Jussila v. AAA Insurance Company

sanctions in the amount of $4,060.00 against Defendant and Defendant’s counsel, Christina N. Muñoz. If a timely motion to compel has been filed, the burden is on the responding party to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the interrogatories. (Coy v. Sup.Ct. (Wolcher) (1962) 58 Cal. 2d 210, 220-221.)

On July 17, 2025, Plaintiff served Form Interrogatories, Set One, and Special Interrogatories, Set One, on Defendant Ernest Ongaro and Sons, Inc. (Kayne Decl., ¶ 5, Exhibits A, B) This motion was filed on November 20, 2025. Counsel continued to meet and confer regarding Plaintiff’s discovery requests. Subsequent to filing this motion, Defendant provided amended responses. From the responses provided, it appears that Defendant fully responded to Form Interrogatory numbers 13.1, 13.2. In reply, Plaintiff states that Defendant has still not provided code-compliant responses to Form Interrogatory 14.1 and Special Interrogatories 2 through 17 and 36 through 39.

a. Form Interrogatory Number 14.1 In opposition, Defendant argues it fully responded but states it will provide an amended response.

b. Special Interrogatories 2-17, 36-39 Defendant maintains that as a lay witness, it does not have the legal training nor sophistication to make legal conclusions as required by Special Interrogatories 2 through 17 and 36 through 39. Despite this, it states in a good faith effort to narrow down the scope of issues presented, Defendant intends to serve a second set of further amended responses, clarifying its position as it relates to Special Interrogatories 2 through 17 and 36 through 39.

c. Sanctions Defendant has not justified the objections. Therefore, sanctions are appropriate. Plaintiff seeks $4,060.00 against Defendant and its counsel of record, Christina N. Muñoz. Plaintiff’s counsel states he has expended approximately 6 hours in pursuit of this matter, including research for and preparation of the meet and confer letter, the meet-and-confer call with defense counsel, follow-up emails to defense counsel, research for this motion, and drafting of this motion, including the notice and memorandum of points and authorities, supporting declaration, separate statement and proposed order, and identification and compilation of exhibits for the motion. (Kayne decl., ¶15.)

He anticipates another 4 hours for the reply. (Ibid.) Based upon Defendant’s concessions in opposition, and significant overlap with Plaintiff’s counsel’s meet and confer efforts and the reply for the motion to compel requests for production, this court finds sanctions in the amount of $2,860 are reasonable against Defendant and its counsel of record.

d. Conclusion and Order The motion is GRANTED as follows. Defendant is directed to provide further responses to Plaintiff’s form interrogatory, number 14.1, and special interrogatories, numbers 2 through 17 and 36 through 39, and to pay sanctions as against Defendant and Christina N. Muñoz in the amount of $2,860 within 30 days of the service of this order. Plaintiff’s counsel is directed to submit a written order to the court consistent with this ruling and in compliance with Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.

5. 25CV07912, Jussila v. AAA Insurance Company

Defendant American Automobile Association, Northern California, Nevada & Utah (“AAA”) moves for an order quashing the purported service of summons and complaint by Plaintiffs John Jussila and Linda Jussila (“Plaintiffs”). 9

On December 1, 2025, Plaintiffs filed proof of service of summons on “House Agent AAA NCNU.” (RJN, Exhiti A.) It indicates Plaintiff served CT Corporation System, Registered Agent” at 330 N. Brand Blvd., Ste 700, Glendale, CA 91203. (Ibid.) This motion is based upon evidence presented in and attached to the declaration of Kimberlei Evans. That declaration has not been filed. Instead, it appears AAA inadvertently twice filed the declaration of Kristin Choi. Accordingly, the motion is CONTINUED to June 10, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16, to allow AAA to file the Evans declaration.

6. SCV-267534, Garcia v. Rustic Bakery, Inc.

This matter was inadvertently set twice for a final compliance hearing. When the parties appeared on March 18, 2026, the final compliance hearing was continued to July 29, 2026, at 3:00 p.m., in Department 16. Therefore, this hearing is taken off calendar and the final compliance hearing will be on July 29.

7. SCV-273553, Insurance Company of the West, a California Corporation v. Blakeslee

Defendant Christopher Terrell Blakeslee (“Defendant”) moves pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2023.030(a) and 2023.010(d) for an order compelling Plaintiff Ephraim Giron Goltiao (“Plaintiff”) to respond to and answer Dr. McIntire’s questions regarding Plaintiff’s medical history at the time of the IME with Dr. McIntire. Defendant requests sanctions in the amount of $4,440.

1. Independent Medical Examination (“IME”) In response to Defendant’s noticing an IME for Plaintiff, Plaintiff provided a response and objections. (McGruder decl., Exhibit B.) Plaintiff objected, in part: “Defendants’ demand for the physical examination of Plaintiff improperly seeks to subject Plaintiff to an oral examination of his history. The Civil Discovery Act does not expressly authorize a medical examiner to conduct an oral examination of a party’s ‘history’. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to take a history of Plaintiff.”

Defendant argues not allowing the medical examiner to obtain an oral history related to Plaintiff’s injuries would be prejudicial as it would significantly limit the utility of the IME. Plaintiff alleges he sustained neck and back injuries as well as a traumatic brain injury as a result of the subject accident, reporting ongoing symptoms including dizziness and vertigo, severe headache episodes, constant ringing in his ears, tingling and numbness in his right arm, and intermittent right knee pain. In taking an oral history related to the accident, Dr. McIntire, a board-certified neurologist physician, will seek to understand the exact nature of each of these symptoms, how they evolved since the accident, and whether the symptoms/conditions make sense neurologically or can be reasonably attributed to the accident in question.

Defendant cites Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844 for the proposition that the scope of permitted inquiry depends upon the nature of the injuries which the patient litigant himself has brought before the court. As relevant here, Britt discussed the defendant’s challenge to the trial court’s discovery order compelling them to disclose their entire lifetime medical histories. “Plaintiffs stress, in this regard, that while they are completely willing to provide defendant with medical information which relates in any way to the physical or emotional injuries for which they seek recovery in the underlying action—and, indeed, that they have already done so—they object to the trial court's unlimited order which requires them to comply with defendant's request for 10