Oliveros v. Shark Island Yacht Club, et al.

3. The aggrieved employees’ release in paragraph V.1 of the second amendment to the settlement agreement is overbroad. Releases by aggrieved employees other than plaintiff should be limited the civil penalties available under PAGA based on the facts alleged in the operative complaint and the notice letter to the LWDA. In addition, the third-tolast sentence in paragraph V.1 should be removed.

4. The “Released Parties” provision in paragraph V.2 of the second amendment to the settlement agreement is overbroad. It includes unrelated, ambiguous and/or unidentified third parties such as “affiliates, partners,” “franchisors, and trusts,” and “agents, attorneys, stockholders, fiduciaries, and other service providers including, but not limited to, O’Hagan Meyer.”

5. Defendant should state in a declaration filed with the court whether it is aware of any class, representative or other collective action in any other court that asserts claims similar to those asserted in this case. If any such actions are known to exist, the declaration shall state the name and case number of any such case and the procedural status of that case, and describe the impact of the settlement on that case.

6. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks attorneys’ fees totaling 33.33% of the gross settlement amount. Absent unique circumstances, and considering the manner in which the approval motion has been handled (see, e.g., ROA 209) the court is unlikely to approve an attorneys’ fees award that exceeds 30% of the gross settlement amount. Plaintiff’s counsel should address in the supplemental filings whether any such unique circumstances exist here.

7. Plaintiff’s counsel seeks litigation costs in the amount of $12,933.33, comprised of $4,220.83 in litigation costs and $8,712.50 in purported expert fees incurred by plaintiff’s counsel’s sister, Olga Ginez. Plaintiff has not submitted any persuasive evidence that Olga Ginez qualifies as an expert to analyze payroll records and prepare damages calculations. Olga Ginez’s declaration states that she is “retired,” but still does “some consulting, bookkeeping, financial reporting, and general accounting services for individuals and businesses.”

Olga Ginez Decl. (ROA 234) ¶ 1. Olga Ginez states she has a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice with a minor in business administration, and that her “career in accounting” includes having “audited profit and loss statements, prepared, and filed payroll and sales tax returns, and reconciled balance sheet accounts for a variety of businesses, including race car builder and auto sales, small construction companies, hair salons, donut shops, and fast food and full service restaurants,” and “managing extensive amounts of data using Microsoft Access and Excel and utilizing reports to file forms and documents with state regulators including the Departments of Insurance, Corporations, and Securities in all 50 states.”

Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff has not submitted evidence of Olga Ginez’s “special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” sufficient to qualify her as an expert on the calculation of damages in a wage and hour action. Evid. Code § 720(a). Olga Ginez’s relevant experience appears to consist of the six times in a 10-year period that plaintiff’s counsel (her brother) retained her to “audit time and payroll data and prepare damage calculations” in wage and hour actions. Id. ¶ 3. In addition, 102.50 hours (i.e., approximately 13 days of work at 8 hours per day) spent on this action with approximately 33 aggrieved employees and a one-year PAGA period appears excessive and unreasonable, especially where Olga Ginez’s time entries reflect that significant portions of her time were spent “compiling, summarizing and comparing” payroll data and “compiling date [sic], etc.”

Olga Ginez Decl. (ROA 234) Ex.

3. Plaintiff’s counsel should provide additional information sufficiently establishing Olga Ginez’s qualifications as an expert and explaining why Olga Ginez reasonably spent 102.50 hours on her work related to this case.

8. Plaintiff should submit a copy of the settlement agreement for the settlement of his individual claims. Ginez Decl. ¶ 21; Oliveros Decl. (ROA 232) ¶ 11. As to the notice letter: 9. The notice letter should be revised consistent with the above.

10. The word “vigorously” should be removed in section of the notice letter.

11. The fourth paragraph of section 6 should be removed.

12. Will the settlement administrator maintain a website for this case? If so, the notice letter should provide the URL for case website and identify the key case documents (including the order and judgment) that will be posted on the website, and should state that judgment will be posted on the settlement administrator’s website for at least 180 days.

13. Should the notice letter be provided in any language other than English? See Green Decl. (ROA 236) Ex. B (charge for Spanish translation). If the notice will be provided in a language(s) other than English, a certified copy of the translated notice (together with an English-language copy) should be attached to the proposed order and judgment as an exhibit. As to the proposed order and judgment (ROA 254): 14. The proposed order and judgment should be revised consistent with the above.

15. The proposed order and judgment should state how notice of entry of the judgment will be given to the aggrieved employees.

16. The proposed order and judgment should state that the court orders the parties, their counsel and the settlement administrator to administer the settlement in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement.

17. The proposed order and judgment should include a proposed date for the final accounting hearing. The final accounting hearing should occur after the deadline to cash checks has expired. The court holds final accounting hearings on Thursdays at 9:00 a.m. The proposed order and judgment shall state that counsel shall submit a final administrator’s report at least 9 court days before the hearing addressing the status of the settlement administration, including the actual amounts paid to the aggrieved employees and the other amounts distributed under the settlement, including any uncashed checks.

The hearing on plaintiff’s motion for approval is continued to October 15, 2026 at 2:00 p.m. in Department CX105 to permit the parties to address and respond to the above issues. See also Department CX105 Guidelines for Approval of Class Action Settlements and PAGA Settlements (www.occourts.org). A supplemental brief shall be filed at least 9 court days before the hearing and shall address as necessary each of the above points. If required, an amendment to the settlement agreement shall be submitted, rather than an “amended settlement agreement,” to streamline the court’s review of the documents.

The parties shall provide redlined copies of any revised documents (e.g., revised settlement agreement, revised notice, revised proposed order). Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, including to the LWDA, and to file a proof of service. Plaintiff must also serve the LWDA with any supplemental brief and any amended settlement documents, and file a proof of service. No earlier hearing date is available for this motion. 9 Reyna v. Eagle Community Credit Union

2021-01225885 Plaintiff’s Motion for Approval of PAGA Settlement The court has reviewed and considered the papers, including the supplemental papers, filed in support of plaintiff’s motion for approval of a $150,000 PAGA settlement. Subject to plaintiff’s submission of the documents identified below, the court grants the motion as follows: No enhancement award to plaintiff; $37,500.00 for attorneys’ fees; $12,857.47 for attorneys’ costs; $4,138.00 for settlement administration fees; and $95,504.53 total PAGA penalties ($71,628.40 to LWDA).

Plaintiff is ordered to submit by June 4, 2026 a proposed order and judgment (including the above amounts) with all exhibits attached (settlement agreement; three amendments thereto; and notice letter (including the above amounts)). The final accounting hearing is scheduled for February 4, 2027 at 9:00 a.m. in Department CX105. Plaintiff shall submit a final administrator’s report at least 9 court days before the hearing addressing the status of the settlement administration, including the actual amounts paid to the aggrieved employees and the other amounts distributed under the settlement, including any uncashed checks.

Plaintiff is ordered to give notice, including to the LWDA, and to file a proof of service. 10 Rodgers v. No Ordinary Moments, Inc.

2023-01349601 Off calendar. 11 Rodriguez v. Han.Sam Corp dba River’s Edge Pharmacy

2026-01542228 Defendant Han.Sam Corp dba River’s Edge Pharmacy’s Motion to Compel Arbitration Defendant Han.Sam Corp dba River’s Edge Pharmacy moves for an order compelling plaintiff Cindy Rodriguez to arbitrate her individual claims and dismissing her class allegations. For the following reasons, defendant’s motion is denied. The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. Little v. Pullman (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 558, 565.

The petitioner bears the burden of proving the existence of a valid arbitration agreement by the preponderance of the evidence, and a party opposing the petition bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence any fact necessary to its defense. Id. Existence of an arbitration agreement A court resolves a dispute regarding the existence of an arbitration agreement using a three-step burden-shifting process. Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1056. “The arbitration proponent must first recite verbatim, or provide a copy of, the alleged agreement. (Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 3.1330; Condee v. Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597.) A movant can bear this initial burden ‘by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.’ (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 318.) At this step, a movant need not ‘follow the normal procedures of document authentication’ and need only ‘allege the existence of an agreement and support the allegation as provided in rule [3.1330].’ (Condee, supra, at pp. 218–219, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 597.) [¶] If the movant bears its initial burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to identify a factual