PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al.

For the reasons discussed below, the anti-SLAPP motion is GRANTED.

LEGAL STANDARD

“A SLAPP suit is a meritless suit filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment rights.” (Finton Construction, Inc. v.Bidna& Keys, APLC(2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 208.) Trial courts evaluate anti-SLAPP motions using a two-step process.(Id. at209.)First, the Court must decide whether the moving party has shown that the challenged cause of action 25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 arises from a protected activity.(Id.)The moving party must meet this burden by“demonstrate[ing] that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’as defined in the statute.”(Id.[citing CCP § 425.16(b)(1)].)

If the moving party satisfies the first prong,the burden shifts to the opposing party to demonstratea probability of prevailing on the claim.(Id.)“Only a cause of action that satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute – i.e., that arises from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal merit – is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.” (Id.)

DISCUSSION

Protected Activity

First, the Court must determine whether cross-defendants have made a threshold showing that the cross-complaint arises from protected activity. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) The Court looks to the allegations in the pleading to determine whether the causes of action are based on protected activity.

Under the first cause of action for violation of constitutional due process rights, Baum alleges that on 6/24/2025, Morrison, three Oakland Police Department officers, and an unidentified woman entered the subject property without Baum’s permission and took photos of the property. (CC ¶ 29.)

On 7/1/2025, Baum filed a federal civil rights complaint against Morrison and the Port in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California (Baum v. Morrison, Case No. 25-cv-5509, the “district court action”) and sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to prevent the Port from ejecting them from the Property. In response to that motion, the Port, represented by Saffouri, filed a declaration by Murtha supporting Murtha’s determination that the Port owns the subject property and stating that public assessor records reflecting that the Property is owned by a railroad are “in error,” and that Murtha has “been in contact with the Alameda County Assessor to correct them.” (Id. ¶ 19 Ex. D.)

On 8/22/2025, Baum received a five-day notice to quit. Baum discovered at some point thereafter that the Assessor had updated the public record to identify the owner of the Property as the City of Oakland. (CC ¶ 22, Ex. E.) On 9/4/2025, Saffouri sent Baum a letter explaining that in 1929, title to the property was transferred from Western Pacific Railroad Company and Standard Realty and Development Company to the City of Oakland by means of a quitclaim deed. (CC Ex. F.) Saffouri explained that because the Property is in the Port Area, the Port has exclusive jurisdiction and is lawfully exercising its right to remove Baum and recover possession

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 of the Property. (Id.)

On 9/8/2025, Baum filed a “formal complaint” with the Assessor requesting that the ownership change be rescinded. (CC ¶ 25.) On 9/15/2025, the Port commenced this action for quiet title, declaratory relief, trespass, and ejectment. On 2/9/2026, Baum filed this cross-complaint.

First cause of action: This claim arises from two distinct sets of activities or occurrences: (1) cross-defendants’ uninvited entry on the subject premises, and (2) Murtha’s request to Phong La and Assessor to investigate the public record regarding the ownership of the subject property. (See CC ¶¶ 29-31.) Where, as here, a cause of action is “mixed” because it arises from both protected and unprotected activity, the Court disregards the unprotected activity during the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis. “When relief is sought based on allegations of both protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is disregarded at this stage.

If the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396.) Thus, to the extent this first cause of action arises from protected activity it is subject to the anti-SLAPP analysis.

Second cause of action: This claim “for declaratory relief from extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation” appears to arise both from Murtha’s communication with the Assessor regarding the “change of ownership” of the Property (see id. ¶ 34 [“There was prejudicial, unlawful, fraudulent, and deceitful conduct committed by cross-defendants Murtha, the Port of Oakland, and its attorney Saffouri, before their original complaint was filed, by their solicitation of the extrajudicial change and backdating of the name of the owner of the Property, by crossdefendants Assessor Phong La, and the Alameda County Assessor’s Office, from the W.P. RR Co. to the City of Oakland.”]); and from the Port’s inclusion of related documents in its filings in the district court action (see id. ¶ 35 [“The Port cross-defendants’ inclusion of a fraudulently obtained document in their pleadings, and their material misrepresentation of its fraudulent origin by omission, is not protected from declaratory relief by the litigation privilege”].)

Third cause of action: This claim for “aiding and abetting extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation” is directly related to the second cause of action, i.e., cross-defendants’ communications with the Assessor’s Office and Murtha’s filing of a declaration in the district court action attesting that the subject property is owned by the Port of Oakland. (See id. ¶¶ 37-40, Ex. D [Murtha Decl.].)

The first (in part), second, and third causes of action all arise from protected activity: crossdefendants’ request that the Assessor investigate title to the Property and correct the public record (i.e., the alleged “extra-judicial” action). This type of communication to a public agency is protected activity under section 425.16(e) because it is a “statement before an official proceeding,” even if the statement is simply to request an investigation. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1009.) To the extent cross-defendants sought the investigation to support their defense to the district court action, the communications are also protected communications made in the course of that litigation. (See Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 908 [finding that “statements made in connection with or in preparation of litigation are subject to section 425.16.”].)

Baum opposes this motion on the ground that the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply to the crosscomplaint at all, because it is a mandatory cross-complaint and “a mandatory cross-complaint not subject to an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Opp. at p. 2.) Some cross-complaints are subject to anti- SLAPP protection and some are not. “A compulsory cross-complaint on a ‘related cause of action’ against the plaintiff (§ 426.30, subd. (a)) would rarely, if ever, qualify as a SLAPP suit arising from petition activity.

By definition, a ‘related cause of action’ is ‘a cause of action which arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause of action which the plaintiff alleges in his complaint.’ (§ 426.10, subd. (c), emphasis added.)” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651 (partially overruled on other grounds).) Baum contends that the cross-complaint “arose from circumstances that occurred both before and after the federal Complaint was filed” and “[t]hese claims are valid whatever the outcome of the quiet title action, and are, therefore, not related to that action.” (See Opp. at p.3.)

Baum’s characterization of the cross-complaint is consistent with and reinforces the Court’s reading, i.e., that the causes of action arise from protected activity (cross-defendants’ investigation request to the Assessor and related filings in the district court action) which occurred before the Port commenced this quiet title action. The anti-SLAPP statute therefore applies to this cross-complaint because it arises (in large part) from public agency communications and petitioning activity.

Having found that the first (in part), second, and third causes of action arise from protected activities, the burden shifts to Baum to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits of the cross-claims.

Probability of Prevailing on the Merits

The second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis “is a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at 384.) At this stage, “[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff's evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant's showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff's claim as a matter of law.” (Id. at 384-85.)

First Cause of Action: On this cause of action, Baum seeks damages based on cross-defendants’ alleged violation of their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As discussed above, this is a “mixed” cause of action arising from both protected activity (Murtha’s

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 request to La and the Assessor to investigate the public record regarding the ownership of the Property) and unprotected activity (cross-defendants’ uninvited entry on the subject premises). (See CC ¶¶ 29-31.)

If, as here, “the court determines that relief is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute, the second step is reached. There, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that each challenged claim based on protected activity is legally sufficient and factually substantiated.” (Baral, 1 Cal.5th at 396.) Thus, this portion of the analysis is limited to the factual allegations related arising solely from protected activity.

Baum alleges that cross-defendants undertook to communicate with the Assessor in support of their position in the district court action. (See CC ¶¶ 18-27.) Because these actions were taken in connection with the district court action, they were protected petitioning activity. Thus, the alleged conduct is subject to litigation privilege. (See Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 [“the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action.”].)

The privilege is “absolute in nature” and is broadly applied to all torts, including claims sounding in defamation, abuse of process, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, fraud, and negligence. (Id. at 215.)

Baum argues that litigation privilege does not apply because “an official proceeding is not involved” and cross-defendants’ “extra-judicial attempts” to remove cross-complainants from the property by updating the public record to reflect the Port’s ownership were not made through the state court system. (Opp. at p. 10.) Baum does not clearly articulate this argument, and the Court does not find it persuasive. Because the litigation privilege applies to this cause of action, Baum cannot state this claim as a matter of law.

Accordingly, the motion is GRANTED as to the first cause of action, but only to the extent it arises from protected activity. To the extent the first cause of action arises from unprotected activity (see, e.g., CC at ¶ 29), the Court will address any sufficiency of pleading arguments or other challenges addressing those allegations in its orders on cross-defendants’ pending demurrers.

Second cause of action for “declaratory relief from extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation”: This cause of action alleges that “prejudicial, unlawful, fraudulent, and deceitful conduct committed by cross-defendants” forms the basis for the Port’s claim of ownership of the subject property and has prejudiced Baum’s rights in this action, and “will have a significant impact on the outcome of the case unless it is acknowledged and corrected.” (See CC ¶¶ 34-35.) Baum requests a declaratory judgment “stating that the extrajudicial change and backdating of the name of the owner to the City of Oakland is void and should be rescinded by the Assessor.” (Id. ¶ 35.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 The above allegations concern past conduct by the cross-defendants. “Declaratory relief is available to a party ‘who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another ....’ (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1060.)” (Monterey Coastkeeper v. Cent. Coast Reg'l Water Quality Control Bd. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) But “[d]eclaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are committed. Thus the remedy is to be used to advance preventative justice, to declare rather than execute rights.” (Ibid.) “In essence, declaratory relief operates to declare future rights, not to address past wrongs.” (Ibid.)

Because Baum’s declaratory relief cause of action concerns alleged past wrongdoing by crossdefendants, declaratory relief is not available. Although Baum contends that evidence exists regarding ownership of the Property, the opposition does not address the fundamental deficiency articulated in the motion, which is that declaratory relief is unavailable in this context. Accordingly, Baum has not stated a legally sufficient claim. The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the second cause of action.

Third cause of action for “aiding and abetting extrinsic fraud and misrepresentation”: The third cause of action alleges that Saffouri and La aided and abetted “the foregoing extrinsic fraud.” (Id. ¶ 37.) Baum identifies the “extrinsic fraud” as Saffouri’s filing of Murtha’s declaration attesting to ownership of the subject property, and containing Murtha’s surveyor’s stamp, in the district court action (CC ¶ 38); Saffouri’s participation in Murtha’s “fraudulent” contact with the Assessor which resulted in the change in the public record (id. ¶ 39); and La’s knowledge and support of the “fraudulent scheme of the Port defendants to extra-judicially change the ownership of the property” (id. ¶¶ 39-40).

As discussed above, the underlying communications between cross-defendants and the Assessor, and cross-defendants submission of related documents in the district court action, were protected activity. To the extent those actions were undertaken in connection with the district court action, they were protected petitioning activity. Thus, the alleged conduct comprising “aiding and abetting” is subject to litigation privilege. (See Silberg, 50 Cal.3d at 212. As noted above, the privilege is “absolute in nature.” (Id. at 215.)

Cross-defendants argue that Baum also fails to state a claim for aiding and abetting because the cross-complaint does not allege compliance with the Government Claims Act. Before filing a lawsuit for damages against a public entity, the plaintiff must present a written claim to the entity. (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) Tort claims are subject to the claim presentation requirement. (City of Stockton v. Superior Ct. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 738.) The “failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (Id.) The cross-complaint alleges that “Cross-claimants intend to file government claims,” but do not allege compliance. (See CC ¶ 1.) Based on this admission, Baum’s claims against the public entities are barred as a matter of law. The Court need not reach cross-defendants’ remaining

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 argument regarding public entity immunity.

As discussed above in connection with the first cause of action, Baum argues that litigation privilege does not apply, but fails to clearly articulate this argument, and the Court does not find it persuasive. The Court finds that Baum has not shown a probability of prevailing on the second or third causes of action. The motion is therefore GRANTED as to the second and third causes of action in the cross-complaint.

ORDER

The motion is GRANTED. The cross-complaint is DISMISSED IN PART as to the first cause of action, to the extent it is based on protected activity, and DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY as to the second and third causes of action.

Attorneys’ Fees

Cross-defendants request $24,295.13 in attorneys’ fees incurred in bringing this motion. A prevailing defendant on an anti-SLAPP motion “shall be entitled to recover that defendant's attorney's fees and costs.” (CCP § 425.16(c)(1).) The attorneys’ fees appear reasonable and are GRANTED.

Cross-Motion to Disqualify Hussein Saffouri

Baum’s request to disqualify Hussein Saffouri is DENIED. Even if the Court were to entertain this request as part of Baum’s opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion instead of a separately noticed motion (it does not), Baum identifies no factual or legal basis to disqualify Saffouri from representing the Port and other cross-defendants in this case. Cross-complainants chose to name Saffouri as a cross-defendant in his capacity as counsel for the Port, but there is no apparent conflict among the cross-defendants he represents. “In the absence of an actual conflict between an opposing attorney's clients, a party should not be able to create one through the simple expediency of filing a cross-complaint.” (Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. La Conchita Ranch Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 856, 862.)

Baum’s objections to the declaration of Hussein Saffouri is OVERRULED.

*If a party does not timely contest the tentative ruling and appear at the hearing, the tentative ruling will become the order of the Court.*

How to Contest a Tentative Ruling

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

25CV143027: PORT OF OAKLAND, A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, ACTING BY AND THROUGH ITS BOARD OF PORT COMMISSIONERS vs BAUM, et al. 05/28/2026 Hearing on Special Motion to Strike under CCP Section 425.16 (Anti-SLAPP motion) filed by Port of Oakland, a municipal corporation, acting by and through its Board of Port Commissioners (Plaintiff) CRS# A-143027-001 in Department 23 Through the eCourt Public Portal

To contest a tentative ruling, notify the Court and all parties no later than 4:00 p.m. one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue by completing the following steps:

1. Log in to the eCourt Public Portal.

2. Select Case Search.

3. Enter the case number and select Search.

4. Select the case name.

5. Select the Tentative Rulings tab.

6. Click “Contest This Ruling.”

7. Enter your name and reason for contesting.

8. Select Proceed.

You must also notify the department and all opposing parties by 4:00 p.m. one court day before the hearing. Notice to the department must be sent to: Dept23@alameda.courts.ca.gov.

Remote Appearance Information

For Department 23 Zoom appearance information, please visit:

https://eportal.alameda.courts.ca.gov/?q=node/397/1152402

Please provide this information to any self-represented or opposing parties.