Martinez, Juana vs. FCA US, LLC

Further, that FCA "failed to disclose the defective nature of the Vehicle and its Engine Defect to its sales representatives and Plaintiff at the time of sale and thereafter. FCA omitted mention of the Engine Defect to its consumers." (FAC P.34.)

Additionally that Plaintiff is a reasonable consumer who would not have purchased the Vehicle had the Engine Defect been disclosed. (FAC P.35.)

Plaintiff generally asserts various tolling doctrines as to the statute of limitations including class action tolling, discovery rule tolling, estoppel, and the COVID-19 tolling. (FAC P.51-71.)

As to concealment, Plaintiff realleges the prior allegations and reasserts them. (FAC P.P.96-103.)

Defendant FCA demurrers the concealment cause of action on the basis of the statute of limitations, economic loss rule and failure to state sufficient facts.

In opposition, Plaintiff argues that the claim was filed within the statute of limitations, that the economic loss rule does not apply, that FCA had a duty to disclose and that Plaintiff has otherwise sufficiently pled the concealment cause of action.

Authority and Analysis The purpose of a demurrer is to test whether a complaint "states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action upon which relief may be based." (Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4 th 209, 220.

To state a cause of action, a plaintiff must allege facts to support his or her claims, and it is improper and insufficient for a plaintiff to simply plead general conclusions. (Careau v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 11371, 1390.)

The complaint must contain facts sufficient to establish every element of that cause of action, and thus a court should sustain the demurrer if "the defendants negate any essential element of a particular cause of action." (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4 th 857, 879-80)

To determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable implication therefrom; it may not consider contentions, deductions, or conclusion of fact or law (Moore v. Conliffe (1994) 7 Cal.4 th 634, 638.)

It is well-settled that all well-pled material facts in the complaint are assumed to be true for the purpose of the demurer. (C & H Foods v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062)

But "doubt in the complaint may be resolved against plaintiff and facts not alleged are presumed not to exist. (Id.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.)

No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no "speaking demurrers"). (Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

Statute of Limitations Defendant contends the statute of limitations begins the date the Vehicle was purchased on October 2, 2016 and that the three-year statute of limitations for fraud therefore bars Plaintiffs' fraudulent inducement - concealment cause of action against Defendant, as the complaint was filed March 21, 2025.

Further, that delayed discovery does not apply because Plaintiff's Vehicle suffered numerous defects that Plaintiff sought repair thereon and, as such, Plaintiff has sufficient time to investigate any potential fraud during that period.

A three-year limitations period applies to fraud claims. (Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 338, subd. (d).)

Under the delayed discovery rule, a cause of action accrues at the time when the cause of action is complete with all its elements. (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 806-807.)

The test for when the statute of limitations on a claim starts to run under the delayed discovery rule is "whether the plaintiff has information of circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable person on inquiry, or has the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to his or her investigation." (McGee v. Weinberg (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 798, 803.)

"In order to invoke this special defense to the statute of limitations, the plaintiff must specifically plead facts which show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence." (Saliter v. Pierce Brothers Mortuaries (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 292, 300.)

"The burden is on the plaintiff to show diligence, and conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer." (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1319 (internal quotations omitted).

Further, "[i]t has long been established that the defendant's fraud in concealing a cause of action against him tolls the applicable statute of limitations, but only for that period during which the claim is undiscovered by plaintiff or until such time as plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. [Citation.] Like the discovery rule, the rule of fraudulent concealment is an equitable principle designed to effect substantial justice between the parties; its rationale is that the culpable defendant should be estopped from profiting by his own wrong to the extent that it hindered an 'otherwise diligent' plaintiff in discovering his cause of action. [Citations.]" (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Indus. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 931.)

The Court does not believe the statute of limitations started until after purchase of the Vehicle and after successive presentations of the Vehicle to an authorized dealer based on the Engine Defect underlying this cause of action.

Here, the Vehicle was presented to an authorized dealer regarding a number of defects including repeated fluid leaks presenting in December 2020, August 2024 and February 2025.

The Court does not believe that a single repair attempt in December 2020 would start the statute of limitations under the doctrines noted above.

Further, Plaintiff notes that paragraph 21 alleges that FCA's authorized dealer replaced the Vehicle's entire engine long block on February 3, 2025, 46 days before this action was filed.

However, the second and/or third repair attempts would constitute reasonable diligence as to discovery of the defect.

As those second and third repair attempts, however, took place within the last three years from the date of filing on March 21, 2025, the Court overrules the demurrer as to the statute of limitations.

Fraudulent Inducement - Specificity "As with all fraud claims, the necessary elements of a concealment/suppression claim consist of '"(1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage."'" [citation omitted]" (Dhital v. Nissan North America, Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 828, 843.)

"Suppression of a material fact is actionable when there is a duty of disclosure, which may arise from a relationship between the parties, such as a buyer-seller relationship. [citation omitted]" (Id.)

Concealment must be pled with specificity. (Id. at 843-844)

General and conclusory allegations are not sufficient. (Nagy v. Nagy (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1262, 1268.)

Unlike most causes of action where the "the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings," fraud requires particularity, that is, "pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered." (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Every element of a fraud cause of action must be alleged both factually and specifically. (Cooper v. Equity General Insurance (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1252, 1262.)

Less specificity is required when "it appears from the nature of the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of the controversy," (Bradley v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal. App. 3d 818, 825.)

"Even under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ...." (Turner v. Milstein (1951) 103 Cal. App. 2d 651, 658.)

Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 is instructive on the issue of specificity at the pleading stage, providing in relevant part: "Plaintiffs alleged the above elements of fraud in the SAC. As we have discussed, plaintiffs alleged the CVT installed in numerous Nissan vehicles (including the one plaintiffs purchased) were defective; Nissan knew of the defects and the hazards they posed; Nissan had exclusive knowledge of the defects but intentionally concealed and failed to disclose that information; Nissan intended to deceive plaintiffs by concealing known transmission problems; plaintiffs would not have purchased the car if they had known of the defects; and plaintiffs suffered damages in the form of money paid to purchase the car....

Nissan also contends plaintiffs did not provide specifics about what Nissan should have disclosed. But plaintiffs alleged the CVT were defective in that they caused such problems as hesitation, shaking, jerking, and failure to function. The SAC also alleged Nissan was aware of the defects as a result of premarket testing and consumer complaints that were made both to National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and to Nissan and its dealers. It is not clear what additional information Nissan believes should have been included.

We decline to hold (again in the absence of a more developed argument on this point) that plaintiffs were required to include in the SAC more detailed allegations about the alleged defects in the CVT. We conclude plaintiffs' fraud claim was adequately pleaded." (Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844.)

Further, the Court notes less specificity is required if it appears from the nature of allegations that defendant must necessarily possess full information, or if the facts lie more in the knowledge of opposing parties. (Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384-1385.

Here, Plaintiff pleads that the Defective Engine was installed in numerous similar vehicles, that Defendant knew or should have known of the Defective Engine, that Defendant had exclusive knowledge thereof as a result of internal sources or data, including customer complaints, that Defendant failed to disclose the Defective Engine, that Plaintiffs would not have purchased the Vehicle had the Defective Engine been disclosed and that Plaintiffs suffered damages.

Further, to the Court, this goes beyond the defects that are presupposed by the warranty and Plaintiffs have alleged the Engine Defect existed in vehicles of the same engine as the Subject Vehicle, in contrast to the holding in Santana v. FCA US, LLC (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 334, 344.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis.

Fraudulent Inducement - Duty to Disclose As to the allegation of a duty to disclose, there are "'four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.'" (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336.)

However, unless the parties were in a fiduciary relationship, the other three circumstances "presupposes the existence of some other relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in which a duty to disclose can arise." (Id. at p. 337.)

"Thus, a duty to disclose may arise from the relationship between seller and buyer, employer and prospective employee, doctor and patient, or parties entering into any kind of contractual agreement." (Ibid.)

On this issue, the court in Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 844 noted: "In its short argument on this point in its appellate brief, Nissan argues plaintiffs did not adequately plead the existence of a buyer-seller relationship between the parties, because plaintiffs bought the car from a Nissan dealership (not from Nissan itself). At the pleading stage (and in the absence of a more developed argument by Nissan on this point), we conclude plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient. Plaintiffs alleged that they bought the car from a Nissan dealership, that Nissan backed the car with an express warranty, and that Nissan's authorized dealerships are its agents for purposes of the sale of Nissan vehicles to consumers. In light of these allegations, we decline to hold plaintiffs' claim is barred on the ground there was no relationship requiring Nissan to disclose known defects." (Id.)

Here, the amended complaint alleges Defendant FCA provides an express warranty, and that the Subject Vehicle was purchased from an authorized FCA dealership. (FAC P.P.7, 8, 9.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding the allegations are sufficient under Dhital as to the buyer-seller relationship.

Economic Loss Rule As to the economic loss doctrine, "economic loss consists of damage for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product or consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damages to other property." (Food Safety Net Services v. Eco Safe Systems USA, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 118, 1130.)

The economic loss doctrine, in some cases, bars a tort action in the absence of personal injury or physical damage to property. (Robinson Helicopter Co. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 984.)

"The economic loss rule requires a purchaser to recover in contract for purely economic loss due to disappointed expectations, unless he can recover harm above and beyond a broken contractual promise." (Id. at 988.)

The holding of Robinson, permitting both recover under fraud and contract, "is narrow in scope and limited to a defendant's affirmative misrepresentations on which a plaintiff relies and which expose a plaintiff to liability for personal damages independent of the plaintiff's economic loss." (Id. at 993.)

The economic loss rule, therefore, does not bar recovery as to a claim for fraudulent inducement. (Id. at 990; see also Dhital, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at 838.)

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer on this basis, finding an exception to the economic loss doctrine is sufficiently pled here.

Therefore, the Court overrules the demurrer.

FCA is ordered to answer the amended complaint no later than ten (10) days from the date of this hearing.

If no one requests oral argument, under Code of Civil Procedure section 1019.5(a) and California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312(a), no further written order is necessary.

The minute order adopting this tentative ruling will become the order of the court and service by the clerk will constitute notice of the order.

Court reporters are usually not available for law and motion matters in the civil division.

The parties and counsel must provide their own reporter if they want a transcript of the proceedings.

Visalia-County Civic Center Honorable Bret D. Hillman Presiding- Department 2 Examiner notes for probate matters calendared Monday, June 1, 2026, that allow for posting: Status: Recommended for Approval (RFA), Appearance Required or Recommended, Approval Conditional Upon, etc. Case Number |