Murchison Consulting, Inc. vs. Bloomstone

2025-01476022 Defendant Steven Young’s motion for reclassification of this action as limited jurisdiction is DENIED. (Code Civ. Proc. §403.040, subd. (b)(1).) Defendant has not sufficiently shown that the case is incorrectly classified as an unlimited civil case. “A party seeking to reclassify a case from unlimited to limited faces a ‘high threshold’” (Hiona v. Superior Court (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 866, 872 [citing Ytuarte v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 266, 278].) There must be a finding “that the verdict will ‘necessarily’ fall short of the superior court jurisdictional requirement”. (Id. [citing Walker v.

Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 270.) The focus of the inquiry is not on the likelihood of the plaintiff obtaining a judgment in excess of the jurisdictional threshold; rather, the question is whether it is possible that the plaintiff could obtain “a jurisdictionally appropriate verdict.”(Id. [citing Maldonado v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 397, 402.)

Defendant’s motion argues that reclassification is warranted because it is not “plausible” that Plaintiff’s claims will result in a verdict that exceeds the jurisdictional threshold for civil unlimited. This is not the correct standard to apply in determining whether reclassification is warranted. Plaintiff alleges he is owed $28,275.20 for costs and expert fees he allegedly incurred in the representation. (See FAC ¶¶19-20). Moreover, Plaintiff alleges he is owed the reasonable value of the legal services he provided to Paquin. Additionally, the FAC includes a cause of action for fraud with a prayer for punitive damages. Defendant’s evidentiary showing in support of the motion does not establish as a legal certainty that Plaintiff’s potential recovery will not exceed the jurisdictional threshold of $35,000.

Defendant shall provide notice.

7 Libertucci vs. Cooper