MCFADDEN, LINDA vs CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL COUNCIL

I. History of Case

A. Complaint and First Amended Complaint. On August 6, 2025, Linda McFadden, a sitting judge of the Stanislaus County Superior Court filed a complaint against the California Judicial Council, (hereinafter JCC) and the Stanislaus County Superior Court (hereinafter SCSC). Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on September 15, 2025, alleging six causes of action: The first five causes of action alleged violations of FEHA by both the JCC and the SCSC. [1] The grounds asserted by Judge McFadden under FEHA allege disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, failure to engage in interactive process, failure to prevent harassment, discrimination and retaliation. The sixth cause of action (against the JCC only) is based on allegations of violation of provisions of Labor Code Sec.1102.5, whistleblower retaliation.

B. Demurrers and Tentative Ruling. Both the JCC and SCSC demurred to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. Hearing on the demurrers was held on February 5, 2026. The court issued its tentative ruling on the demurrers providing that: "Judge McFadden bases her causes of action upon Presiding Judge Stephens' administrative directives, inter alia, assigning Judge McFadden to a misdemeanor calendar, removing her from the court's appellate panel, removing her from the court's executive committee, changing Judge McFadden's courtroom, failing to modify Judge McFadden's courtroom assignment based upon health concerns, making requests to obtain medical documentation of Judge McFadden's health condition, and Judge Stephens' refusal to meet and confer regarding Judge McFadden's complaints.

Shortly after Judge McFadden's re-assignment and confirmation of her transfer to a different department of the court, Judge McFadden submitted a written complaint to the Commission on Judicial Performance. "The separate demurrers of the SCSC and the JCC are primarily based on Judge McFadden's failure to sufficiently allege facts to support the conclusion that the JCC and the SCSC were her employers - joint or otherwise. Defendants allege that each cause of action fails to state facts sufficient to establish that she is entitled to FEHA relief and particularly fails to establish that she is an employee entitling her to maintain her complaint.

Defendants focus on the FEHA requirement that there must be an "employment relationship" as a foundation for liability. [2] While FEHA provides some definitions for both the terms and "employer" and "employee," it leaves undefined the breadth of the term "employee" for purposes of this action. While it seems clear that the entities, i.e., the Superior Court or the Judicial Council, are required to respond to FEHA claims [3] from those who enjoy status as an "employee," [4] there is no requirement for liability to extend to those who are outside the "employee" penumbra."

Relying on the holdings in Essick v. County of Sonoma [5] and Brown v. City of Inglewood [6], the court's tentative ruling found that Judge McFadden could not be deemed an employee for the purposes of her FEHA or her Whistleblower complaint. The court's tentative ruling concluded that: "Here, it is clear that Judge McFadden is neither an employee of the Judicial Council nor of the Stanislaus Superior Court. Rather, she is an elected officer who can be retained or recalled by the voters of Stanislaus County, her ultimate employers."[7] "As such, the demurrers of the JCC and the SCSC must be SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

The court cannot envision any amendments that might bring superior court judges within the definition of "employee" for purposes of FEHA or Labor Code Sec. 1102.5. [8] Therefore, as a matter of law, the court determined that the pleading cannot be amended to state a valid cause of action. [9]

II. Proposed Second Amended Complaint. At the February 5, 2026 oral argument, counsel for Judge McFadden proposed that Plaintiff should be entitled to amend the First Amended Complaint by adding the Commission on Judicial Performance as an additional defendant. The court declined to allow Plaintiff to directly file a Second Amended Complaint, but instead allowed Plaintiff to file a proposed Second Amended Complaint to be reviewed and determined by the court whether the inclusion of the CJP or other proposed amendments would justify overruling of the demurrers of the JCC and the SCSC.

Counsel were given leave to file additional authorities in opposition or support of the proposed Second Amended Complaint. Hearing on the question whether the Proposed Second Amended Complaint would be allowed was initially set for April 7, 2026. After the court read and considered the submissions of both counsel on the issue of the viability of the Proposed Second Amended Complaint, the court issued the following minute order on March 27, 2026, that read in part:

"On its own motion, the court hereby continues the hearing previously set for April 7, 2026, at 10:00 am in Department TBA. Plaintiffs and all Defendants' submissions on the issues described below shall be filed and served by April 24 2026, (with copies to the court via email). Each party may file and serve their replies to each other's submissions by April 24, 2026. The court sets hearing on all issues relating to the Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint on May 28,2026, at 10:00 a.m. in Department TBA. "Having read and considered the parties submissions regarding Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint, the court requests that the parties address the impact, if any, of Calif.

Const. Article Vl Sec.18(g) and (h): "(g) No court, except the Supreme Court, shall have jurisdiction in a civil action or other legal proceeding of any sort brought against the commission by a judge. Any request for injunctive relief or other provisional remedy shall be granted or denied within 90 days of the filing of the request for relief. A failure to comply with the time requirements of this section does not affect the validity of commission proceedings. "(h) Members of the commission, the commission staff, and the examiners and investigators employed by the commission shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct at any time in the course of their official duties.

No civil action may be maintained against a person, or adverse employment action taken against a person, by any employer, public or private, based on statements presented by the person to the commission."

A. Plaintiff's Proposed Amendments. Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, principally because her contentions are conclusory in nature and devoid of substantial factual development. The proposed modifications are set forth in Addendum A to this order, which shows the allegations that actually or impliedly involve the CJP. (Specific references are highlighted in yellow.) [Ed. note: Addendum A has been electronically transmitted to the parties and is not included in the online posting.]

Changes to Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint are limited to (1) Describing the CJP, and its designation as successor party to Doe 2; (2) An allegation that Plaintiff's complaint to the CJP resulted in the treatment she received from the JCC and SCSC; (3) An allegation that the institutional arrangement of the JCC, SCSC, and CJP created a de facto employer structure for purposes of California employment laws; (4) Various alleged "background facts" set forth in paragraphs 13 through 16 referring to or inferring the involvement of the CJP (set forth in Addendum A); (5) A reference to correspondence between Plaintiff and the Stanislaus Superior Court Human Resources department (attached to proposed complaint as "Exhibit C") that referred to the court's policies regarding accommodations for medical conditions and disability; (6) Plaintiff's allegation that she submitted a formal complaint to the CJP regarding the then Presiding Judge concerning an alleged abuse of authority and retaliation.

The fact that Plaintiff submitted a complaint to CJP appears to form the crux of her entire complaint. In paragraph 5 of her proposed Second Amended Complaint she posits that: "Plaintiff alleges that the Judicial Council of California (JCC), the Commission on Judicial Performance (CJP), and the Stanislaus County Superior Court (SCSC) operated collectively in a coordinated structure that exercised significant and interlocking control over Plaintiff's work as a Superior Court Judge. Although she was an elected constitutional officer, Plaintiff's daily ability to perform her judicial functions--including courtroom access, calendar assignments, technological systems, accommodation requests, and administrative integration--was controlled in practice by JCC and SCSC, acting in close communication.

CJP, while not directly managing workplace logistics, holds constitutional authority over judicial discipline and was the recipient of Plaintiff's protected disclosures, the substance of which influenced the treatment she received from SCSC and JCC. This institutional arrangement--where each Defendant exercised or influenced a different dimension of judicial oversight--created a de facto employer structure, such that JCC, CJP, and SCSC functioned as joint or integrated employers for purposes of California employment laws, including Labor Code Sec.1102.5."

Plaintiff's Conclusion in her supplemental briefing states "Her case rests on the principle that no public employer - regardless of proximity to a disciplinary body--may retaliate against a judge for making a protected disclosure." At no point in the proposed complaint does Plaintiff allege what the CJP had done regarding the complaint that Plaintiff made to them, nor what facts justify the conclusion that JCC, SCSC and CJP operated "collectively in a coordinate structure that exercised significant and interlocking control over Plaintiff's work as a Superior Court Judge", nor facts supporting the claim that CJP "was the recipient of Plaintiff's protected disclosures, the substance of which influenced the treatment she received from SCSC and JCC.

P.5 of proposed complaint. Save the above additions to the First Amended Complaint, there are no other substantive facts in the proposed complaint.

B. Lack of Facts asserted to establish that Plaintiff is an "employee" of any of the actual or proposed defendants. Defendants JCC and SCSC are correct in pointing out that the Plaintiff has failed to cite any authority that she is an employee. On the contrary, Defendants again rely on Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5 th 33 and Bradley v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 158 Cal.App.4 th 1612, 1625. Brown definitively establishes that as an elected official, Plaintiff is not entitled to employee status because she is an elected official.

Bradley holds that an employer's status depends on the entity exercising "direction and control" over the worker's performance. Plaintiff's references to elements such as courtroom access and assignments are elements of court administration, and do not establish that any of the defendants control her judicial work. Defendants JCC and SCSC correctly point out that the CJP is a constitutionally established disciplinary body, having power to remove and discipline judges. Nothing about this role qualifies the CJP as an employer of judges.

Similarly, Plaintiff's theory that the CJP, JCC and SCSC are an "integrated enterprise" overlooks the fact that the individual and proposed defendants are separate legal entities and that there is a failure to make a factual showing that there is a different legal or other interrelationship. Plaintiff emphasizes her argument that she is an "employee" on a letter from the Human Resources division of the SCSC. Plaintiff's supplemental briefing states that "In that communication, SCSC Human Resources described Plaintiff as an 'employee' in the context of evaluating disability accommodation obligations under the FEHA."

This interpretation forces a conclusion from language that was materially different. No statement was made that Plaintiff was an employee. Statements relevant to Plaintiff's position were as follows: "It is the policy of the Court to provide, when feasible, reasonable accommodation for employees with known medical conditions which prevent them from performing the essential functions of their job classification" *. *. *. * "The Human Resources Division will review your request for a reasonable accommodation and a determination will be made whether you meet the definition of a "qualified individual with a disability" and if we are able to accommodate your request."

Plaintiff's supplemental briefing on the issue of maintaining an action against the CJP attempts to carve out an exception to the language of Article VI, sections 18(g) and (h) to establish employment status for a judge who experiences whistleblower retaliation or otherwise related FEHA claims. However, due to the lack of a factual basis that supports Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint, the court finds that the Defendant's objections to the proposed amended complaint are well taken and that the Proposed Second Amended Complaint should not be filed.

C. Jurisdiction. The request to allow filing of the Proposed Second Amended Complaint must fail for another reason - lack of Jurisdiction. Calif. Const. Art. VI, Sec.Sec.18 (g) and (h) provide as follows: (g) No court, except the Supreme Court, shall have jurisdiction in a civil action or other legal proceeding of any sort brought against the commission by a judge. Any request for injunctive relief or other provisional remedy shall be granted or denied within 90 days of the filing of the request for relief.

A failure to comply with the time requirements of this section does not affect the validity of commission proceedings. (h) Members of the commission, the commission staff, and the examiners and investigators employed by the commission shall be absolutely immune from suit for all conduct at any time in the course of their official duties. No civil action may be maintained against a person, or adverse employment action taken against a person, by any employer, public or private, based on statements presented by the person to the commission.

The requirement for exclusive jurisdiction in the Supreme Court is met here because (1) the proposed Second Amended Complaint is clearly a civil action (or other legal proceeding of any sort) brought against the commission, and (2) it is brought by a judge. The CJP is named as a defendant in every cause of action. The proposed complaint alleges that CJP "was responsible in part for the acts, omissions and violations of law alleged in this Complaint." P.4. Additionally, Plaintiff further alleges that she was an "agent and/or employee of all Defendants."

P.7 Therefore, only the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction. This court would have no jurisdiction to determine the issues raised in this proposed case. Plaintiff's initial request to allow this court an opportunity to amend her First Amended Complaint was based on adding the CJP as a defendant. It now appears that Plaintiff has no ability to maintain CJP as a defendant in this case. In light of the jurisdictional bar, Plaintiff now offers to further amend the proposed Second Amended Complaint: "If the Court concludes that any prayer or allegation can be read to seek a direct order against the commission, to challenge the content of a commission determination, or to impose liability on commission actors for official conduct, that perceived overbreadth should be addressed surgically.

The Court can preserve claims for damages and non-CJP injunctive relief against JCC and SCSC while requiring Plaintiff to amend to disclaim any direct superior-court claim against the commission within the meaning of section 18(g). That is the most faithful way to honor the enacted constitutional limits without expanding them." This offer to amend is a non-starter. This court previously ruled in its tentative decision of February 5, 2026 that Plaintiff had failed to state causes of action against JCC and SCSC, because neither of those entities was an employer of the Plaintiff.

Plaintiff seems to now propose that she continue to litigate as if she were an employee, while additionally maintaining an active role on the part of the CJP, and agreeing to (1) forego damages against the CJP (the existing proposed prayer does not seek damages against the CJP), and (2) agreeing not to seek a direct order against the CJP or impose liability on commission actors, but still maintaining the CJP as a defendant. Clearly, this arrangement would still be a clear violation of Sec.Sec.(g) and (h).

Plaintiff does not offer to define what a "direct order" might be or how the CJP might be maintained as a defendant in this proposed litigation without violating the Constitutional bar to litigating before any court other than the Supreme Court. Given the broad language fixing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ("in a civil action or other legal proceeding of any sort brought against the commission by a judge") it would appear that any attempt to maintain the CJP's presence in the type of litigation proposed by Plaintiff would run afoul of the plain language of Sec.Sec.(g) and (h).

Since this court has no jurisdiction over a case involving litigation against CJP brought by a judge, it would appear that this court is likely foreclosed from ruling on the issue whether the proposed Second Amended Complaint does or does not constitute a proper cause of action. Therefore, the court merely rules that Plaintiff's proposed Second Amended Complaint lacks sufficient grounds to allow its filing because of the absence of sufficient facts to justify a continuation of this litigation. Further amendments could not cure the defect that Plaintiff lacks "employee" status.

III.

Conclusion

The court denies permission to file Plaintiff's Proposed Second Amended Complaint. The demurrers of the Judicial Council of California and the Stanislaus County Superior Court are hereby sustained without leave to amend. The court strikes the Plaintiff's Proposed Second Amended Complaint.

========== Endnotes [1] Fair Employment and Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code Sec.12940 (hereinafter FEHA). [2] Vernon v. State of California (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 123. [3] DeJung v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 533, 546-547. [4] Ibid. [5] Essick v. County of Sonoma (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 941. [6] Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5th 33. [7] Persky v. Bushey (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 810, 821-824. [8] Jimenez v. U.S. Continental Marketing, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 189, 196; Lab. Code, Sec. 1102.5. [9] Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1491; Myles v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1072, 1076

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Clifford Tong in Department 23: ***There are no tentative rulings in Department 23***

The following are the tentative rulings for cases calendared before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu in Department 24: ***There are no tentative rulings in Department 24***

The following is the tentative ruling for a case calendared before Commissioner Jared D. Beeson in Department 19 located at the Turlock Division at 300 Starr Avenue, Turlock, CA: UD-26-000413 - BANSAL, JANAK vs GARCIA, JOE R - Defendant's Demurrer - HEARING REQUIRED.