Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana

On November 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed a “Motion to Strike Defendants’ Untimely, Unverified, Unauthorized Answers” and a “Consolidated Motion for Judicial Entry of Default, to Deem Verified Complaint Allegations Admitted, and to Strike All Post-Answer Filings.” On November 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed a second “Consolidated Motion for Judicial Entry of Default, to Deem Verified Complaint Allegations Admitted, and to Strike All Post-Answer Filings.” Toyota filed a combined opposition on December 8, 2025.

The Individual Defendants also filed a combined opposition on December 8, 2025. Plaintiff’s motions rely on the same legal authority and evidence and seek the same relief. Accordingly, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 1048, the Court will conduct a joint hearing on the motions and issues this joint ruling.

Notice

Individual Defendants oppose the motions on grounds Plaintiff failed to provide timely notice. Plaintiff served the motions on November 24, 2025 and November 25, 2025 via electronic service. A notice of motion must be filed and served 16 court days before the hearing, plus 2 additional calendar days where service is via electronic delivery. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1005(b).) The hearing is scheduled for December 19, 2025. Thus, Plaintiff was required to file and serve notice by November 23, 2025. Ordinarily, defective notice deprives the Court of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

jurisdiction. (Lee v. Placer Title Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 503, 509.) However, absent a showing of prejudice, the filing of an opposition addressing the merits of a motion waives defects in notice. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690, 696-698.) Here, Defendants filed oppositions addressing the merits of the motions and have failed to show that the they were prejudiced by Plaintiff’s failure to give timely notice. The Court therefore finds the defects in notice were waived.

Default Based on SAC

Plaintiff argues Defendants are in default because they failed to file timely verified answers to the SAC. As noted above, the Court has previously issued numerous rulings finding the TAC is the operative pleading and overruling Plaintiff’s objections to the Court’s jurisdiction based on the contention Toyota is in default as to the SAC. In order to obtain reconsideration of the Court’s prior rulings or to renew an application that was previously denied, a party must comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 1008.

Failure to comply with the statutory requirements for a reconsideration or renewed applications deprives the Court of jurisdiction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(e); Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094.)[1] Any renewed application or request for reconsideration under Code of Civil Procedure § 1008 must be supported by “new or different facts, circumstances, or law.” Further, the moving party must show that the the new or different facts, circumstances, or law could not have been presented at the original hearing. (Baldwin v.

Home Savings of America (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1192.) Here, Plaintiff’s arguments based on the SAC rely on the same facts, circumstances, and law that were previously considered by the Court in making its prior rulings. As Plaintiff has failed to comply with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 1008, the Court will not issue a further ruling on these issues. The Court’s prior orders finding the TAC is the operative pleading and that Defendants are not in default as to the SAC remain the Court’s final rulings on these issues.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

Plaintiff is advised that further attempts to relitigate issues that have already been decided, without complying with Code of Civil Procedure § 1008, “may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1008(d).)

Default Based on TAC – Toyota

Plaintiff argues Toyota is in default by operation of law as to the TAC because Toyota failed to file an answer to the TAC on or before March 24, 2025. The Court’s March 24, 2025 order did not state the Defendants were required to file an answer by March 24, 2025. (Minute Order, 03/24/2025.) Rather, the Court’s order stated “Defendants’ response will be due today, March 24, 2025. (Ibid.) A motion to strike is one of the expressly-identified responsive pleadings that prevents entry of default. (Code Civ.

Proc. § 585.) Further, the filing of a motion to strike extends the time to answer. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435(c).) Here, Toyota filed a timely motion to strike on March 24, 2025. In ruling on the motion, the Court determined the deadline to file an answer is extended to May 27, 2025. Toyota timely filed separate answers on May 20, 2025. Thus, the record indicates that Toyota timely responded to the TAC. Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default as to Toyota is denied. For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike Toyota’s post-March 24, 2025 pleadings, motions, discovery requests and discovery responses, on grounds Defendants were in default and lacked standing, is denied.

Default Based on TAC – Individual Defendants

Plaintiff argues the Individual Defendants are in default by operation of law as to the TAC because Toyota failed to file an answer to the TAC on or before March 24, 2025. The deadline for Individual Defendants to file a responsive pleading was March 24, 2025. Individual Defendants did not file an answer until March 27, 2025. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 585, if a party fails to file a timely responsive

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

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pleading, “the clerk, upon written application of the plaintiff, shall enter the default of the defendant.” By its express terms, the clerk is not permitted or required to enter the default of the defendant until the plaintiff has made a written application for entry of default. Consistent with this language, “it is generally recognized that an untimely pleading is not a nullity, and it will serve to preclude the taking of default proceedings unless it is stricken.” (A&B Metal Products v. MacArthur Properties, Inc. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 642, 647.) “[T]he entry of the defendant's default is no more than a privilege which may or may not be exercised by the plaintiff; and when it has not been taken advantage of before the defendant files his answer he cannot be regarded strictly as in default.” (Bank of Haywards v.

Kenyon (1917) 32 Cal.App. 635, 637.) Relying on Todd v. Everett (1966) 247 Cal.App.2d 209, 211-212 and W.A. Rose Co. v. Municipal Court (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 67, 72-73, Plaintiff argues Defendants were in default by operation of law as of March 24, 2025. Upon review, both Todd and W.A. Rose Co. involved factual situations where the plaintiff made a written application for default, which the clerk failed to enter. Thus, these cases do not support the proposition that default attaches by operation of law on the last day a responsive pleading is due.

Rather, consistent with the authority cited above, these cases support the conclusion that a party is not in default until the plaintiff makes a written application for entry of default. As the California Supreme Court stated “When a party, after the time expressly granted for filing a pleading against him has expired, suffers further time to elapse without taking any action thereon, and in the mean time the pleading is served and filed, he, by such conduct, in effect grants the additional time and the party is not strictly in default.

The clerk is not authorized to enter a default for failure to file an answer when such answer is on file at the time such default is attempted to be entered.” (Reher v. Reed (1913) 166 Cal. 525, 528.) Here, there is no evidence that Plaintiff requested Individual Defendants’ default before they filed their answer on March 27, 2025. Thus, Individual Defendants were not in default on March 27, 2025 and were entitled to file their answer to the TAC on that date. Having filed an answer, Individual Defendants are not in default and default cannot be entered against them unless the answer is first stricken from the record[2].

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default as to the Individual Defendants is denied. For the same reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Individual Defendants’ post-March 24, 2025 pleadings, motions, discovery requests and discovery responses, on grounds Defendants were in default and lacked standing is denied.

Motion to Strike Answers as Untimely - Toyota

Plaintiff moves to strike Toyota’s answers to the TAC on grounds they were not timely filed on March 24, 2025. As set forth above, Toyota timely filed a responsive pleading to the TAC by filing a motion to strike on March 24, 2025. Toyota’s deadline to file an answer was subsequently extended to May 27, 2025. Toyota filed their respective answers to the TAC timely on May 20, 2025. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the answers as untimely is therefore denied.

Motion to Strike Answer as Untimely – Individual Defendants

Plaintiff moves to strike the Individual Defendants’ answer to the TAC on grounds it was not timely filed on March 24, 2025. Individual Defendants did not file their answer until March 27, 2025. However, as noted above, the filing of a late answer is an irregularity, not a nullity. (Bank of Haywards, supra, 32 Cal.App. at p. 636.) The Court has discretion to strike a late-filed answer, but a plaintiff does not have a mandatory right to have a late answer stricken. (Ibid.) Plaintiff caused substantial confusion by filing the TAC one-day late and subsequently filing a notice of withdrawal of the TAC before Individual Defendants’ response to the TAC was due.

Although the Court ultimately set March 24, 2025 as the deadline for response, the Court’s order provided less than one full day for Individual Defendants to file their answer. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the interests of justice support granting the Defendants a three-day extension to file their answer. In its discretion, the Court therefore denies the motion to strike the TAC as untimely.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

Further, the Court finds Plaintiff waived any objection to the timeliness of Individual Defendants’ answer by failing to file a timely motion to strike. A motion to strike must be filed within the time allowed to respond to a pleading. (Code Civ. Proc. § 435(b)(1); City and County of San Francisco v. Strahlendorf (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1911.) A plaintiff’s deadline to respond to an answer is 10 days. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 430.40(b).) Thus, Plaintiff’s deadline to file a motion to strike was April 7, 2025.

Plaintiff did not reserve this hearing until October 8 2025, more than 6 months after the deadline to file the motion and did not file the actual motion until November 24, 2025. Having filed a motion to strike more than 7 months passed the deadline, Plaintiff cannot reasonably object to the filing of an answer a mere 3 days late. Plaintiff’s motion to strike the Individual Defendants’ answer as untimely is denied.

Motion to Strike Answers as Unverified – All Defendants

Plaintiff argues Toyota’s and the Individual Defendants’ answers should be stricken because they are unverified. Defendants argue the motion to strike should be denied as untimely. As noted above, the deadline to file a motion to strike an answer is 10 days after service of the answer. However, a trial court has authority to extend the deadline for filing a responsive pleading and may consider a late-filed motion to strike where it does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. (See Jackson v.

Doe (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 72 [trial court did not error by considering a late-filed demurrer].) Significantly, the Court notes a motion to strike is not the only remedy a plaintiff may pursue when an answer is unverified. When a defendant files an unverified answer, a plaintiff may either move to strike the unverified answer or, alternatively, may move for judgment on the pleadings. (McCullough v. Clark (1871) 41 Cal. 298; DeCamp v. First Kensington Corp. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 268, 276; Stockton Lumber Co. v.

Blodgett (1906) 3 Cal.App. 94.) The deadline for filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings has not passed. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 438(e).) Thus, at this time, Plaintiff has not waived any objection that Defendants’ answers are unverified. Under these circumstances, denying the motion to strike as

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

untimely would cause unnecessary delay and expense as Plaintiff could still file a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court will therefore exercise its discretion to consider the latefiled motion to strike. To verify a pleading, it is sufficient for a party to assert the truth of his or her belief in the matters alleged under penalty of perjury. (Code Civ. Proc. § 446.) Here, Plaintiff attached a declaration to the TAC, under penalty of perjury, that attest to the truthfulness of the allegations and states the declaration is offered for the purpose of verifying the TAC.

The Defendants’ respective oppositions do not contend the declaration is insufficient and do not otherwise argue the TAC is unverified. “When the complaint is verified, the answer shall be verified.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 446.) Here, the Defendants’ respective answers are unverified. Individual Defendants argue that whether the answers are verified or unverified does not affect how this case will proceed. However, the filing of an unverified complaint to a verified complaint constitutes an admission of its allegations. (DeCamp v.

First Kensington Corp. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 268, 276.) Thus, whether the answers are verified has a substantial effect on the scope of the disputed issues of fact that must be resolved at trial. The motion to strike Defendants’ answers on grounds they are unverified is granted. The Court has discretion to permit Defendants leave to amend their answers. (Jenssen v. R.K.O. Studios, Inc. (1937) 20 Cal.App.2d 705, 707.) Here, the Defendants explain they did not file verified answers because they did not realize, at the time of filing, that Plaintiff intended the TAC to be treated as verified.

The Court notes the TAC does not state it is verified in the caption, does not indicate it is verified anywhere in the body of the complaint, and that Plaintiff’s signature on the last page of the complaint does not indicate the complaint is signed under penalty of perjury. Further, the declaration attached to the complaint does not specify it is a verification in the title and merely references the intent to verify the complaint in a single paragraph. Under these circumstances, the Court finds Defendants should be granted leave to file verified answers.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

Disposition

Plaintiff’s motion to strike Defendants’ respective answers as unverified is GRANTED, with leave to amend. Defendants may file verified answers to the TAC on or before January 8, 2026. Plaintiff’s consolidated motions are denied as to all other requests for relief, without prejudice to Plaintiff seeking entry of default if Defendants fail to file timely verified answers.

*** This tentative ruling shall become the Court’s final ruling unless a party wishing to be heard so advises the clerk of this department no later than 4:00 p.m. on the court day preceding the hearing, and further advises the clerk that such party has notified the other side of its request for hearing. The parties may appear remotely through the use of Zoom. The parties may join the Zoom session by audio and/or video through the link/telephone number which can be obtained by contacting the clerk of the court at dept12@saccourt.ca.gov or (916) 874-6181 no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the scheduled hearing.

In the event that a hearing is requested, oral argument shall be limited to no more than 30 minutes per side. Parties requesting services of a court reporter will need to arrange for private court reporter services at their own expense, pursuant to Government Code section 68086 and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956. Requirements for requesting a court reporter are listed in the Policy for Official Reporter Pro Tempore available on the Sacramento Superior Court website at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp-6a.pdf.

Parties may contact Court-Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore by utilizing the list of Court Approved Official Reporters Pro Tempore available at https://www.saccourt.ca.gov/court-reporters/docs/crtrp- 13.pdf. A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list. Once the form is

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

34-2021-00311004-CU-PA-GDS: Delma Jefferson vs. Samuel Gene Dana 12/19/2025 Hearing on Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer to Third Amended Complaint in Department 12

signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will be forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided. In the event that this tentative ruling becomes the final ruling of the Court, the order will be effective immediately. No formal order or other notice will be required. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1019.5; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1312.)

[1] While the Court retains authority to reconsider its prior rulings on the Court’s own motion (Le Francois v. Goel

(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1095) the Court has not and does not bring its own motion to reconsider these issues. Although Plaintiff has not done so here, the Court notes a party may not circumvent the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure § 1008 by filing a written motion requesting the Court reconsider a prior ruling, sua sponte. (Even Zohar Construction & Remodeling, Inc. v. Belaire Townhouses, LLC (2015) 61 Cal.4th 830, 844.).) [2] The Court considers Plaintiff’s request to strike Individual Defendants’ answer to the TAC infra.