Defendant’s Demurrer to Amended Complaint
brought to the attention of the Court by ex parte motion. Counsel has 15 days from the date of the enclosed certificate of mailing in which to exercise any rights under CCP § 170.6.
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15 Sandoval vs. Defendant's Demurrer to Amended Complaint Riverside County The Court previously issued a tentative ruling (ROA 370) that CVRI2502556 proposed overruling Riverside Superior Court’s (RSC) and Does 1- 100’s demurrer in its entirety. At the hearing, RSC advanced new arguments about judicial immunity that weren’t fully briefed in the moving papers. The Court continued the hearing on the demurrer and ordered supplemental briefing on judicial immunity.
For the reasons set forth below, the demurrer is OVERRULED. However, given the state of judicial immunity case law in California, all parties should be aware that the Court will not consider injunctive relief against RSC or Does 1-100 on the present record, only declaratory relief.
Defendant RSC shall file its answer by June 12, 2026.
GROUNDS FOR RULING
I. Prior Tentative Ruling
The Court incorporates the prior tentative ruling by reference. The only live issue for purposes of the present ruling is judicial immunity.
II. Judicial Immunity
RSC and Does 1-100 (the individual judicial officers of RSC) contend they are immune from suit under California law.
“California’s courts have had little to say in published opinions about the reach of judicial immunity.” (Mahler v. Judicial Council of California (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 82, 109.) Accordingly, California follows the view of the federal courts on the scope of judicial immunity. (Id., at p. 110.) At the time Mahler was decided,
federal law—and thus California law—barred “claims for prospective injunctive relief against judicial officials acting in their judicial capacity,” with a limited exception permitting such relief “when a declaratory decree is violated or declaratory relief is unavailable.” (Id., at p. 109 (quoting Justice Network Inc. v. Craighead County (8th Cir. 2019) 931 F.3d 753, 763).) However, because it was “the universal view of the federal courts . . . that the doctrine of judicial immunity has never foreclosed declaratory relief,” Mahler adopted that holding as well. (Id., at p. 110.)
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Under Mahler, then, judicial officers acting in their judicial capacities were immune from suits for damages and suits for prospective injunctive relief (with narrow exceptions), but not from suits for declaratory relief. RSC and Does 1-100 argue the federal law of judicial immunity has since evolved, and suits for declaratory relief are now barred as well.
Their argument is based on Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson (2021) 595 U.S.
30. Whole Woman’s Health was a challenge to Texas’s privately enforced abortion ban. The petitioners sued to enjoin numerous state officials from taking any action to enforce the statute. Relevant here, they named a Texas state court judge and court clerk as defendants. Although only one judge and clerk were named, the petitioners “intend[ed] to seek an order enjoining all state-court clerks from docketing S.B. 8 cases and all state-court judges from hearing them.” (Id., at p. 39.)
The Supreme Court “[a]lmost immediately” identified the flaw in petitioners’ theory: “Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” (Ibid.) And while Ex Parte Young (1908) 209 U.S. 123 recognized a “narrow exception” allowing federal courts to enjoin state executive officials in certain circumstances, “this traditional exception does not normally permit federal courts to issue injunctions against state-court judges or clerks.” (595 U.S. at 39.)
As the foregoing makes clear, Whole Women’s Health is about sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, not judicial immunity. The Supreme Court said nothing about whether the judge was immune from suit because he was a judge. Rather, he was immune from suit because the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity barred suit, and the limited Ex Parte Young exception was inapplicable to him.
Notably, both Whole Women’s Health and Ex Parte Young hold that issuing an injunction against a state court judge “would be a
violation of the whole scheme of our Government.” (Ibid. (quoting Ex Parte Young, supra, 209 U.S. at p. 163).) Of course, the relevant “scheme of our Government” is the federal system. A federal court enjoining or issuing declaratory relief against a state judge is the violation. A state court enjoining or issuing declaratory relief against a judge of that state poses no federalism concerns. In any event, the Eleventh Amendment has no application in state courts, and RSC and Does 1-100 make no argument that sovereign immunity applies.
RSC and Does 1-100 also rely on Whole Women’s Health’s holding that “‘no case or controversy’ exists ‘between a judge who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the constitutionality of the statute.’” (Id., at p. 40.) Their reliance on this language is misplaced, because it omits important context. In addition to the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court found article III of the United States Constitution barred the petitioners’ suit. “Article III of the Constitution affords federal courts the power to resolve only ‘actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.’ [Citation.] . . .
Judges exist to resolve controversies about a law’s meaning or its conformance to the Federal and State Constitutions, not to wage battle as contestants in the parties’ litigation.” (Id., at pp. 39-40.) Absent a live case or controversy, the judicial power of the United States didn’t reach the petitioners’ claims.
California law is different. “The California Constitution does not impose the same ‘case-or-controversy’ limit on state courts’ jurisdiction as article III of the United States Constitution does on federal courts.” (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 936 fn. 11.) Simply put, article III and the case-orcontroversy requirement are irrelevant to this case.
III.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in the original tentative ruling, and for the reasons set forth above, the demurrer is overruled. However, as Mahler holds, prospective injunctive relief against judges is improper unless (1) a judge has violated a declaratory decree or (2) declaratory relief is unavailable. In this case, no declaratory decree has yet been issued. Nor may Plaintiffs plead that declaratory relief is unavailable when they seek declaratory relief against RSC and Does 1-100. As a result, while the 2AC will move forward against RSC and Does 1-100, declaratory relief against these parties will be the only form of relief available on this record.
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