SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al.

The Court subsequently issued an order requiring Song to file and serve a second amended opposition due to noncompliance with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. (Court Order of 12/5/25.) Plaintiff failed in her opposition to Defendants’ separate statement to unequivocally state whether a fact was disputed or undisputed, and also improperly asserted argument. Song 23CV054347: SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Miae Song (Plaintiff) CRS# 876427324363 in Department 20 raised punitive damages arguments at oral argument on or about January 29, 2026. The evidence supporting punitive damages was in the record throughout.

The motion presents the same facts in a different framework — it does not present new or different facts, circumstances, or law. Accordingly, the motion does not satisfy section 1008.

II. The Court Exercises Its Inherent Authority to Reconsider the March 20 Order

Section 1008 limits the parties’ ability to file repetitive motions, but it does “not limit the court’s ability, on its own motion, to reconsider its prior interim orders so it may correct its own errors.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1107.)

The Court has reviewed the record in this matter and concludes that its prior ruling warrants reconsideration. The Court’s prior ruling, part of an 11-page order analyzing Defendants’ motion directed to 12 causes of action plus punitive damages, did not address: (1) Ramesh’s October 4, 2022 email declining to approve Song’s CFRA leave; (2) the September 8, 2022 ultimatum to take two weeks off or quit; (3) contentions regarding Flanagan’s physical threat of violence at the September 8 meeting; (4) Ramesh’s failure to forward Song’s retaliation complaint to HR; (5) Ramesh’s characterization of Song’s retaliation concerns as “childish”; (6) Ramesh’s demand for work equipment during approved CFRA leave; or (7) managing agent status.

The Court’s analysis was not hampered by page limits on the briefing as suggested by Song. Rather, the challenge was the flood of information -- both material and nonmaterial -- that made it exceedingly difficult to identify key issues and evidence. Thus, for example, Song cited 77 of her 93 Plaintiff’s Additional Material Facts (PAMFs) in her original opposition to the motion for summary adjudication on punitive damages; tellingly, the more persuasive motion for reconsideration pared that down to 25. The challenge was also compounded by a lack of specificity. For example, Song cited 25 PAMFs in support of a single sentence in her original opposition. (Pl.’s Opp. at p. 18:22-24 [citing “PMFs #3-27”].) Of those 25 PAMFs, only six — PAMFs 7, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22 — are cited in the entire motion for reconsideration.

Meanwhile, Defendants’ responses to the PAMFs generally and unhelpfully, with very few exceptions, failed to indicate whether they agreed or disagreed to part or all of each PAMF, instead stating that the cited evidence did not support the contentions and/or that the PAMFs were irrelevant.

That said, Defendants have a point that many of Plaintiff’s PAMFs were not properly supported. To take one example, PAMF 7 cites five evidentiary exhibits in support (Alexander Decl, portions of Exs. 22 & 53; Rissell Decl.,Exs. E, H, P), but four do not support the point stated (Alexander Decl. Ex. 22; Rissell Decl. Ex. E, H, P), and the fifth (Alexander Decl. Ex. 53) does not exist. Ex. 53 does contain a cross-reference to Exhibit 7. Plaintiff’s supplemental declaration filed in May 2026 did not contain Exhibit 7, such that the Court was required to pull

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV054347: SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Miae Song (Plaintiff) CRS# 876427324363 in Department 20 up the originally filed electronic copy of the exhibit to confirm that PAMF No. 7 was indeed supported by this sole piece of evidence not cited in the PAMF. Meanwhile, Exhibit 7 is over 20 pages long, with many pages immaterial to the point being made; indeed, the only page that appears to be relevant, SONG000032 (“I’m bypassing Cindy.

I think she may have spoke to him after our last talk but then I felt retaliation”), is not highlighted or called out in any of the briefing. To sum up: Plaintiff cites five exhibits to support PAMF 7, but none of the five support it, and one does not exist. An exhibit that does support PAMF 7 is not cited therein, and contains over 20 pages of irrelevant matter, and one page of relevant matter, that is not called out. The Court found issues with the evidentiary support for Plaintiff’s PAMFs to be a recurring issue.

The upshot is that, to find the evidence upon which Plaintiff relies, the Court was asked to look for the proverbial needle in the haystack, and Plaintiff included a massive amount of hay, not to mention red herrings, that compounded the difficulty.

Notwithstanding, in the interests of substantial justice and merits adjudication, the Court exercises its inherent authority to reconsider the March 20 Order’s summary adjudication of punitive damages.

III. Triable Issues of Material Fact Precluding Summary Adjudication of Punitive Damages A.

Legal Standard

Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), authorizes punitive damages on clear and convincing evidence of “oppression, fraud, or malice.” “Oppression” means “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., § 3294, subd. (c)(2).) For a corporate employer, section 3294, subdivision (b), requires that “the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.”

A “managing agent” includes only those corporate employees who “exercise substantial independent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 566- 567.) The determination “does not necessarily hinge on their level in the corporate hierarchy.” (Id. at p. 579 [internal quotations and citation omitted].) Managing agent status is “a question of fact for decision on a case-by-case basis.” (Id. at p. 567.)

B. Managing Agent Status — Ramesh

The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Song, establishes a triable fact as to whether Ramesh was a managing agent. As Complex Director of Sales and Marketing for the Hilton Hotels of San Francisco Union Square complex, Ramesh supervised approximately 50 employees. (PAMF 78 [citing Rissell Decl., Ex. F, Ramesh Transcript at 150:1-25, 151:1-20].)

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV054347: SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Miae Song (Plaintiff) CRS# 876427324363 in Department 20 There is a triable issue as to whether Ramesh exercised discretionary decisionmaking authority over key aspects of employment such as employees’ access to equipment, approval of leave, and responses to employee complaints.

In the absence of any written Hilton policy governing employee equipment during leaves of absence, Ramesh appears to have exercised discretionary authority to demand all of Song's work equipment — building keys, cell phone, and email access — while Song was on approved CFRA leave. (PAMF 79 [citing Rissell Decl., Ex. F, Ramesh Transcript at 150:1-25; Ex. C, Bernier Transcript at 38:15-40:13]; see also Alexander Decl., Ex. 34.) The exercise of discretion in an area where no formal policy exists may be probative of managing agent status as a form of ad hoc policy formulation. (See Colucci v. T-Mobile USA, Inc. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 442, 454.)

On October 4, 2022, when Rhodes asked Ramesh for an "end date" for Song's leave, Ramesh responded with an unqualified refusal to grant leave. (PAMF 78 [citing Alexander Decl., Ex. 33, at HILTON000520-524].) Ramesh's refusal was overridden the next day. An attempted exercise of authority that is immediately overridden reasonably should carry less weight than one that stands. The refusal may be more probative of Ramesh's state of mind than of her policymaking authority. That said, the episode is not irrelevant to managing agent status.

Rhodes's initial question — "How much leave time can you give her?" (PAMF 78) suggests that Ramesh was understood within the organization as having authority over leave decisions. That others in the organization deferred to Ramesh on such questions is at least circumstantial evidence of ad hoc discretionary authority, even if the specific decision was later corrected.

Plaintiff also cites Ramesh’s handling of the “retaliation” complaint as evidence of her status as a managing agent. Ramesh did not forward Song's September 3, 2022 retaliation complaint to HR. (PAMF 65 [citing Alexander Decl., Ex. 29, at HILTON001173-1176; Rissell Decl., Ex. F, Ramesh Transcript at 173:13-174:14; Ex. C, Bernier Transcript at 52:15-53:3]; see also Rissell Decl., Ex. E, Song Decl. at 94-95 [Song testified to making numerous complaints to Ramesh regarding Flanagan, and that Ramesh “flat out told me that she didn’t believe me”].)

Hilton’s policy required managers to forward retaliation complaints to HR. (PAMF 64 and evidence cited therein.) Ramesh also did not report Flanagan’s outburst at the September 8, 2022 meeting, where it is alleged that Ramesh had to take action by grabbing Flanagan and pushing him out of her office. (PAMF 73 and evidence cited therein.) A jury could find that Ramesh's decision to not to file a retaliation complaint or report the September 8, 2022 outburst, without contemporaneous consequence, evidences ad hoc discretionary authority over a significant aspect of the employment relationship.

In light of the Court’s holding viz Ramesh, the Court does not reach the alternative argument of whether Defendants, through Hilton’s former Complex Human Resources Director, Emanuel Brueh or others, ratified the some or all of the conduct underlying the lawsuit. (See, e.g., PAMF 19, 21, 22, 73.)

C. Oppression — Ramesh’s Conduct Exceeded Mere Negligence

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV054347: SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Miae Song (Plaintiff) CRS# 876427324363 in Department 20

The March 20 Order characterized the complained-of conduct as negligence-type failures and applied Ebaugh v. Rabkin’s holding that mere or gross negligence is insufficient for punitive damages. That legal standard is correct. The question presented is whether the evidence, viewed through the clear and convincing standard, could support a finding that Ramesh’s conduct exceeded mere negligence and rose to the level of oppression — “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(2).)

Plaintiff has cited sufficient evidence to support the existence of a triable issue of oppression. The evidence includes:

Ramesh’s response to Plaintiff’s exercise of medical leave rights. Ramesh responded on October 4, 2022 to an inquiry regarding Plaintiff’s September 26, 2022 request for medical leave with an emphatic “I do NOT approve of any [sic];leave of absence for her.’ (PAMF 78 and evidence cited therein; Alexander Decl Ex. 34.) Ramesh directed staff to retrieve Song’s work equipment. (PAMF 79.) Ramesh was informed the next day that FMLA leave was a federally protected right not subject to manager approval. (PAMF 78.)

Similarly, in connection with the September 8, 2022 ultimatum meeting, Ramesh told Song to take two weeks or less off from work, or quit — at a time when Song was reporting burnout and health issues and would shortly request medical leave. (Rissell Decl. Ex. E, pp. 71-72, cited in PAMF 74.) A jury could find that Ramesh’s response to the Song’s medical leave requests reflects conscious disregard of Song’s rights, not mere negligence or ignorance.

Flanagan’s physical threat and Ramesh’s inaction. At the September 8 meeting, Flanagan reportedly jumped out of his chair, lunged at Song, and yelled that he was being told he was not a team player, shook his fists in an angry manner, and his face was bright red in color. (PAMF 73 and evidence cited therein.) Ramesh reportedly was prompted by this behavior to grab Flanagan and shove him out of her office. (Id.) Ramesh did not report this behavior to Bernier or HR, and Flanagan received no disciplinary action in his file for this incident. (Id.) Hilton maintains a “Zero Tolerance” policy concerning aggressive or hostile behavior creating a reasonable fear of injury. (Id. [citing Alexander Decl., Ex. 54, at HILTON000592-601].)

Viewing this evidence through the prism of the clear and convincing standard, a reasonable jury could find that Ramesh’s conduct rose to the level of oppression.

CONCLUSION

The portion of the Court’s order of March 20, 2026 granting summary adjudication of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim is VACATED. Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages under Civil Code section 3294 is REINSTATED for trial.

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

23CV054347: SONG vs HILTON HOTEL EMPLOYER, LLC, et al. 05/27/2026 Hearing on Motion for Reconsideration filed by Miae Song (Plaintiff) CRS# 876427324363 in Department 20 If a party does not timely contest the foregoing Tentative Ruling and appear at the hearing, the Tentative Ruling will become the order of the court.

HOW DO I CONTEST A TENTATIVE RULING?

THROUGH ECOURT Notify the Court and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing, and briefly identify the issues you wish to argue through the following steps: 1. Log into eCourt Public Portal 2. Case Search 3. Enter the Case Number and select "Search" 4. Select the Case Name 5. Select the Tentative Rulings Tab 6. Select "Click to Contest this Ruling" 7. Enter your Name and Reason for Contesting 8. Select "Proceed" BY EMAIL Send an email to the DEPARTMENT CLERK and all the other parties no later than 4:00 PM one court day before the scheduled hearing. This will permit the department clerk to send invitations to counsel to appear remotely.

BOTH ECOURT AND EMAIL notices are required.