ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al.

A Stipulation and Appointment of Official Reporter Pro Tempore (CV/E-206) is required to be signed by each party, the private court reporter, and the Judge prior to the hearing, if not using a reporter from the Court’s Approved Official Reporter Pro Tempore list.

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

Once the form is signed it must be filed with the clerk. If a litigant has been granted a fee waiver and requests a court reporter, the party must submit a Request for Court Reporter by a Party with a Fee Waiver (CV/E-211) and it must be filed with the clerk at least 10 days prior to the hearing or at the time the proceeding is scheduled if less than 10 days away. Once approved, the clerk will forward the form to the Court Reporter’s Office and an official reporter will be provided.

***NOTICE: EFFECTIVE APRIL 13, 2026, THIS DEPARTMENT HAS MOVED TO THE TANI G. CANTIL-SAKAUYE COURTHOUSE LOCATED AT 500 G. ST. SACRAMENTO, CA. ALL MOTIONS NOTICED FOR DEPARTMENT 25 WILL BE HEARD IN DEPARTMENT 8D OF THE NEW COURTHOUSE. ALL PAPERS FOR THIS DEPARTMENT MUST BE FILED AT THIS NEW LOCATION AND WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE. ALL HEARINGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT THIS NEW LOCATION****

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant and Cross-Complainant Harvest Church Elk Grove (“Harvest”) application for a temporary restraining order and order to show cause re issuance of preliminary injunction against Plaintiff and Cross-Defendant Assemblies of God, Northern California and Nevada District Council (the “District”) is ruled upon as follows.

I.

Background

The District initiated this action by filing their Complaint on March 4, 2026. On March 17, 2026, the District filed its Verified First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) as well as an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction (the “District Application”). The District Application was noticed for hearing on March 27, 2026.

On March 24, 2026, Harvest filed its Cross-Complaint as well as an Ex Parte Application for Temporary Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause re preliminary Injunction (the “Harvest Application”). The Harvest Application was noticed for hearing on March 25, 2026.

On March 25, 2026 this Court held a hearing on the Harvest Application and, after hearing argument from the parties, the Court continued the hearing on the Harvest Application to March 27, 2026 so that it could be heard with the District Application.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

On March 27, 2026 after stipulation from the parties, the Court ordered that the hearing on both the District Application and on the Harvest Application be continued May 4, 2026. Based on the Parties’ stipulation, the Court further ordered that the District shall file its supplemental opposition[1] to the Harvest Application no later than April 17, 2026, and Harvest shall file any reply in support of the Harvest Application by no later than April 24, 2026.

Thereafter, the Court, on its own motion, continued the hearing the Harvest Application to May 27, 2026. Neither party objected to this continuance.

Harvest’s Cross-Complaint alleges that this action arises from a dispute between Harvest, a nonprofit corporation, and the District, a separate nonprofit corporation, over the corporate governance of Harvest. (Cross-Complaint at ¶ 1.) Harvest contends that the District has attempted to assume corporate control over Harvest without any legal basis, and has used an internal petition—signed by 70 “unidentified” members of Harvest—to justify these takeover attempts. (Id., at ¶¶ 1-2.) According to the Cross- Complaint, the District claims this internal petition gives it the right, under the bylaws of the General Council of the Assemblies of God Fellowship (the “General Council”) to provide “Organizational Assistance” to local churches affiliated with the General Council in the event of “problems either internal or external” involving the local church. (Id., at ¶ 2.)

Harvest alleges that the District “actively solicited” signatures from members of Harvest after Harvest’s senior pastor, Reverand Smith, and one of its staff pastors, Reverand Garcia-Smith, were unable “to attend a unilaterally scheduled meeting with the District to answer for ‘confidential’ allegations purportedly made by five former unidentified Harvest staff members that Harvest, under Rev. Smith’s leadership purportedly violated ‘state and federal employment and civil rights laws.’”[2] (Id., at ¶ 3.)

Harvest denies that it violated the employment or civil rights of any of its past or present employees. (Id., at ¶ 4.) Harvest also disputes the validity of the of the internal petition. (Id., at ¶ 4, 5.) Harvest contends, however, regardless of the legitimacy of the petition, it “does not confer upon the District the power to assume corporate control over Harvest.” (Id., at 5.)

Harvest contends that the District has nonetheless attempted to assume corporate control over Harvest by, without limitation, “falsely holding its own officers out as the new officers and directors of Harvest to Harvest’s bank, thereby causing a restriction to be placed on Harvest’s primary bank account and hindering Harvest from satisfying its

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

contractual obligations.” (Id., at ¶ 6.)

The Cross-Complaint names both the District and Jay Herndon, D.Min., J.D. (“Dr. Herndon”) as cross-defendants and brings claims against both cross-defendants for (1) Intentional Interference with Five Star Bank Contract and (2) Declaratory Relief.

Harvest makes this Application for an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should issue pending trial in this action and for a temporary restraining order preventing and enjoining the District from:

1. Holding itself or its officers, board members, or other appointees out as the officers or board members of the Harvest nonprofit corporation;

2. Asserting ownership, control, or authority in any form over the Harvest nonprofit corporation’s property, including its bank accounts; and

3. Asserting control or authority over whether, how, when, and to whom Harvest may transfer any funds from the Harvest nonprofit corporation’s own bank accounts.

(Notice of Application at 2:9-14.)

The District opposes, arguing that Harvest’s Application “seeks to upend the governance structure and ignore measures taken pursuant to membership petitions and operative bylaws, and to wrest control of ecclesiastical and polity matters from the District.” (Amended Opposition [hereafter “Opposition”] at 2:10-12.) The District further argues that Harvest’s Application should be denied because (1) Harvest is not likely to win on the merits, (2) any disputes Harvest has with the District should be resolved by binding arbitration, (3) the balance of equities are in the District’s favor, and (4) the Court should disregard any allegations with respect to the matter of ministerial credentials. (Id., at 2:10-18.)

Based on the circumstances and briefing provided, the Court construes Harvest’s Application as a motion for preliminary injunction.

II. Legal Standard

“As its name suggests, a preliminary injunction is an order that is sought by a plaintiff prior to a full adjudication of the merits of its claim. [Citation.]” (White v. Davis (2003) 30 Cal.4th 528, 554.) “The purpose of such an order ‘is to preserve the status quo . . . .’ It

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

‘does not constitute a final adjudication of the controversy.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Ass’n v. City of Costa Mesa (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 298, 305.)

“To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff ordinarily is required to present evidence of the irreparable injury or interim harm that it will suffer if an injunction is not issued pending an adjudication of the merits. [Citation.]” (White, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 554; see generally Code Civ. Proc. § 526, subd. (a)(2) [a preliminary injunction “may be granted. . . [w]hen it appears . . . that the commission or continuance of some act during the litigation would produce . . . great or irreparable injury . . . to a party to the action].) “‘[T]he extraordinary remedy of injunction’ cannot be invoked without showing the likelihood of irreparable harm. [Citation.]” (Intel Corp. v.

Hamidi (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.) Similarly, “if the plaintiff may be fully compensated by the payment of damages in the event he prevails, then preliminary injunctive relief should be denied.” (Tahoe Keys Property Owners’ Ass’n v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1459, 1471 [stating “[t]he showing of potential harm that a plaintiff must make in support of a request for preliminary injunctive relief may be expressed in various linguistic formulations, such as the inadequacy of legal remedies or the threat of irreparable injury [citations], but whatever the choice of words it is clear that a plaintiff must make [a] showing which would support the exercise of the rather extraordinary power to restrain the defendant’s actions prior to a trial on the merits”].)

“If the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established, then [the court] must examine two interrelated factors to determine whether . . . a preliminary injunction should be [issued]: ‘(1) the likelihood that the moving party will ultimately prevail on the merits and (2) the relative interim harm to the parties from issuance or nonissuance of the injunction.’ [Citation.]” (Costa Mesa City Employees Assn., supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at 306.) The greater the showing on one factor, the lesser the showing must be on the other. (Butt v. State of California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 678.) However, a preliminary injunction may not be granted, regardless of the balance of interim harm, unless it is reasonably probable that the moving party will prevail on the merits. (San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 442.)

The party seeking injunctive relief bears the burden of showing all elements necessary to support issuance of a preliminary injunction. (O'Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.)

Courts will deny a preliminary injunction unless there is a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will be successful in his or her assertion of rights. (Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 528.) A preliminary injunction will not be issued simply to prevent the possibility of some remote future injury. Issuing a preliminary injunction

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with the characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief. (Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (2008) 555 U.S. 7, 22.)

III.

Discussion

A. Irreparable Injury

In order to issue any preliminary injunction, irreparable harm must be presented. In its moving papers, Harvest argues that it has been harmed because it is “unable to use its own funds without first obtaining the District’s blessing, including even to wire funds to its counsel for this case.” (Moving Application at 19:15-16.) Harvest further argues that unless an injunction is granted, the District “would have a green light to game the adversarial system by influencing who its adversary can hire as counsel.” (Id., at 20:12- 14.)

In support of its argument, Harvest presents evidence that its bank informed Harves’s counsel that a restriction would be placed on Harvest’s bank account such that no funds could be transferred out of that account without the authorization of Dr. Herndon and that it would not wire funds to counsel without “dual approval” from Harvest and Dr. Herndon. (Luke Decl. ¶¶ 4-9.)

Harvest also argues that the District “also threatened to terminate Harvest’s employees, falsely telling Harvest’s staff: ‘we are now your new employers,’ and ‘we need to meet with each of you to familiarize ourselves with your roles and responsibilities and to confirm or make any necessary changes.’” (Id., at 20:17-19.) On this point, Harvest clarifies in reply that “[w]hile individual Harvest employees might, themselves, have financial recourse against the District if the District follows through on its threats of termination, their financial recourse does not provide a remedy to Harvest for its loss of human talent and capital.” (Reply at 5:14-16.)

Harvest also clarifies that “if Harvest must obtain permission from Cross-Defendant Jay Herndon before any corporate expense can be paid, the very ability for Harvest to operate will have been turned over to the District—Harvest’s legal adversary.” (Id., at 10:8-11.) In support of this argument, Harvest submits the declaration of Rahul Sharma regarding communications from Dr. Herndon regarding employment issues. (Sarma Decl. ¶ 20.)

In opposition, the District argues that “Harvest’s asserted injuries are either overstated or already resolved. Its claim that the District Council interfered with its ability to retain counsel is moot—the District Council approved that expense.” (Opposition at 14:25-27.)

The Court finds that Harvest has sufficiently met its burden of showing irreparable harm

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

for purposes of a preliminary injunction. The loss of control of its bank accounts, which affects Harvest’s ultimate ability to operate as well as its ability to participate in this litigation (to the extent its ability to pay its attorneys is restricted), as well as the potential loss of employee talent would depart from the status quo and irreparably harm Harvest. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the District’s arguments in opposition. While it appears from the parties’ briefing that the District has allowed for a wire to cover Harvest’s attorneys’ initial retainer fee, it is not clear to the Court that the issue is now moot given that litigation between the parties is ongoing, and that the District maintains the authority to deny future requests for payments to Harvest’s counsel.

Moreover, it appears undisputed that Harvest must still seek approval from the District before making any withdrawals from its bank account and thus, this broader issue over control of the bank account is not moot.

The District Council further argues that “[a]ny limitation on Harvest’s independence is the direct and foreseeable consequence of its voluntary participation in a hierarchical church structure, expressly providing for District oversight, including reversion to District-affiliated status. This is not irreparable harm; it is the enforcement of agreedupon governance.” (Opposition at 14:27-15:3.) But such an argument is more properly directed at whether or not the whether or not Harvest is likely to prevail on the merits of its claims—not whether or not the threshold requirement of irreparable injury is established.

Accordingly, the Court must now weigh the two interrelated factors of likelihood of success and balancing of the harm.

B. Harvest’s Likelihood of Success

Harvest alleges causes of action for (1) Intentional Interference with Five Star Bank Contract and (2) Declaratory Relief.

Turning first to Harvest’s cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations, the elements of such a claim are: “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendant's knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant's intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 55.)

Here, the Court finds that Harvest has presented evidence which demonstrates a likelihood to prevail on the merits on its cause of action for intentional interference with contractual relations. Specifically, as to the first two elements, Harvest presents

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

evidence that there is a contractual relationship between Harvest and Five Star Bank (Declaration of Rev. Tynesia Fields [“Fields Decl.”], ¶ 2), and that the District knew of that contract. (Fields Decl., ¶ 5; Harvest Index of Exhibits [“Harvest IOE”], Exhibit G.) In regards to the third and fourth element—intentional acts by the District designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship and actual disruption of the contractual relationship—Harvest presents evidence that the District blocked Harvest from using the funds in that account. (Declaration of Emerson B. Luke [“Luke Decl.”], ¶ 10; Harvest IOE, Exhibit K.) Finally, as to the final element, Harvest presents evidence that it has been harmed because it is unable to use its own funds without first obtaining the District’s blessing. (See Luke Decl., ¶¶ 3-10.)

In regards to Harvest’s second cause of action for declaratory relief, Harvest must demonstrate (1) a proper subject of declaratory relief, and (2) an actual controversy involving justiciable questions relating to the rights or obligations of a party. (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 984.)

In this regard, Harvest also presents evidence that an actual controversy relating to the corporate control of Harvest, and its personal property, exists. (See Luke Decl., ¶¶ 3- 10.)

In opposition, the District does not directly argue that Harvest will be unable to demonstrate one or more elements of these causes of action. Rather, the District argues that Harvest’s claims are unlikely to succeed first because the District’s intervention is “ecclesiastical in nature and beyond civil court review,” and second because even under neutral principles, the District Council acted within its bylaw authority. (Opposition at 10:25-26, 12:17-18.)

The Court addresses each argument in turn.

1. Applicability of Ecclesiastical Rule of Judicial Deference

First, the Court is unpersuaded by the District’s claim that Harvest cannot succeed on its claims because the District’s intervention is ecclesiastical in nature and thus beyond this Court’s jurisdiction.

In addressing how California courts should resolve disputes over church property, the California Supreme Court, in Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, explained:

Decisions from both this court and the United States Supreme Court have

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

made clear that, when asked to do so, secular courts may, indeed must, resolve internal church disputes over ownership of church property. As the high court put it in the seminal 19th-century case involving a church property dispute, “an appeal is made to the secular authority; the courts when so called on must perform their functions as in other cases. [¶] Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.” (Watson v.

Jones (1871) 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 714, 20 L.Ed. 666.) Similarly, in its most recent decision involving a church property dispute, the court stated, “There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.” (Jones v. Wolf [(1979)] 443 U.S. [595,] 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020.)

(Episcopal Church Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 478.)

However, the California Supreme Court also cautioned that:

But when called on to resolve church property disputes, secular courts must not entangle themselves in disputes over church doctrine or infringe on the right to free exercise of religion. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has made two points clear: (1) how state courts resolve church property disputes is a matter of state law; but (2) the method a state chooses must not violate the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. “[T]he First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. [Citations.]

As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization. [Citations.] Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed, ‘a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.’ ” (Jones v.

Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. at p. 602, 99 S.Ct. 3020, quoting Md. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Ch. (1970) 396 U.S.

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26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (conc. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

(Id., at 478-479.)

As discussed in Episcopal Church Cases, two methods have been approved by the United States Supreme Court for adjudicating church property disputes. (Id., at 480.) The first method is referred to as the “principle of government” approach. (Ibid.) Very generally, under the “principle of government approach,” the court first distinguishes between two types of church disputes: (1) disputes within a congregation or independent organization, which is governed within itself, and (2) disputes involving a hierarchical church structure. (Ibid.)

When the dispute concerns a congregation or independent organization, the dispute often concerns schisms within the congregation which leads to separation into distinct conflicting bodies, and the rights of such bodies to the use of the property “must be determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.” (Ibid.) However, when the dispute involves a hierarchical structure, courts are “bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and its bound by its orders and judgment. (Ibid., [quoting Watson v.

Jones, (1872) 80 U.S. 679, 726-727].) The second method is referred to as the “neutral principles of law” approach under which the court examines the organizations’ governing documents and applies “‘neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes.’” (Id., at 480.)

After reviewing both the “principles of government” approach as well as the “neutral principles of law” approach, the California Supreme Court concluded:

[S]ecular courts called on to resolve church property disputes should proceed as follows: State courts must not decide questions of religious doctrine; those are for the church to resolve. Accordingly, if resolution of a property dispute involves a point of doctrine, the court must defer to the position of the highest ecclesiastical authority that has decided the point. But to the extent the court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law. The court should consider sources such as the deeds to the property in dispute, the local church’s articles of incorporation, the general church’s constitution, canons, and rules, and relevant statutes, including statutes specifically concerning religious property, such as Corporations Code section 9142.

(Id., at 485 [internal citations omitted].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

Since the California Supreme Court decided Episcopal Church Cases in 2009, California appellate courts have had opportunity to apply the neutral principles of law approach to resolve disputes over control of local church corporations in hierarchical churches, such as the Assemblies of God. Of particular note is Iglesia Evangelica Latina, Inc. v. Southern Pacific Latin American Dist. of the Assemblies of God et al. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 420 (“Iglesia Evangelica”).

In Iglesia Evangelica, a local church within the Assemblies of God fellowship challenged its corporate takeover by the regional district council. Specifically, in Iglesia Evangelica, a dispute between the local church’s pastors led the district council to convert the local church from a general council church to a district council church, remove the local church’s pastors, and have the local church transfer to the district council 16 parcels of real property held by the local church. (Iglesia Evangelica, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 425.)

After a bifurcated trial, the trial court ruled, in part, that Assemblies of God was a hierarchical church, that the local church had agreed to be governed by Assemblies of God and the relevant district council’s bylaws, which gave the district council the “absolute authority to resolve disputes, including permitting [the district council] to hold title to its real and personal property.” (Id., at p. 430, 431-32.) Accordingly, the “trial court refused to interfere with [the district council’s] authority to govern itself, including decisions regarding property, and entered judgment for [the district council] on its quiet title claim.” (Id., at 432.)

The appellate court reversed the trial court, explaining:

The rule of deference to ecclesiastical decisions, such as to the decision to change [the local church’s] status from general council church to district council church, does not require us to ignore [the local church’s] secular corporate form. Because we can resolve the issue of whether [the district council’s] corporate takeover of [the local church] was proper without reference to Assemblies of God church doctrine, we apply neutral principles of law to this dispute.

(Id., at 440.)

The case at hand is analogous to Iglesia Evangelica not in the least because the dispute arises from the same religious denomination. Indeed, similar to Iglesia Evangelica, the District seeks to assert control over Harvest’s assets as part of the hierarchical structure. However, as in Iglesia Evangelica, such a decision—even if ecclesiastical in its underlying processes—does not require the Court to ignore

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

Harvest’s secular corporate form. Just as in Iglesia Evangelica, because the Court can resolve the issue of whether the District’s efforts to assert control over Harvest was proper, without reference to Assemblies of God church doctrine, the Court concludes that it can, and will, apply neutral principles of law to this dispute.

In this regard, the Court rejects the District’s argument that Harvest’s “claims necessarily require the Court to invalidate or disregard ecclesiastical decisions regarding ministerial credentials, church governance, and internal discipline” and that such decisions “lie beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.” (Opposition at 11:14-18.) The Court need not evaluate the District’s decision to revoke the ministerial credentials of Reverand Smith’s or Reverand Garcia-Smith, nor need the Court evaluate the reversion of Harvest to “district affiliated” status in order to evaluate whether the District’s efforts to seize control of Harvest’s primary checking account was proper.

The Court also disagrees with District’s argument that Iglesia Evangelica is distinguishable on the basis that, “[u]nlike Iglesia Evangelica, this case does not involve competing claims to church real property or any transfer of title by the District ” (Id. at 11:18-22.) While it is true that the present case does not involve a dispute over the ownership of any real property—it appears that all parties agree that the bank account is Harvest’s personal property—there is a present dispute over who controls the bank account, or in other words, who controls Harvest and thus, in turn, who controls its personal property.

Indeed, in Concord Christian Center v. Open Bible Standard Churches (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1396, (“Concord Christian”)[3], the appellate court noted that while the facts at hand did not involve any issues of actual title to or ownership of property, the issues before it affected the ultimate control of the local church’s property and assets and whether the local church was subject to regional supervision and control. (Concord Christian, supra 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413.) Consequently, the appellate court found that the trial court properly ruled that it had jurisdiction to adjudicate such issues to the extent it could do so without impinging on exclusive ecclesiastical authority. (Ibid.)

Given the foregoing, the Court concludes that the same reasoning that applies to a resolution of church real property disputes applies to resolution of a dispute over control of a religious corporation. (See ibid.)

Finally, to the extent that the District argues that Iglesia Evangelica is distinguishable because the “present dispute arises from the enforcement—not the disregard—of Harvest’s governing documents” the Court notes that it cannot evaluate such an argument without first applying the neutral principles of law. (Id., at 12:1-14.) Accordingly, the Court addresses this argument in its analysis below.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court applies neutral principles of law to this dispute.

2. Application of Neutral Principles of Law

This brings the Court to the District’s second argument in opposition—that Harvest’s claims are unlikely to succeed because, even under neutral principles, the District acted within its bylaw authority.

In order to adequately address this argument, and in order to effectively apply neutral principles of law to this dispute, the Court must first consider the parties’ governing documents and the overall governing structure of Assemblies of God.

As mentioned above, the Assemblies of God church is a hierarchical church. At the top of this denomination is the General Council of the Assemblies of God Fellowship (the “General Council”). (See Declaration of Rahul Sharma [“Sharma Decl.”] at ¶ 5; see generally, Harvest’s Index of Exhibits [“IOE”], Exhibit A.) Below the General Council sit regional district councils, such as the District here, which operate to “facilitate a network for resources and relationships and provide training for credentialed ministers and local churches.” (Sharma Decl., ¶ 5.) Finally, below the regional district councils sit the local churches, which are either classified as either district-affiliated churches, or as general council churches. (See Ibid; see also Harvest IOE at Exhibit A, Const. Art. XI, §§ 1-2.)

The General Council’s Constitution states that the “General Council of the Assemblies of God is a cooperative fellowship based upon mutual agreements voluntarily entered into by its membership, and shall be known as a fellowship of churches and credentialed ministers.” (Harvest’s IOE, Exhibit A at Const., Art. II.) The General Council’s constitution also provides that district councils “shall have supervision over all the ecclesial and sacerdotal activities of the Assemblies of God, in its prescribed field ” (Id., Exhibit A at Const., Art. X, § 2.) Additionally, the Constitution provides that “[t]he district council shall not violate the Constitution or Bylaws of The General Council of the Assemblies of God.” (Id., Exhibit A at Const. Art. X, § 6.)

The General Council’s Bylaws provide that district councils operate to “facilitate a network for resources and relationships and provide training for credentialed ministers and local churches.” (Id., Exhibit A at Bylaws Art. V, § 2.) And further provide that that:

Organizational Assistance. The services of both the General Council and district council are available to assist the General Council affiliated

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

church in dealing with any of its problems, either internal or external, when requested by the pastor or a majority of the official board of the church or a petition signed by 30 percent (30%) of the voting members, with the petitioning process and delivery to the district council taking no more than thirty (30) days in total to complete. When district officers receive such requests, it is recommended they first verify that scriptural principles of reconciliation, such as those found in Matthew 18:15–17 and 1 Timothy 5:19, have been reasonably attempted by the requesting party in situations involving interpersonal conflict.

District officers shall respond by investigating problems and, if necessary, recommending remedial actions to the responsible district governing entity, (e.g., district presbytery or district executive presbytery). At its discretion, that governing entity may act to provide organizational assistance to the church and, when necessary, revert it from General Council status to district affiliated status until the governing entity considers the problem resolved.

(Id., at Exhibit A, Bylaws, Art. VI, § 4(c) [underline added for emphasis].)

In regards to the local churches, the General Council’s Constitution provides that local assemblies can be classified as (1) “General Council Affiliated Assemblies” (2) “District Council Affiliated Assemblies,” (3) “Parent Affiliated Churches”, and (4) “Cooperating Assemblies.” (Id., at Exhibit A, Const., Art. XI.) As is relevant here, a “General Council affiliated assembly is one that has applied for and has received a Certificate of Affiliation from The General Council of the Assemblies of God.” (Id., at Exhibit A, Const. Art. XI, § 1.) The Constitution further provides that:

Right of self-government (sovereign rights). Each General Council affiliated assembly has the right of self-government under Jesus Christ, its living Head, and shall have the power to choose or call its pastor, elect its official board, and transact all other business pertaining to its life as a local unit. It shall have the right to administer discipline to its members according to the Scriptures and its constitution or bylaws. It shall have the right to acquire and hold title to property, either through trustees or in its corporate name as a self-governing unit. The fact it is affiliated with The General Council of the Assemblies of God shall in no way destroy its rights as above stated or interfere with its sovereignty. The governance model adopted by the local assembly shall conform to the guidelines of Constitution, Article XI, Section 1, paragraph a, subparagraph (4).

(Id., at Exhibit A, Const. Art. XI, § 1(c).)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

In regards to District Council Affiliated Assemblies, the Constitution provides:

Provision shall be made by the district councils for district council affiliated assemblies, in accordance with the provisions of the district council constitution and bylaws. These assemblies shall be encouraged to proceed to the status of sovereign General Council affiliated assemblies.

(Id., at Exhibit A, Const., Art. XI, § 2.)

The District’s Constitution provides that “[i]t shall be a principle and responsibility of this District Council to maintain standards of scriptural order in all matters affecting its life and ministry within its churches, programs and membership” and further that “[i]t shall be a principle and responsibility of this District Council to promote and maintain standards of doctrine and conduct, and to apply discipline according to the Holy Scriptures and this Constitution and Bylaws and as hereinafter set forth.” (Declaration of Dr. Jay Herndon [“Herndon Decl.”], Exhibit 2, Const., Art. III, § 1.) The District’s Constitution further:

adopts and acknowledges as superior authority the Constitution and Bylaws of The General Council of the Assemblies of God, as such is now or may from time to time be amended, hereinafter for simplicity occasionally referred to as “General Council Bylaws,” for conduct of all business and administrative regulation, and establishment of standards of doctrine and qualifications for membership, and this corporation is likewise subject to legislation and directives of that parent organization, and upon such superior authority this Constitution and Bylaws following is adopted; and, in event of conflict, inconsistency or incompatibility of the following regulations with the letter or interpretation of same, this District Council shall be guided by such superior authority and legislation or directives of the General Council.

(Id., at Exhibit 2, Const., Art. IV, § 2 [underline added for emphasis].)

With respect to local churches, the District’s Bylaws provide that “[a] General Council affiliated church is one that has applied for and received a Certificate of Affiliation from The General Council of the Assemblies of God, commonly and herein referred to as a sovereign church.” (Id., at Exhibit 2, Bylaws, Art. VIII, § 2(a).) The District’s Bylaws also state that:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

The sovereign local church may revert to District Council affiliation. When this occurs, the church corporation is deemed to have surrendered its sovereignty, its Constitution and Bylaws is suspended or set aside. The Executive Presbytery may choose to transfer its property to the District Council to be held in trust. The District Superintendent becomes the president of the church corporation under authority of the Division of District Churches and District Missions which becomes the Church Board for all business purposes, and the District Executive Officers become the statutory officers of the corporation under regulation of the District Council Constitution and Bylaws.

(Id., at Exhibit 2, Bylaws, Art. VIII, § 5(c) [underline added for emphasis].)

The District’s Bylaws also provide that “ District Council affiliated churches shall operate according to policies established by the District Presbytery, with day-to-day coordination and support provided by the Director of the Division of District Churches and District Missions in accordance with these District Council Bylaws. The statutory bylaws of all District affiliated churches shall be the most recent version of the ‘Constitution and Bylaws for District Affiliated Churches’ as recommended by the District Presbytery.” (Id., at Exhibit 2, Bylaws, Art. VIII, § 10(A)(1).)

Finally, Harvest’s Constitution provides that, “[w]hile recognizing its inherent right to sovereignty in the conduct of its own affairs, [Harvest] voluntarily enters into full cooperative fellowship with and as a member of the [General Council] and likewise in fellowship with and as a member of the [District] ” (Harvest’s IOE at Exhibit B, Const., Art. IV, § 1.) Article IV, Section Four of Harvest’s Constitution also states, in full:

Section Four: Organizational Assistance

If at any time [Harvest] encounters any internal or external problems, which cannot be reasonably and expeditiously resolved by action of the member or the Board of Deacons, [Harvest] shall seek the services and assistance of District Council or General Council, upon request of the Senior Pastor or a majority of the Board of Deacons, or upon petition of the membership. Such petition of the membership shall be in written form, and shall require the signatures of at least twenty percent (20%) of the current active membership of the Church, and shall be addressed to District Council, and presented to the District Superintendent of District Council. Such petition shall specifically but briefly recite the details of the matter for which assistance is requested, and particularly describe

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

features of dispute or administrative frustrations. Upon such presentation to the District Council, it shall be deemed to be a petition on behalf of [Harvest], as an initiative of the membership, whereupon the District [] Council, District Superintendent or Presbytery, should take appropriate action or undertake to provide necessary services as are available. In the event the membership of [Harvest] should become divided over doctrinal or other issues, in which individuals or factions might propose that this Church should withdraw or disaffiliate from the Assemblies of God, such disputes shall not be put to a confirming vote, but shall be resolved according to provisions of these Bylaws, Article Twelve, Resolution and Arbitration of Disputes, at Section Two.

(Id., at Exhibit B, Const., Art. IV, § 4 [underline added for emphasis].)

Article IV, Section Five of Harvest’s Constitution further provides:

Section Five: District Council Assistance in Church Administration

If at any time the business of this Church cannot be adequately undertaken and performed by its administrators through the Board of Deacons, or when a proper Board of Deacons is not available or functioning, the Church may, by request of its Board of Deacons or at least 51% of its then current active membership, petition the Executive Presbytery of the District Council to serve as the Board of Deacons, to so serve until such time as the Executive Presbytery and the membership of this Church agree that the membership should resume full responsibility for its affairs. In this regard neither the District Council nor the Executive Presbytery of the District Council assumes any personal responsibility or liability for debt or other obligations of the Church in taking such action as may be necessary in these premises.

(Id., at Exhibit B, Const., Art. IV, § 4 [underline added for emphasis].)

Finally, Harvest’s Constitution provides that its board of directors “shall be known as the Harvest Church Board of Deacons, or the Board of Deacons”, shall consist of eight natural persons (including the Senior Pastor, an associate pastor, the World Missons Task Force Director, and five elected officers and that “[a]ll official and business powers, activities, and affairs, of this corporation shall be exercised and conducted under authority and ultimate direction of the Board of Deacons.” (Id., at Exhibit B, Const., Art. V, § 1 [underline added for emphasis].) Harvest’s Bylaws also empower the Board of

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

Deacons to, inter alia, “receive and authorize disbursement of funds; to borrow money and incur indebtedness in the course of business of [Harvest]” and to “take and hold as custodians for the use and benefit of the Church all of its property,” (Id., at Exhibit B, Bylaws., Art. IV, § 2(E), 3(b)-(c) [underline added for emphasis].)

Once again, Iglesia Evangelica—discussed by both parties—is illustrative. As discussed above, Iglesia Evangelica also concerned a dispute over the control of a local church within the Assemblies of God Fellowship. Specifically, in Iglesia Evangelica, the local church challenged the regional district council’s takeover after an internal dispute at the local church. (Iglesia Evangelica, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment and held in favor of the local church on the district council’s claims as well as the local church’s claims arising from the wrongful transfer of its property to the district council. (Id. at 424.)

In reversing the trial court, the appellate court first identified two issues presented by the appeal: (1) did the district council validly assume control of the local church’s corporate form, and (2) upon doing so, could the district council validly transfer property held in the local church’s name to itself. (Id., at 432.) As discussed above, the appellate court initially determined that, because the court could resolve the issue of whether the district council’s corporate takeover of the local church was proper without reference to church doctrine, it could apply neutral principles of law to this dispute. (Id., at 440.)

In this regard, the appellate court also concluded that the district council “erroneously believed that because its hierarchical structure and governing documents permitted it to demote [the local church] to district council church status upon the request of a board member, it could ignore [the local church’s] corporate form and applicable statutory and other corporate formalities in taking control of the church.” (Ibid.) However, explained the appellate court, the “rule of deference to ecclesiastical decisions does not require us to ignore [the local church’s] corporate form.”

The appellate court then went on to apply neutral principles of law and, in that analysis, examined the local church’s bylaws, as well as the governing structure of the Assemblies of God fellowship and California’s Corporation Code. (Id., at 440-441.) Pursuant to this analysis, the appellate court noted that the local church’s bylaws and the Corporation Code required certain formalities in conducting board elections, but other than its reliance on Assemblies of God and the district’s constitution and bylaws, there was no evidence in the record that the district complied with either the Corporations Code or the local Church’s bylaws in conducting its corporate takeover. (Id., at 441.) The appellate court also distinguished Concord Christian Center v. Open Bible Standard Churches, supra,132 Cal.App.4th 1396 (“Concord Christian”), explaining that:

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

nothing in [the district council’s] constitution or bylaws addresses the demotion of a general council church to a district council church, except for the reference in its bylaws to district council churches being subject to the direct supervision of the presbytery, and that such churches include “former sovereign Assemblies of God church programs that have surrendered their sovereignty temporarily or otherwise seek District council protection....” ([district council] Const., Art. XIII, § 3.) In turn, the Assemblies of God constitution provides that district council churches are under supervision to the district council in accordance with the district council constitution and bylaws. ([Assemblies of God] Const., Art.

XI, § 2.) These provisions are insufficient to permit [the district council] to ignore [the local church’s] corporate form; the fact that Assemblies of God is a hierarchical church and [the district council] has oversight over district council churches is insufficient, without express provisions such as those found in Concord Christian, to transmit the power to [the district council] to ignore [the local church’s] corporate form in the event of a change in [the local church’s] status.

(Ibid.)

Accordingly, the appellate court concluded that “[i]n the absence of more specific directives in the parties’ documents, Assemblies of God’s and [the district council’s] sovereignty with respect to the supervision and control of district council churches cannot be read to supplant the local church’s own bylaws.” (Id., at 442.) Indeed, the local church “did not amend its bylaws to permit a corporate takeover in the event of a demotion to a district council church.” (Ibid. [underline added for emphasis].) The appellate court further found that there were no provisions in the relevant governing documents that permitted the district council to supplant the local church’s ownership of its property and further that the district council did not comply with its own bylaws governing transfers of property. (Id., at 443-444.)

It is also helpful to consider Concord Christian, discussed by Iglesia Evangelica (and by both parties).

In Concord Christian, a local church, Concord Christian, attempted to disaffiliate from its national church, Open Bible. (Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.) The trial court entered judgment ruling that the local church’s attempt to disaffiliate was ineffective. (Ibid.) The judgment further upheld Open Bible’s imposition of supervision and control over the local church and all of its assets. (Ibid.) The appellate court

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

affirmed judgment.

In affirming the trial court’s finding that Open Bible’s imposition of supervision and control over the local church and its assets was proper, the appellate court found that the trial court properly examined the parties’ governing documents and the factual circumstances. (Id., at 1413-1416.) As described by the appellate court, Open Bible’s bylaws in effect at the time provided that “[e]ach affiliated local church has the ‘privilege’ of adopting its own bylaws, so long as they ‘do not conflict with the spirit of the Policies and Principles’ of Open Bible.” (Id., at 1400.)

These bylaws further provided that, “if any affiliated church has not filed its own bylaws with the national, regional and district offices of the denomination, “all of the provisions of Article IV of [the Open Bible] bylaws shall apply.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the bylaws provided that “[a]ny local affiliated church ‘needing or requesting help in the management of its pastoral, internal or legal affairs’ may be placed under ‘regional supervision’ for the purpose of providing a ‘service of counsel and supervision’ aimed at assisting it ‘back to stability and health.’” (Id., at 1401.) “Under regional supervision, the regional board of directors becomes the governing board of the local affiliated church, with power to manage the local church's property and to remove the pastor.” (Ibid.)

The local church, Concord Christian, was formed in 1953 and its articles of incorporation “affirmed that the ‘[b]y-laws of this corporation shall be in accord with the By-laws of the Open Bible Standard Churches, Inc...’” (Id., at 1402.) However, the local church “operated without its own bylaws for many years, instead following the provisions of article IV of Open Bible’s denominational bylaws.” (Ibid.) On May 7, 2001, nine of the remaining local church members voted to adopt bylaws which, in many respects, followed the pattern for all Open Bible affiliated churches. (Id., at 1405.)

The local church was put on regional supervision twice between its inception and the dispute which gave rise to the litigation. The first time was in October 1994, at the request the lead pastor, Reverand Lloyd Mashore. (Id., 1404.) The church remained on regional supervision until March 16, 2000. (Id., at 1404.) The local church was put on regional supervision a second time in June 2001, following an attempt by the church to disaffiliate from Open Bible. (Id., at 1405-1406.)

In affirming the trial court’s finding that regional supervision was properly imposed in June 2001, the appellate court found that the facts at hand (including the attempts of a merger with a non-Open Bible congregation, controversy over Mashore’s leadership style, and the significant decline in the local church’s membership) justified imposition of regional supervision in accordance with the applicable provisions of Open Bible’s governing documents. (Id., at 1415.) Moreover, the appellate court noted that the fact

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

that Mashore voluntarily relinquished his ministerial credentials before regional supervision was imposed is sufficient by itself to justify automatic imposition of regional supervision under Open Bible’s 1999 Bylaws. (Ibid.)

As mentioned above, both parties argue that discuss Iglesia Evangelica and Concord Christian and urge the Court that these decisions support their respective positions.

Specifically, Harvest argues that “the Court of Appeal faced a virtually identical situation” in Iglesia Evangelica as here. (Moving Application at 18:7-9.) Harvest contends that “[l]ike the district in Iglesia Evangelica, the District here also reclassified Harvest as a district-affiliated church and then used that maneuver as pretext to claim corporate control and authority over Harvest and its bank account.” (Id. at 18:7-9.) However, just as in Iglesia Evangelica, Harvest’s bylaws “do not expressly permit a corporate takeover by the district based on a demotion to district-affiliated status, nor from a petition of some percentage of members asking for ‘organizational assistance’.” (Id., at 18:9-12.)

Harvest argues that this point is “cement[ed]” by the fact that Harvest’s bylaws require an affirmative petition signed by at least 51% of its active membership to solicit the District to take over Harvest’s board, and that here, there is no such petition with signatures of 51% of the membership. (Id., at 18:13-20.) Accordingly, Harvest argues, that Iglesia Evangelica demonstrates that, at minimum, Harvest has a likelihood of success. (Ibid.)

In opposition, the District contends that under neutral principles, the dipositive question is whether or not the District followed the procedures and exercised the authority granted to it under the General Council Bylaws, District Bylaws, and Harvest’s own Bylaws. (Opposition at 12:19-25.) The District insists that the answer to this “narrow” question is “unequivocally yes.” (Ibid.) In this regard, the District argues that it complied “with each required step” as it “received a valid petition signed by at least 30% of Harvest’s members, as authorized by Harvest’s Bylaws” then “investigated the concerns” and when “it became clear that the Harvest Board was unwilling to comply with its own governing documents” the District “exercised its authority—expressly granted under General Council Bylaws, Article VI, Section 4(c)—to revert Harvest to District-affiliated status.” (Id., at 12:26-13:4.)

Further, the District asserts that reversion to district-affiliated status carries defined consequences under the bylaws of both the General Council and the District; specifically, that the church comes under the supervision and control of the District, and that, under the District Bylaws, the District is authorized to control the property of a district-affiliated church. (Id., at 13:21-14:4.)

The District urges that Harvest’s Bylaws “reinforce this authority” as these bylaws “expressly empower” the District to take “appropriate action” in response to internal

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

church disputes. (Id., at 13:4-9.) Relatedly, the District contends that “Harvest’s reliance on a purported 51% petition requirement is misplaced” as this provision “applies only to a specific and limited circumstance: when the congregation seeks to have the District [] serve as the Board of Deacons.” (Id., at 13:10-12.) Finally, the District asserts that “[a]s recognized in Concord Christian, hierarchical churches often establish multiple pathways for higher bodies to intervene in local church affairs, and courts must enforce those provisions as written.” (Id., at 13:17-20.)

In short, the primary, remaining, contention presented by this motion is whether or not the District has the authority under the relevant governing documents to assume control over Harvest and its property, including its primary bank account. In Harvest’s view, the answer is no and the Court agrees.

As discussed above, Harvest’s Constitution provides that “[a]ll official and business powers, activities, and affairs, of this corporation shall be exercised and conducted under authority and ultimate direction of the Board of Deacons.” (Harvest’s IOE at Exhibit B, Const., Art. V, § 1.) Harvest’s bylaws also expressly grant the Board of Deacons power and control over its funds. (Id., at Exhibit B, Bylaws., Art. IV, § 2(E), 3(b)-(c).) Indeed, it does not appear that any of the parties dispute the fact that control of the bank account at issue rests with Harvest’s Board of Deacons, nor is there any argument that a recent election has changed the makeup of the Board of Deacons.

Rather, the District argues that because it received a petition for assistance from 30% of Harvest’s active membership it properly investigated the claims and then properly reverted the Harvest to “district-affiliated” status, which gave it control over the corporate property. In so arguing, it appears that the District relies solely on its own bylaws which provide, that when a sovereign church reverts to District Council affiliation “the church corporation is deemed to have surrendered its sovereignty, its Constitution and Bylaws is suspended.” (Herndon Decl. Exhibit 2, Bylaws, Art. VIII, § 5(c).) The District’s bylaws further provides that:

The District Superintendent becomes the president of the church corporation under authority of the Division of District Churches and District Missions which becomes the Church Board for all business purposes, and the District Executive Officers become the statutory officers of the corporation under regulation of the District Council Constitution and Bylaws.

(Ibid.)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

However, such argument ignores the corporate form of Harvest as it ignores the express provisions of Harvest’s governing documents. Namely, that Harvest’s governing documents vests its Board of Deacons with control over its “powers, activities, and affairs” and to “receive and authorize disbursement of funds”, i.e., its bank account. Moreover, while Harvest’s governing documents provide a mechanism for its members, by way of a petition signed by 20% of its active members, to seek “organizational assistance” from the District Council, it does not expressly define what “organization assistance” means. (Harvest’s IOE at Exhibit B, Const., Art.

IV, § 4.) Yet, Harvest’s Constitution expressly provides that, by way of a petition signed by at least 51% of its members, the District Council may serve as the Board of Deacons. (Id., at Exhibit B, Const., Art. IV, § 5.) Here, as Harvest argues in opposition, there is no argument by the District that it received a petition signed by 51% of the active members of Harvest. Rather, the District relies on a petition signed by 30% of Harvest’s active members, and the District’s subsequent decision to revert Harvest to district affiliated status, to justify its right to control Harvest’s activities and bank account.

Again, in this Court’s view, such an argument ignores Harvest’s corporate form in the event of a change in Harvest’s status.

Importantly, like in Iglesia Evangelica, Harvest’s operative governing documents do not permit a corporate takeover in the event of a demotion to a district council church. (Iglesia Evangelica, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 442.) Moreover, as explained in Iglesia Evangelica, “the fact that Assemblies of God is a hierarchical church and [the district council] has oversight over district council churches is insufficient, without express provisions such as those found in Concord Christian, to transmit the power to [the district council] to ignore [the local church’s] corporate form in the event of a change in [the local church’s] status.” (Id., at 441.)

In this regard, the Court also agrees with Harvest that Concord Christian is inapposite. In Concord Christian, the national church, Open Bible, had specific bylaws governing when a local affiliated church may be put under regional supervision and what effect regional supervision had. (Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at 1401.) Indeed, Open Bible’s bylaws provided that, “[u]nder regional supervision, the regional board of directors becomes the governing board of the local affiliated church with power to manage the local church’s property ” (Ibid.)

Furthermore, the articles of incorporation of the local church “affirmed that the ‘by-laws of this corporation shall be in accord with the By-laws of the Open Bible Standard Churches, Inc ” (Id., at 1402.) Moreover, the local church operated for the majority of its existence without bylaws of own, instead following the provisions of Article IV of Open Bible’s bylaws. (Ibid.) Even when the local church adopted its own bylaws in May of 2001, there is no discussion that these newly adopted bylaws had any specific provisions regarding a corporate takeover in the event

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

of “regional supervision” is imposed on it by Open Bible. (See generally, Id., at 1405.)

Thus, the present case stands in contrast to Concord Christian in two important respects. First, unlike in Concord Christian, there is no provision in Harvest’s governing documents which affirms that the bylaws and constitution of Harvest shall be in accord with the constitution and bylaws of the General Council or District Council. At most, as discussed above, Article Four, Section One of Harvest’s Constitution provides that Harvest “voluntarily enters into full cooperative fellowship with and as a member of the [General Council], and likewise in fellowship with and as a member of [the District Council].” (Harvest’s IOE at Exhibit B, Const., Art.

IV, § 4.) But, Harvest’s governing documents do not directly “adopt” or acknowledge as superior authority the Constitution or Bylaws of either the General Council or District Council. Not only is this in contrast to the facts at hand in Concord Christian, but it is also in contrast to the District’s Constitution which expressly provides that it “adopts and acknowledges as superior authority the Constitution and Bylaws of The General Council of the Assemblies of God” and further that “in event of conflict, inconsistency or incompatibility of the following regulations with the letter or interpretation of same, this District Council shall be guided by such superior authority and legislation or directives of the General Council.” (Herndon Decl at Exhibit 2, Const., Art.

IV, § 2.)

That is not say that Harvest’s governing documents do not grant authority and power to the General Council and District Council. Indeed, as is relevant here (and discussed above), Section Four of Harvest’s Constitution provides that Harvest may seek “organizational assistance” from the District or General Council when it encounters “internal or external problems” and that Harvest may request this “organizational assistance” by request of the Senior Pastor, a majority of the Board of Deacons, or upon petition of 20% of the current active membership of Harvest. (Harvest’s IOE at Exhibit B, Const., Art.

IV, § 4.) Harvest’s Constitution further provides that it may seek “District Council Assistance in Church Administration” if the business of Harvest cannot “be adequately undertaken and performed.” (Id., at Exhibit B, Const., Art. IV, § 5.) “Assistance in Church Administration” may be sought at the request of Harvest’s “Board of Deacons or at least 51% of its then current active membership.” (Ibid.)

This brings us to the second manner in which this case differs from Concord Christian: here, Harvest’s bylaws provide a specific avenue for the District to serve as the Board of Deacons (and thus to control the funds of Harvest) – by request of the Board of Deacons or at least 51% of Harvest’s current active membership – whereas in Concord Christian the local church’s bylaws appear to have had no such provision. (Ibid.) In other words, while the District’s Bylaws provide certain consequences when a local church is reverted to district council status, here, Harvest’s governing documents

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

expressly provide that the District can displace the Board of Deacons in the event of either the petition of 51% of its church members or by request of the Board of Deacons itself—neither of which happened here. Thus, unlike in Concord Christian, the local church’s governing documents provide an explicit procedure for the displacement of the Board of Deacons, which the District has failed to follow here.

Finally, the Court rejects the District’s contention that “Harvest’s reliance on a purported 51% petition requirement is misplaced” as this provision “applies only to a specific and limited circumstance: when the congregation seeks to have the District [] serve as the Board of Deacons.” (Opposition, at 13:10-12.) As Harvest argues in reply the Court is required to “interpret contractual language in a manner which gives force and effect to every provision, and not in a way which renders some clauses nugatory, inoperative or meaningless” (State Comp.

Ins. v. Department of Ins. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 227, 237, quoting City of Atascadero v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 445, 473; see also Sass v. Hank (1951) 108 Cal.Ap.2d 207, 215 [“several portions of the contract are not fairly interpreted by construing each of them separately. The entire writing must be read as a unit, giving effect to every part, “Each clause helping to interpret the other”].) As a result, the Court must read Article IV Section Four (“Organizational Assistance”) and Article IV, Section Five (“District Council Assistance in Church Administration”) together, in way which does not render one section meaningless as a result of the interpretation of the other.

In sum, after considering the structure of the Assemblies of God, as well as the governing documents of the General Council, District, and Harvest, and after applying neutral principles of law, the Court concludes Harvest has demonstrated has carried its burden of establishing that it is likely to prevail on the merits of its claims.

C. Balance of Hardships

“The ultimate goal of any test to be used in deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue is to minimize the harm which an erroneous interim decision may cause.” (IT Corp. v. County of Imperial (1983) 35 Cal.3d 63, 73.) As noted above, a lesser showing on the balance of hardships factor is required where the likelihood of success on the merits is high. (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 678.)

The Court first notes that, as discussed above, Harvest has shown a high probability of success on the merits on their claims. Thus, the harm to Harvest need not be as severe. In addition, the Court agrees with Harvest that the risk of harm to it is high since, unless enjoined, the District essential controls Harvest’s purse strings as it can veto any disbursement which the District does not approve of—including, potentially, additional

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

payments to Harvest’s counsel related to this litigation. Moreover, the District’s threats to terminate some of Harvest’s employees is also significant since, as discussed above, the potential loss of employee talent would irreparably harm Harvest.

On the other hand, the District’s protentional harm appears minimal, at best. In this regard, the District’s conclusory argument that it “faces concrete, irreparable harm” is insufficient, as the District, fails to explain what “concrete irreparable harm” it will face in the event the Court issues Harvest’s requested injunction. (Opposition at 14:14-15:12.) Moreover, for the reasons discussed above, the Court rejects the District’s argument that “[a]ny limitation on Harvest’s independence is the direct and foreseeable consequence of its voluntary participation in a hierarchical church structure ” (Id., at 14:27-15:1.)

D. Arbitration

The Court notes that the District argues that this motion should also be denied because “the alternative dispute resolution clause of [Harvest’s Bylaws] do not permit this Court to rule on Harvest’s disputes with the District.” (Opposition at 14:5-12.) Indeed, the District filed on May 12, 2026 a motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Civil Action.

The Court rejects the argument that the District’s pending motion to compel arbitration precludes issuance of a preliminary injunction. Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.8 subdivision (a) and (b) provide:

(a) As used in this section, “provisional remedy” includes the following:

(1) Attachments and temporary protective orders issued pursuant to Title 6.5 (commencing with Section 481.010) of Part 2.

(2) Writs of possession issued pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 512.010) of Chapter 2 of Title 7 of Part 2.

(3) Preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders issued pursuant to Section 527.

(4) Receivers appointed pursuant to Section 564.

(b) A party to an arbitration agreement may file in the court in the county in which an arbitration proceeding is pending, or if an arbitration proceeding has not commenced, in any proper court, an application for a provisional

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy, but only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief. The application shall be accompanied by a complaint or by copies of the demand for arbitration and any response thereto. If accompanied by a complaint, the application shall also be accompanied by a statement stating whether the party is or is not reserving the party’s right to arbitration.

(Underline added for emphasis.)

Accordingly, the Court agrees with Harvest that the parties may seek provisional relief from the court, even assuming (without deciding) the parties are subject to mandatory arbitration.

E. Matter of Ministerial Credentials

Finally, the Court notes that the District concludes its opposition by arguing that the matter of ministerial credentials is inappropriate for this Court’s consideration. (Opposition at 15:13.) However, such an argument is immaterial to this motion as Harvest does not invite the Court to question the validity of any decisions made related to the ministerial credentials of any of Harvest’s current or former pastors.

Disposition

Based on the above, Harvest’s motion for preliminary injunction is GRANTED.

On granting an injunction, the Court must require an undertaking on the part of the applicant to the effect that the applicant will pay to the party enjoined any damages, not exceeding an amount to be specified, the party may sustain by reason of the injunction, if the Court finally decides that the applicant was not entitled to the injunction. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 529.)

Harvest shall post, by no later than June 10, 2026 an injunction bond in the amount of $10,000.00. In the event Harvest fails to timely post the injunction bond, the District may file and serve an appropriate motion or application to modify, amend, or vacate the preliminary injunction granted herein.

Harvest is directed to submit a proposed order for the Court’s signature.

[1] The District had previously filed an initial opposition to the Harvest Application on

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO

26CV005473: ASSEMBLIES OF GOD, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA DISTRICT COUNCIL, INC. vs HARVEST CHURCH ELK GROVE, et al. 05/27/2026 Order to Show Cause Re: Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order in Department 8D

March 24, 2026. [2] Harvest further alleges that the District also sought, and obtained, the termination of

the ministerial credentials of Rev. Smith and Rev. Garcia-Smith based on these same allegations. (Cross-Complaint at ¶ 3 n.1.) [3] While Concord Christian was decided before Episcopal Church Cases, the appellate

court nonetheless applied the “neutral principles of law” approach as directed by the United States Supreme Court. (Concord Christian, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413.) Accordingly, the appellate court found that the “trial court correctly determined that Open Bible was a hierarchical church as to which a civil court must defer with respect to its ecclesiastical decisions” and that the trial court properly applied the ecclesiastical rule “to abstain from making a determination as to only one issue” namely the propriety of Open Bible’s revocation of ministerial credentials.” (Ibid.)