Pilot Road, LLC, et al. v. Julia Keller, et al.

Pilot Road, LLC, et al. v. Julia Keller, et al.

Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of Complaint

Hearing Date: May 29, 2026

The motion of Defendants Julia Keller, Edward Lovaas, Jay Keller, and DrJChardonnay, Inc. (“DJC”) (collectively, “Defendants”) to strike the exemplary and punitive-damages claims in the Complaint of Plaintiffs Pilot Road, LLC (“Pilot Road”), and Pelio Vineyard, LLC (“Pelio”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. As a result, the Case Management Conference set for June 9, 2026, is CONTINUED to July 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 14.

Complaint.

Pilot Road owns real property at 25 Pilot Road in Carmel Valley (the “Property”). [Complaint at ¶ 17.] When Pilot Road bought the Property in January 2021, two wineries, Blue Fox Cellars (“Blue Fox”) and Cowgirl Winery, were operating there under lease. [Id. at ¶ 18.]

When Cowgirl Winery closed, Plaintiff leased the vacated space to Pelio, who continues to occupy the premises. [Complaint at ¶ 18.]

Ms. Keller and Mr. Lovaas allegedly conducted business as Blue Fox. [Complaint at ¶¶ 3, 6.] Mr. Keller allegedly is the sole shareholder and operator of DJC. [Id. at ¶¶ 4-5.] DJC is the lessee of the part of the Property leased to Blue Fox. [Id. at ¶ 20.] That lease expires on December 31, 2027. [Id. at ¶ 21.]

In their Complaint filed on February 5, 2026, Plaintiffs generally claim that Defendants breached their lease agreement with Pilot Road. These violations include failing to pay their share of utility charges, misusing the premises as both living quarters and a teaching facility, and disturbing Pelio’s customers. [Id. at ¶¶ 24-25, 27.] Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants “often posted false and unprivileged statements on [their] front door and windows about Plaintiffs that were visible to the public,” as well as "dug up and removed trees, and other bushes and plants throughout the Property that belonged to Plaintiffs.” [Id. at ¶¶ 33-34.]

Plaintiffs allege seven causes of action against Defendants, including the Third Cause of Action for Willful Cutting of Growing Trees and the Sixth Cause of Action for Libel. [Complaint at ¶¶ 57-59.] Each cause of action seeks “damages as set forth below.” [Id. at 13:5-6, 15:9-10.] In the Complaint’s “Prayer for Relief,” Plaintiffs seek exemplary and other damages. [Id. at 16:4- 15.]

For the Third Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants “wrongfully entered Plaintiffs’ Property, with full knowledge that Plaintiffs own the Property, and willfully and maliciously cut down and removed several trees located on Plaintiffs’ Property, severely damaging the trees, and causing damage to Plaintiffs’ Property.” [Complaint at ¶ 58.] Plaintiffs seek statutory treble damages for Defendants’ conduct. [Id. at ¶ 59.]

For the Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs allege that they “witnessed hand-made posters taped to the front of [Blue Fox’s] windows and doors on the Blue Fox Premises that contained false and unprivileged writings about Plaintiffs.” [Complaint at ¶ 70.] Such “false and unprivileged statements by Defendants were false when drafted and posted,” and “were placed in areas that were visible by anyone who visited the Blue Fox Premises.” [Id. at ¶¶ 71-72.] The posters’ false and unprivileged content about Plaintiffs exposed them to “hatred, contempt, ridicule, and/or disgrace.” [Id. at ¶ 73.] Plaintiffs allege that the writings were “prepared and posted by Defendants and done so to purposely cause hatred, contempt, ridicule, and/or disgrace to Plaintiffs so as to damage Plaintiffs’ businesses and reputation in the community.” [Id. at ¶ 74.]

Discussion.

1. Meet and Confer Requirement.

Initially, defense counsel Brian D. Liddicoat’s declaration indicates that the meet-andconfer requirement was met. [Liddicoat Decl. at ¶¶ 2-3 and Exhs. A-B; Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5.]

2. Legal Standard.

The court may, upon a motion or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).] The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading that is not drawn or filed in compliance with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).] The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading contains irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in accordance with the laws. [Code Civ. Proc. § 436.] The grounds for moving to strike must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. [Code Civ. Proc. § 437.]

A motion to strike is the proper vehicle to attack a claim for punitive damages where facts alleged do not rise to the level of fraud, malice, or oppression. [Truman v Turning Point of Central Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.]

3. Claims for Exemplary and Punitive Damages.

Defendants move to strike parts of the Complaint because Plaintiffs did not allege specific facts showing malice, oppression, or fraud. Even in cases involving intentional torts, Defendants argue that broad assertions are not enough under Civil Code section 3294. That law allows plaintiffs to recover exemplary or punitive damages if they prove the defendant was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. [Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).] Malice means conduct intended to

cause injury or despicable conduct carried out with a willful and conscious disregard for others' rights or safety. [Id. at subd. (c)(1).] Oppression refers to despicable conduct that subjects someone to cruel and unjust hardship, knowing it violates their rights. [Id. at subd. (c)(2).] Fraud involves intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant, with the goal of depriving someone of property or legal rights or causing injury. [Id. at subd. (c)(3).]

Defendants argue that the Complaint does not contain enough allegations to meet section 3294 requirements, such as proof that Defendants intended to harm Plaintiffs, engaged in despicable conduct knowingly disregarding Plaintiffs’ rights, or made fraudulent misrepresentations aiming to deprive them. Additionally, Defendants assert that the Complaint fails to sufficiently allege facts under section 3294 regarding the corporate defendant DJC.

In their opposition, Plaintiffs contend that punitive damages are sufficiently pled under the Third and Sixth Causes of Action.

a. Libel.

To plead libel under the Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs must allege that Defendants published a false statement about them to a third party, and that this falsehood caused harm to Plaintiffs. [Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1173.] Without a privilege, the general rule is that anyone involved in publishing a false and libelous statement can be held liable for damages, including special, general, and punitive damages. [Di Giorgio Corp. v. Valley Labor Citizen (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 268, 273.]

As detailed above, Plaintiffs’ libel claims are outlined in paragraphs 33 and 71 to 74 of the Complaint. Due to the Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiffs have provided a basis for exemplary or punitive damages. However, the Complaint overall and the Sixth Cause of Action specifically lack sufficient facts to demonstrate that Defendants are, among other things, guilty of malice under Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (c)(1). Although Plaintiffs claim that the statements Defendants allegedly made on various handmade posters were false, there is no allegation regarding Defendants’ knowledge of the statements’ falsity. [See Complaint at ¶¶ 71-74.] Based on this, the motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

b. Malicious Cutting of Trees.

The statutory tree-cutting claim allows for treble damages [Civ. Code § 3346; Code Civ. Proc. § 733], not punitive damages. Therefore, Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to support a punitive-damages claim. [See Civ. Code § 3294.] Plaintiffs allege that Defendants unlawfully entered the Property and intentionally and maliciously cut down and removed several trees. [Complaint at ¶ 58.] However, that paragraph is inadequate because it lacks facts showing that Defendants intended to cause injury to Plaintiffs or engaged in despicable conduct with a willful and conscious disregard for others' rights or safety [Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (c).] For this reason, the motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

c. Exemplary-Damages Allegations Against DJC.

Defendants move to strike parts of the Complaint that seek punitive or exemplary damages against DJC, a corporate defendant. Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (b), states:

An employer shall not be liable for damages pursuant to subdivision (a), based upon acts of an employee of the employer, unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee and employed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.

Plaintiffs argue that the Complaint states Mr. Keller is the only shareholder and operator of DJC. [Complaint at ¶ 5.] Plaintiffs also claim that Mr. Keller signed the Estoppel Certificate on behalf of DJC. [Id. at 19.] Therefore, Plaintiffs assert that the Complaint alleges Defendants, including Mr. Keller, made knowingly false statements.

However, the Sixth Cause of Action fails to provide facts identifying the specific defendants who made and posted the allegedly false and unprivileged statements. [See Complaint at ¶ 74.] Therefore, the Complaint currently does not include specific facts demonstrating that an officer, director, or managing agent of DJC personally engaged in, authorized, or ratified conduct amounting to oppression, fraud, or malice. Because there are no connected allegations linking Mr. Keller, as the alleged corporate officer of DJC, to the conduct described in the Sixth Cause of Action, the motion is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Conclusion.

The motion to strike is GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiffs have 10 days from the date of service of the Notice of the Court’s signed order to amend the Complaint consistent with this Court’s order. [Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 3.1320, subd. (g).]

The initial Case Management Conference set for June 9, 2026, is CONTINUED to July 28, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 14.

Defendants shall prepare the Proposed Order consistent with this Tentative Ruling.

NOTE RE TENTATIVE RULING

This tentative ruling becomes the court’s order, and no hearing shall be held unless one of the parties contests it by following Rule 3.1308 of the California Rules of Court and Monterey County Local Rule 7.9. Those parties wishing to present an oral argument must notify all other parties and the Court no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing; otherwise, NO

ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE PERMITTED, AND THE TENTATIVE RULING WILL BECOME THE ORDER OF THE COURT AND THE HEARING VACATED. You must notify the court by email or by calling the Calendar Department at 831-647-5800, extension 3040, before 4:00 p.m. on the court day before the hearing.

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