Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Kenneth Salomon

Through the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) in the Breach of Contract Action, CVC prays the Court for a declaration of CVC and CVHG’s respective rights in and to those proceeds, pursuant to their written agreement. (See, e.g., FAC at ¶¶ 15-17, 31-35, and Prayer at 12:4-11.) As such, the Court finds common questions of law and fact between the two actions, and further finds that consolidation would promote convenient and judicial economy. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 1048, subs. (a); see also Wouldridge v. Burnes, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d 86.)

That the Breach of Contract Action also seeks damages for alleged breach, by CVHG, of the parties’ agreement does not, in the Court’s estimation, defeat the advantages of consolidation.

Based on the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED.

Wells Fargo Bank, NA v. Kenneth Salomon 25CV001875

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is DENIED. Defendant is granted 15 days’ leave from notice of entry of order to file and serve a response to the Summons and Complaint. (Code Civ. Proc., § 418.10, subd. (b).) Plaintiff is directed to provide notice of entry of order.

Defendant Kenneth Salomon (“Defendant”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), 5 for an order quashing Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank’s (“Plaintiff”) personal service of the summons and complaint on Defendant on March 31, 2026.

“A defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: (1) To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (§ 418.10, subd. (a)(1).)

Defendant argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over him because service of the summons and complaint was not completed within 180 days of filing the complaint on September 11, 2025, as required by Rules of Court, rule 3.740(d).

In Opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute the 180-day service- and proof-filing deadline, or that Plaintiff failed to comply with that deadline. However, Plaintiff argues that noncompliance is not a jurisdictional defect or a ground to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1), and it alone does not render service void. Rather, the consequence for noncompliance is set out in rule 3.740(e), which provides that the Court may issue an OSC regarding reasonable monetary sanctions. Plaintiff points out that Defendant has not challenged any other defect in the service.

Defendant filed nothing by way of a reply or response to the Opposition.

5 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

The Court agrees with Plaintiff. Rule 3.740 is not a jurisdictional rule; rather, it establishes case management procedures for collections cases. Subdivision (e) of rule 3.740 is entitled “Effect of failure to serve within required time” and provides the mechanism by which noncompliance with the 180-day service rule is handled by the court—i.e., the court may set an OSC why reasonable monetary sanctions should not be imposed, which hearing is to be continued if plaintiff thereafter files a proof of service.

This timing requirement is a procedural mandate designed to promote efficient case management rather than jurisdictional prerequisites that affect the court’s fundamental authority. In sum, Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint is not void solely by the fact that service occurred outside of the 180-day deadline. Defendant raises no other challenges to service. Therefore, the Motion is DENIED.

Integon National Insurance Company v. Andrew Madison 26CV000413 Mackenzie-Davis et al

MOTION BY PLAINTIFF FOR ORDER PERMITTING SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT ON DEFENDANT ANDREW MADISON MACKENZIE-DAVIS BY PUBLICATION

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is GRANTED. The Court will sign the proposed order.

Plaintiff Integon National Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) moves, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 415.50, 6 for an order directing that service of the summons and complaint in this action on defendant Andrew Madison Mackenzie-Davis (“Mackenzie-Davis”) be effected by publication of the summons in a newspaper of general circulation in Napa County.

The matter originally came on for hearing on May 8, 2026. Attorney Robert Stoll appeared on behalf of defendant Bryson Hall, who is involved in separate litigation with Mackenzie-Davis in another California state court. Attorney Stoll represented that Plaintiff is apparently providing Mackenzie-Davis a defense in the separate litigation. Therefore, Attorney Stoll argued, Plaintiff’s contention that it cannot locate Mackenzie-Davis for purposes of the instant motion lacks credibility. Attorney Patrick Howe appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

No one appeared on behalf of Mackenzie-Davis. Attorney Howe did not dispute that Plaintiff is providing a defense to Mackenzie-Davis in the separate litigation. However, Attorney Howe stated that Plaintiff is represented by separate attorneys in that litigation and that Mackenzie- Davis has an interest in Plaintiff losing the present case. The Court continued the matter to allow Attorney Stoll to serve and file a response to the motion by May 22, 2026. Attorney Howe was granted leave to file a Reply no later than May 27, 2026.

There is nothing new on file from the May 8, 2026 hearing.

“A summons may be served by publication if upon affidavit it appears to the satisfaction of the court in which the action is pending that the party to be served cannot with reasonable

6 All subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

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