Darnell Johnson v. Narinder Bains, et al.

See Complaint, Cause of Actions (filed: Sept. 29, 2025). Plaintiff alleges that these representations were false; that Defendants failed to maintain Plaintiff’s unit (“the Premises”) in a habitable condition as there was rats, roaches, lack of repairs, and unsafe living conditions; and that Defendants withheld or destroyed Plaintiff’s personal property, discriminated against him based on race and disability, and wrongfully withheld his security deposit. Id.

On November 4, 2025, Defendant Sullivan filed this Demurrer to each of the causes of action1 in the Complaint on the grounds they fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a

1 Although Sullivan’s notice of demurrer mentions Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Civil

Rights Violations, his Memorandum of Points and Authorities In Support of the Demurrer does not address this Cause of Action at all. Accordingly, the Demurrer as to the Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Civil Rights Violations is unfounded, unsupported and OVERRULED. (See Citizens for Positive Growth & Preservation v. City of Sacramento (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 609, 629 [“‘A point which is merely suggested by . . .

cause of action and are uncertain. Demurrer at 1:17-24.

I. Sullivan’s Demurrer

Sullivan demurs on the grounds that the Complaint under Section 430.10(e) fails to state sufficient facts to constitute any cause of action and under Section 430.10(f) is uncertain for all causes of action. Demurrer at 1:17-24.

A. Sullivan’s Request for Judicial Notice is Denied.

Sullivan requests judicial notice of the following:

1) Substitution of Attorney (Exhibit A).

2) Default judgment entered against Plaintiff for Bains (Exhibit B).

3) Eviction Information from Sheriff (Exhibit C).

4) Return on Writ of Possession of Real Property by Santa Clara Office of the Sheriff-Civil Division (Exhibit D).

5) Motion to Set Aside Default/Default Judgment (Exhibit E).

6) Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Default/Default Judgment (Exhibit F).

7) Email from Johnson to Sullivan regarding disposition of personal property (Exhibit G).

Each request for judicial notice is DENIED as improper and unfounded. Sullivan attempts to use the exhibits to raise disputes of factual issues and to argue facts outside the four corners of the pleading. But on demurrer “‘a court’s function is limited to testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.’ . . . ‘A demurrer is simply not the appropriate procedure for determining the truth of disputed facts.’ . . . The hearing on demurrer may not be turned into a contested evidentiary hearing[.]’” (Fremont Indemnity Co. v.

Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 113-114.) Moreover, his judicial notice request merely lists the documents for which judicial notice is sought, without providing any information explaining why judicial notice is proper. (See e.g., Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co., Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 736, 744 [“The burden is on the party seeking judicial notice to provide sufficient information to allow the court to take judicial notice.”].) Accordingly, the request for Judicial Notice is DENIED in its entirety.

counsel, with no supporting argument or authority, is deemed to be without foundation and requires no discussion.’”].

B. Legal Standard on Demurrer

“The party against whom complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer or answer as provided in [Code of Civil Procedure] section 430.30, to the pleading on any one or more of the following grounds: . . . (e) The pleading does not state sufficient facts to constitute cause of action, (f) The pleading is uncertain.” (C.C.P. § 430.10(e) & (f).)

A demurrer may be used by “[t]he party against whom complaint has been filed” to object to the legal sufficiency of the pleading as whole, or to any “cause of action” stated therein, on one or more of the grounds enumerated by statute. (C.C.P. §§ 430.10 & 430.50(a).)

“A demurrer tests only the legal sufficiency of the pleading. It admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint; the question of plaintiff's ability to prove these allegations, or the possible difficulty in making such proof does not concern the reviewing court.” (Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal. 3d 197, 213-214.) In ruling on demurrers, courts may consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 751.) Evidentiary facts found in exhibits attached to complaint can be considered on demurrer. (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94.)

Under California law, even if a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend the complaint is routinely granted. California courts are quite liberal permitting amendments, not only where a complaint is defective in form, but also where substantive defects are apparent: “Liberality in permitting amendment is the rule, if fair opportunity to correct any defect has not been given.” (Angie M. v. Superior Court (1995) 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1227.) In the case of an original complaint (like we have here), plaintiff need not even request leave to amend: “Unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment, denial of leave to amend constitutes an abuse of discretion, irrespective of whether leave to amend is requested or not.” (McDonald v.

Sup. Ct. (Flintkote Co.) (1986) 180 Cal. App. 3d 297, 303-304.) And so where, like here, we have an original complaint where plaintiff has not yet had opportunity to amend the complaint in response to a demurrer, “leave to amend is liberally allowed as a matter of fairness, unless the complaint shows on its face that it is incapable of amendment.” (City of Stockton v. Sup. Ct. (Civic Partners Stockton, LLC) (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 730, 747); (see also Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (abuse of discretion for the court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that plaintiff can state a good cause of action).)

C. Analysis of this Demurrer

In support of his Demurrer under Section 430.10(e), Sullivan argues: 1) no relationship or duty is alleged by and so there can be no breach of the implied warranty of habitability or conversion claims; 2) the fraud claim lacks foundation as to duty owed by Sullivan to Johnson as he was not Johnson’s landlord; 3) the IIED claims for failure to allege facts of severe emotional distress; 4) there are no allegations Sullivan was in

possession of Johnson’s security deposit to support the common counts; and 5) Johnson has not pled facts against Sullivan to give rise to wrongful eviction. Memorandum In Support of Demurrer to Complaint (“Def. Memo.”) at 3:4-4:28.2 The Court will now address and resolve each of those arguments in turn.

1. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability is Sustained with Leave to Amend within 15 days.

Sullivan first argues that the Complaints fails to plead facts establishing any relationship or duty owed by him to Plaintiff whatsoever, and there is no alleged landlordtenant relationship alleged between the two. (Def. Memo. at 3:17-19.)

The elements of a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability include: “existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises’ habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.) Here, the Complaint is devoid of any fact allegations that Sullivan was Plaintiff’s landlord and was notified of the condition.

Accordingly, as the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support this cause of action, the Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability is SUSTAINED.

But given that this Demurrer involves the original Complaint the Court, in the generous spirit of fairness and liberality of amendment under California law, gives Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND within 15 days from today to try to cure this pleading deficiency. City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 747; Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227.

2. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Conversion is Overruled.

Next, Sullivan argues that a claim for conversion can be alleged against a landlord, but because no landlord-tenant relationship is alleged no cause of action for conversion is stated. (Def. Memo. at 3:23-28.)

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property

2 To the extent that any of Sullivan’s arguments depend on his request for judicial

notice, they are unfounded and the Court declines to address them because his request for judicial notice was DENIED. (See e.g., SKF Farms v. Superior Ct. (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905 [a demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not evidence or other extrinsic matters].)

rights, and (3) damages.” (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [internal quotations omitted].)

Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants wrongfully took Plaintiff’s personal property, including musical instruments, recording equipment, irreplaceable memorabilia, clothing, furniture, and appliances, and as a result he suffered damages. (Complaint, p. 7). That is enough to plead this claim. (See Bader v. Anderson (2009) 179 Cal. App. 4th 775, 787 [in considering a demurrer, the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed true, however improbably they may be].)

Moreover, despite Sullivan’s novel suggestion to the contrary (Def. Memo. at 3:23- 28), there is no precedent or principle in California law holding that a cause of action for conversion requires a landlord-tenant relationship.

Accordingly, the Demurrer on Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Conversion is OVERRULED.

3. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Fraud is Sustained with Leave to Amend within 15 days.

Sullivan next argues that the fraud claim lacks any foundation as to duty and is otherwise unintelligible. (Def. Memo. at 4:1-9).

“The necessary elements of fraud are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2) knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1108 [superseded by statute on other grounds].) As a general rule, each element in a fraud cause of action must be pled with specificity. (See Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.)

Here, from the face of the Complaint it appears that Plaintiff’s fraud claim is one for intentional misrepresentation or intentional concealment. (See Complaint, p. 4, §§ FR- 2, FR-3(b); see also Stevens v. Superior Court (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 605, 609 [“‘Where failure to disclose a material fact is calculated to induce a false belief, the distinction between concealment and affirmative misrepresentation is tenuous. Both are fraudulent. An active concealment has the same force and effect as a representation which is positive in form.’”].)

Intentional fraudulent concealment requires a duty to disclose to the plaintiff. (Daneshmand v. City of San Juan Capistrano (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 923, 931.) And here, the fraud claim does not sufficiently allege facts to establish any duty between Sullivan and Plaintiff.

Accordingly, as the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support this cause of action, the Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Fraud is SUSTAINED.

But given that this Demurrer involves the original Complaint the Court, in the generous spirit of fairness and liberality of amendment under California law, gives Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND within 15 days from today to try to cure this pleading deficiency. City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 747; Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227.

4. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress is Sustained with Leave to Amend within 15 days.

Sullivan next argues that the Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (“IIED”) fails because it does not allege what he did to give rise to the claim and fails to allege facts of severe emotional distress. (Def. Memo. at 4:9-12.) The Court finds Sullivan’s argument persuasive. The Complaint fails to plead any facts of anything that Plaintiff claims Sullivan did to cause intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Accordingly, as the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support this cause of action, the Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for IIED is SUSTAINED.

But given that this Demurrer involves the original Complaint the Court, in the generous spirit of fairness and liberality of amendment under California law, gives Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND within 15 days from today to try to cure this pleading deficiency. City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 747; Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227.

5. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Common Counts is Overruled.

The Complaint asserts common counts for money had and received and goods sold and delivered to Defendant and for which Defendant promised to pay Plaintiff. (See Complaint, p. 3, Cause of Action—Common Counts.)

Sullivan argues that 1) if “a common count appears to be based on the same cause of action as an insufficient specific count in an alternative pleading, the entire complaint is demurrable” and 2) there are no allegations that he was Plaintiff’s “landlord in possession of Johnson’s security deposit.” (Def. Memo. at 4:17-24.)

While it is true that this common count appears to be based on the same facts and circumstances giving rise to the Conversion claim, Sullivan’s first argument for demurrer on the common count here fails precisely because the Court has already ruled above that the Conversion claim is sufficiently pleaded. Likewise, there is no precedent or principle in California law holding that a common-count claim requires landlord-tenant relationship.

Moreover, “a common count, by long continued practice is not subject to attack by general demurrer or by a special demurrer for uncertainty.” (Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 792-793 [internal quotations omitted].)

Accordingly, the Demurrer to the Common Counts is OVERRULED.

6. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) on the Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction is Sustained with Leave to Amend within 15 days.

Sullivan also argues that there that there are no facts pleaded against him in the Complaint to support the cause of action for wrongful eviction. Def. Memo. at 4:25-28.

“California recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction. . . . An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises.” (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 293 [internal citations and quotations omitted].) A tenant who is wrongfully evicted by a landlord may recover damages regardless of whether the eviction is actual or constructive. (Pierce v. Nash (1954) 126 Cal.App.2d 606, 612-615 [constructive eviction]; Saferian v. Baer (1930) 105 Cal.App. 238, 243 [actual eviction].) In order to maintain a wrongful eviction cause of action, a party must have “property rights and privileges in respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with.” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 899.)

In light of this binding precedent, to plead a cause of action for wrongful eviction, the Complaint must plead facts to establish that that Defendant was Plaintiff’s landlord. But the Complaint here fails to plead any facts to establish that Sullivan was Plaintiff’s landlord or an agent of the landlord.

Accordingly, as the Complaint fails to state sufficient facts to support this cause of action, the Demurrer as to Plaintiff’s Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction is SUSTAINED.

But given that this Demurrer involves the original Complaint the Court, in the generous spirit of fairness and liberality of amendment under California law, gives Plaintiff LEAVE TO AMEND within 15 days from today to try to cure this pleading deficiency. City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 747; Angie M., 37 Cal. App. 4th at 1227.

7. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(f) on the ground of Uncertainty is OVERRULED.

“‘[D]emurrers for uncertainty are disfavored, and are granted only if the pleading is so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.’ ‘A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.’” (A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677, 695 [internal citations omitted].)

Here, it is crystal clear from Sullivan’s papers that he understands exactly what each cause of action claims against him. He strongly disagrees with those claims, but that does not mean they are “incomprehensible.” He comprehends them well, he responds to them well. Accordingly, Sullivan’s Demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure Section

430.10(f) on the ground of uncertainty to all causes of action is OVERRULED.

Conclusion & Order

For the reasons set forth above, the Demurrer is Overruled in Part and Sustained in Part with Leave to Amend as follows. The Court ORDERS that:

1. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) is OVERRULED for:

a. The Cause of Action for Conversion,

b. The Cause of Action for Common Counts, and

c. The Cause of Action for Civil Rights Violations.3

2. The Demurrer under Section 430.10(e) is SUSTAINED with Leave to Amend within 15 days from today for:

a. The Cause of Action for Implied Warranty of Habitability,

b. The Cause of Action for Fraud,

c. The Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, and

d. The Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction.

Moreover, in light of the Court’s Order above giving Plaintiff Leave to Amend his Complaint, the Clerk of the Court is ORDERED to take OFF CALENDAR Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File First Amended Complaint that is set for haring on January 20, 2027.

SO ORDERED.

Date: May 29, 2026 Hon. Vincent I. Parrett Superior Court of the State of California, County of Santa Clara

3 See fn. 1 above.

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