet her initial burden by failing to support at least five asserted UMFs with sufficient evidence which thereby constitute multiple and independent grounds each warranting denial of Hill’s motion.

UMF 3 states “Defendant Hill and Tibbets [sic] have a long-term and close relationship wherein Tibbets’ [sic] ex-boyfriend and father of her child is Defendant Hill’s son.” To support this UMF, Hill cites to the deposition transcript of Jacklin Tibbetts. However, the cited portion of this transcript fails to establish that Hill and Ms. Tibbetts had a “longterm” and “close relationship” as asserted in this UMF. Indeed, in this portion of the deposition transcript Ms. Tibbetts testified that she used to be in a relationship with Hill’s son, that Ms.

Tibbetts does not pay Hill rent, but rather she has an agreement with Hill’s son whereby Ms. Tibbetts does not collect child support and he pays for Ms. Tibbetts and her children to “live there.” (See Declaration of Marissa L. Vandersluys [“Vandersluys Decl.”], Exhibit C at 7:13-8:25.) Such testimony does not establish what kind of relationship Hill and Ms. Tibbetts shared, much less that the relationship was “long-term” and “close.” The Court notes that it is unclear why Hill has purposefully injected this characterization of the relationship between Hill and Tibbetts as constituting a material fact upon which Hill’s motion for summary judgment is based.

Indeed, if Hill believed that this description of their relationship was not material to obtaining summary judgment, Hill should not have included it in Hill’s asserted UMFs. (See California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(d)(2) [separate statement to include “only material facts and not any facts that are not pertinent to the disposition of the motion”]; Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 875-876 [paragraphs in separate

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statement should be limited to facts that address elements of cause of action or affirmative defense].) But in any event, because Hill has purposefully included such asserted material facts, Hill cannot now be heard to assert that her failure to establish such facts is somehow inconsequential to granting summary judgment. As previously explained, under Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252, a moving party’s inclusion of facts in its separate statement effectively concedes each fact’s “materiality,” whether intended or not. (See also, Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.) Thus, the Court finds that Hill fails to support UMF 3 with adequate evidence and, consequently did not satisfy her initial burden with respect to this UMF.

UMF 5 asserts that “Tibbets [sic] has a 17-pound, boxer mix dog named “Dmitri” that has resided with her at the Subject Property since approximately 2014,” and cites to an excerpt from the deposition transcript of Jacklin Tibbetts in support. Similar to the issue previously discussed, Hill has inexplicably included asserted facts in her UMF which are not supported by the supporting citation. In the cited portion of this deposition transcript, Ms. Tibbetts testifies that she owns the dog, Dmitri, that is the subject of the lawsuit that Dmitri is 17 pound boxer mix. (Id. at Exhibit C at 9:5-25.) However, Ms. Tibbetts does not testify that Dmitri has “resided with her at the Subject Property since approximately 2014” as asserted in UMF 5. Rather, at most, Ms. Tibbetts testifies that:

Q. Okay. And so at the time of this incident, which was about five years ago, do you know how long you had owned Dmitri at that point in time?

A. So probably at that point, about five years.

(Id. at Exhibit C at 10:1-4.) Not only is there no further evidence cited in support of this UMF which establishes the “time of this incident” so as to support the UMF’s assertion that the dog, Dmitri, had resided at the subject property since approximately 2014, but this testimony only establishes that Ms. Tibbetts had owned Dmitri for about five years prior to the incident. It does not establish that Dmitri had resided with Ms. Tibbetts at this property since the time Ms. Tibbetts owned Dmitri.

Again, while it is unclear to the Court why Hill relies upon every factual assertion made in this UMF as being material to obtaining summary judgment, Hill has nonetheless effectively conceded its materiality. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252; Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.) Accordingly, the Court finds that Hill also fails to support UMF 5 with adequate evidence.

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UMF 8 asserts that “[t]his prompted Defendant Hill to replace the fence and gate at the subject property in April 2019, two months before the subject incident and the fence was in good repair at the time of the incident.” In support, Hill cites to various special interrogatories propounded by Plaintiffs, Hill’s responses to the same, and to portions of Ms. Tibbetts’ deposition transcript. While some of this evidence supports the fact the fence and gate were replaced a few months “prior to the incident” (see Id. at Exhibit A at No. 3, 6, 9; Exhibit B at No. 3, 6, 9), none of the cited evidence supports the contention that this occurred in “April 2019” as asserted in this UMF.

In this regard, the Court notes that while Hill cites to Exhibit H, which is described as “Defendant Hill’s Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Two,” the only Exhibit H attached to Ms. Vandersluys’ declaration contains Plaintiff’s responses to Hill’s Special Interrogatories Set One, and not Hill’s responses to any special interrogatories, or a “Set Two.” Furthermore, the cited excerpts from Ms. Tibbetts’ deposition transcripts do not identify any date during which the fence and gate were replaced. (Id. at Exhibit C, at 10:9-14, 11:2-7, 12:25- 13:14, 14:12-15.)

Again, while it is unclear to the Court why Hill relies upon the fence and gate replacement occurring in “April 2019” as being a material fact necessary for summary judgment, such question is not relevant at this point because Hill has effectively conceded its materiality. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252; Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506.) Accordingly, this UMF is also unsupported.

UMF 11 states “Defendant Hill has never received any complaints about Dmirti and had never observed him to be aggressive or violent.” While Hill makes a plethora of citations to evidence in support of this UMF, none of the citations support the asserted fact that Hill had never received any complaints about Dmitri. Specifically, Hill cites to her response to special interrogatory No. 12 which establishes, at most, that Hill did not receive any complaints related to the Dmitri in the last five years prior to the incident. (Id. at Exhibit A, No. 12; Exhibit B, No. 12.)

Hill also cites to portions of Ms. Tibbetts’ deposition transcript in which Ms. Tibbetts testified that Hill met Dmitri and, to the best of Ms. Tibbetts knowledge, had no reason to believe that Dmitri was dangerous or aggressive in any way. (Id. at Exhibit C, 15:3-11.) Hill similarly cites to a number of requests for admission propounded by Plaintiffs in which Hill denies that she knew of any complaints from students and staff at Will Rogers Middle School about the dog, denies that she knew of any complaints from students and staff at Will Rogers Middle School that the gate would not stay closed, denies that she knew there as an “aggressive dog” living at 6736 Will Rogers Dr., Fair Oak, and denies that other people have been bitten by dogs on other properties owned by Hill. (Id. at Exhibit D, Nos. 4, 10, 11, 13, 15; Exhibit E, Nos. 4, 10, 11, 13, 15.)

Finally, Hill cites to additional requests for admission propounded by Plaintiffs in which Hill admits that she did not ask Ms. Tibbetts about the nature or character of her dog, if her dog had ever bitten, attacked, scratched,

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and/or caused injury to another person or animal, and that prior to the incident, Hill did not ask Ms. Tibbetts if her dog had ever left the fenced in property.[1] (Id. at Exhibit I, Nos. 21-23; Exhibit J, Nos. 21-23.) While this evidence refers to the absence of complaints from particular persons or sources and for a particular time frame, none of this evidence demonstrates that it is undisputed that Hill has never received any complaints about Dmitri (the subject dog), which is what Hills’ UMF 11 actually asserts. Thus, the Court find that this UMF is also insufficiently supported by the evidence cited.

UMF 12 states “Plaintiff Sambandham alleges that on June 28, 2019, she was present at the Will Rogers Middle School walking around the parking lot when she observed Dmitri push open the fence door at the Subject Property.” In support, Hill cites excerpts of Sambandham’s deposition transcripts, however, none of these excerpts establish the date Sambandham was walking and saw Dmitri push open the fence door, much less that it was on June 28, 2019. (Id. at Exhibit K, 14:10-24, 17:17-18:13, 18:24- 19:8.) While in this instance, the materiality of the asserted fact appears clear, Hill fails to substantiate the asserted UMF. Accordingly, the Court finds that this UMF is also not supported by the evidence cited.

It is worth repeating that to the extent Hill may argue that the any of the facts as asserted in UMFs 3, 5, 8, 11, and 12 are not truly material to her motion, inclusion of the facts concedes materiality. (See Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) Indeed, in Insalaco v. Hope Lutheran Church of West Contra Costa County (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 506, the First District Court of Appeal addressed this point directly. The court noted that the moving party “enumerated purportedly undisputed material facts in its separate statement, some of which [opposing party] disputed.” (Id. at 521.)

The moving party convinced the trial court that despite their inclusion in the moving party's separate statement, those facts were not actually material and succeeded on summary judgment. (Ibid.) The appellate court reversed, concluding that summary judgment was improper “[b]ecause a dispute as to any one of these facts means there was a dispute as to a concededly material fact.” (Id. at 522 [emphasis added].)

In sum, the Court finds that Hill has failed to support at least five asserted UMFs put forth in support of her motion for summary judgment and thus Hill has not met her initial burden to demonstrate that she is entitled to summary judgment. Again, any one of these failures would warrant denial of Hill’s motion, but in this case, there are multiple unsupported UMFs providing multiple and independent grounds for denial. Accordingly, the burden never shifted to Plaintiffs to create a triable issue of material fact.

The Court DENIES Defendant’s motion for summary judgment.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00299111-CU-PO-GDS: Lakshmi Sambandham vs. Rebecca Diane Hill 11/06/2025 Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment in Department 53

IV.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Hill’s motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative summary adjudication, is DENIED in its entirety.

This minute order is effective immediately. Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, Plaintiff shall prepare an appropriate order which conforms to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c(g).

[1] In making these admissions, Hill also stated that she did not is not aware of any “INCIDENTS.” While

Hill capitalizes “incidents” thus suggesting her use of the term as a defined term, Hill does not define “incidents” in her response. (Vandersluys Decl., Exhibit J, Nos. 21-23.) “Incidents” is defined by Plaintiffs in their requests for admission as meaning “the circumstances and events surrounding the alleged accident, injury, or other circumstance giving rise to this action or proceeding wherein Plaintiff Sambandham was attacked by a dog which resided at the property of Defendant Rebecca Hill.” (Id. at Exhibit I at p. 2:12-16.) Thus, considering that Hill stated she is not aware of any “incidents,” as defined by Plaintiffs, there remains no support for the assertion that Hill never received any complaints about Dmitri.