Brandon Jackson v. Upland Evergreen SPE LLC, et al

Here, Penal Code section 396, subdivision (i), only states that a violation of this statute may be pursued as an UCL claim. It does not expressly state that a violation of this statute would create any independent cause of action; nor does it refer to an individual’s right to bring an action to recover any actual damages that have been uniquely suffered by that individual. Rather, if a landlord violates Penal Code section 396, that landlord is subject to criminal penalties, i.e., guilty of a misdemeanor and is subject to a fine and/or imprisonment. Therefore, it does not appear that the Legislature manifested an intent to create a standalone cause of action for a violation of Penal Code section 396 outside of a UCL claim.

Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that Penal Code section 396 is a standalone cause of action, it would be duplicative of Plaintiff’s Third Cause of Action for Violation of the UCL1, or alternatively, as originally argued by Defendant, it would be barred by the one-year statute of limitations proscribed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the First Cause of Action, without leave to amend.

ii. UCL/Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claims Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s UCL and Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing claims are both partially barred by the four-year statute of limitations as proscribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 337 and Business and Professions Code section 17208.

In Opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that these claims are subject to a four-year statute of limitations period. Instead, Plaintiff argues that his claims are not entirely time-barred under the continuous accrual theory. On Reply, Defendant concedes that the continuous accrual theory would apply and that any allegation of wrongdoing occurring after June 27, 2021 would not be time-barred.

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Third and Fourth Causes of Action, with leave to amend, to allow Plaintiff to state claims for violations occurring after June 27, 2021.

iii. Negligence Claims Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Negligence Per Se and Negligence claims are both partially barred by the two-year statute of limitations as proscribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1.

Defendant argues that even under the continuous accrual theory, the alleged tortious actions would have ceased on April 1, 2023, after the COVID-19 state of emergency was lifted and the

1 In general, a demurrer can be sustained where one cause of action is duplicative of another cause of action. (Palm Springs Villas II Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Parth (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 268, 290; Rodrigues v. Campbell Industries (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 494, 501 [finding demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend as to cause of action that contained allegations of other causes and “thus add[ed] nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory of recovery”].) 2

protections of Penal Code section 396 expired. Therefore, Defendant argues that to be timely, Plaintiff needed to file her negligence claims by April 1, 2025.

In Opposition, Plaintiff argues that his negligence claims are timely due to tolling by Judicial Council Emergency Rule 9, which served to toll all civil statutes of limitations exceeding 180 days from April 6, 2020 through October 1, 2020, which added 178 days to Plaintiff’s deadline.

On Reply, Defendant argues that because Plaintiff admits that the last violation occurred on February 28, 2023, which was not within the tolling period proscribed by Emergency Rule 9, Plaintiff’s negligence claims cannot receive any additional time for tolling.

In general, two branches of accrual rules apply to so-called “continuing wrongs”: the “continuing violation doctrine” and the “theory of continuous accrual.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1197.) The continuing violation doctrine can render an entire course of conduct actionable, including acts otherwise outside the statute of limitations. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1056.) In contrast, and as discussed above, the theory of continuous accrual permits recovery of damages only for conduct occurring within each new limitation period. (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199; Baxter v. State Teachers’ Retirement System (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 340, 378-379.) For negligence claims, the theory of continuous accrual is applied. (Orange County Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343, 396.)

Given that the theory of continuous accrual applies, the tolling period as provided in Emergency Rule 9 would only serve to toll violations occurring on or before October 1, 2020. However, even if the Emergency Rule 9 tolling period were applied, two years and 178 days from October 1, 2020 would fall on March 28, 2023. Furthermore, even if the latest violation date (February 28, 2023) was used, Plaintiff’s negligence claims would have needed to be filed within two years, i.e., on or before February 28, 2025. Because the Complaint was filed several months after that date, i.e., on June 27, 2025, Plaintiff’s negligence claims are therefore untimely.

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Second and Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence Per Se and Negligence, without leave to amend.

Whether Plaintiff’s Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim is Proper? Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot assert a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim based on a purported violation of a public policy interest which is not itself set forth within the terms of the underlying contract at issue itself, citing Racine & Laramie, Ltd. v. Department of Parks & Recreation (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1026, 1031 [holding that the covenant of good faith is read into contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly tied to the contract’s purpose.]

Defendant asserts that because the contract at issue was a lease agreement and because Plaintiff admits that he lived at the Premises (Compl. ¶¶ 33, 74), Plaintiff therefore received the benefit of what he contracted for. Notably, despite alleging that Defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by “charging illegal, excessive rents” during the COVID- 19 pandemic (see Compl. ¶ 75), Plaintiff does not allege that the lease agreement itself contains 3

an express or implied term prohibiting the charging of rent beyond lawful limits during a sudden state of emergency.

In Opposition, Plaintiff fails to address this argument. In general, “[c]ontentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority. [Citations.]” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.)

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Fourth Cause of Action, with leave to amend.

Whether Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment Claim is Proper? Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment should be dismissed because it is not a separate cause of action. In Melchior v. New Line Productions, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 779, 793, the Court of Appeal held that there is no cause of action in California for unjust enrichment. “The phrase ‘[u]njust [e]nrichment’ does not describe a theory of recovery, but an effect: the result of a failure to make restitution under circumstances where it is equitable to do so.” (Ibid., citing Lauriedale Associates, Ltd. v. Wilson (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448.) Unjust enrichment is “‘a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies,’” rather than a remedy itself. It is synonymous with restitution. (Ibid., citing Dinosaur Development, Inc. v. White (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1310, 1314-1315.)

In Opposition, Plaintiff that in modern times, unjust enrichment has been allowed as a separate cause of action under a quasi-contract claim theory, citing Elder v. Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 841, 857 (Elder). However, the Elder Court also acknowledged that “[t]he availability of relief for unjust enrichment in the nature of restitution raises legal and factual issues to be resolved at a later stage of the litigation, and is not before us on demurrer.” (Ibid.) Given this, the Elder Court simply declined to rule on the propriety of an unjust enrichment claim because that issue was not properly raised in that action.

Therefore, the Court sustains Defendant’s demurrer to the Fifth Cause of Action, without leave to amend.

Dated: May 27, 2026

____________________________ Judge Kory Mathewson

4