HONGLIN CHEN, ET AL VS. LAN YUN

Because a demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint, a plaintiff’s ability to prove those allegations does not concern the reviewing court. Plaintiffs need only plead facts showing that they may be entitled to some relief. (Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 604, superseded by statute on other grounds.) When a plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory, it is error to sustain a demurrer. (Bush v. California Conservation Corps (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 194, 200.)

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ANALYSIS

First cause of action for defamation

To state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must allege a publication of a statement of fact that is false, defamatory, and unprivileged, and that has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. (See Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893; Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750.) California authority recognizes those core defamation elements.

The demurrer to Plaintiffs’ original Complaint was sustained as to this cause of action because the timing and nature of the alleged publications were not sufficiently specified. The FAC alleges, on information and belief, that “Defendant Yun has spread false and damaging stories and statements about Plaintiffs to various individuals in Plaintiffs’ network, community, and to various social media and networking platforms and agencies in order to damage Plaintiffs’ personal and business reputations and cause them harm.”

The FAC alleges that Defendant stated, among other things, that Plaintiffs “defrauded Lan Yun,” “robbed” her, are a “fake business,” and that “nobody should do business” with them. The FAC further alleges that Defendant stated Katherine Chen is a “violent person” and a “liar” about money and general business dealings. (FAC, ¶¶ 50-51.) Plaintiffs identify the statements as having been made in 2023 and 2024 to Plaintiffs’ business, social, and networking contacts, including referral sources and customers. (Id., ¶¶ 51-52.)

Plaintiffs argue that this cause of action is based on both libel and slander, and that slander may be pled by alleging the substance of the defamatory statements. Plaintiffs rely on Okun v. Superior Court (Harris) (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442. (Opp. at p. 10:14-17.) Even accepting that general proposition, the FAC remains insufficient. The FAC does not identify which statements were allegedly spoken, which were allegedly written, which statements were made to which recipients, when the statements were made other than the broad timeframe of 2023 and 2024, or which statements concerned which Plaintiff. These omissions are material because Plaintiffs assert multiple allegedly defamatory statements, multiple Plaintiffs, and multiple categories of recipients.

The FAC therefore does not provide Defendant with sufficient notice of the allegedly actionable publications. The defect is not merely one of evidentiary detail. Rather, the FAC fails to plead the alleged publications with sufficient clarity to permit Defendant to determine what statements are at issue, to whom they were allegedly made, and whether the statements are alleged to constitute libel, slander, or both.

The Demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the first cause of action.

Second cause of action for false light

A plaintiff seeking to establish a false-light claim based on a defamatory publication must satisfy the same requirements applicable to a defamation claim. (Balla v. Hall (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 652, 687, quoting Hawran v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 277.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ false-light claim is based on the same alleged publications underlying the defamation claim. Because the FAC does not sufficiently identify the allegedly actionable statements, recipients, timing, or whether the statements were oral or written, the false-light claim is insufficient for the same reasons.

The Demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the second cause of action.

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Third cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage

The elements of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage include: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of that relationship; (3) intentional acts by the defendant designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) independently wrongful conduct by the defendant; (5) actual disruption of the relationship; and (6) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s conduct. (See CACI No. 2202; Kasparian v. County of Los Angeles (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 242, 260.) The independently wrongful requirement is an essential limitation on the tort.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant interfered with “business prospects” involving “Provisors, TriNet, Bumble, Match Group, Facebook, Pinterest, Coffee Meets Bagel, Hinge, LinkedIn, Instagram, TikTok, YouTube, X, Medium, Natra, Bluesky, Huyen Nguyen, Medium, Reddit and other such companies and platforms and individuals.” (FAC, ¶ 75.)

These allegations are insufficient. The FAC identifies a list of companies, platforms, and individuals, but does not allege facts showing an existing economic relationship between any Plaintiff and any identified third party containing the probability of future economic benefit. Nor does the FAC allege facts showing Defendant’s knowledge of any such relationship, the particular acts Defendant allegedly took to disrupt any specific relationship, when those acts occurred, or how any specific relationship was actually disrupted. Although Plaintiffs need not plead their evidence, they must plead ultimate facts supporting each element of the cause of action. The present allegations are too generalized to do so.

The Demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the third cause of action.

Fourth cause of action for extortion

A civil extortion theory generally depends on conduct that would constitute extortion under the Penal Code, including the wrongful use of force or fear to obtain property or other consideration. (See Pen. Code, §§ 518, 519, 523; Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361.) Penal Code section 518 defines extortion as obtaining property or an official act through wrongful force or fear, and Penal Code section 519 identifies threats that may constitute fear for purposes of extortion.

The FAC alleges “a course of coercive and threatening conduct,” including “threatening emails sent by Yun in late 2022 and 2023.” Plaintiffs allege these emails included “veiled and direct threats,” including statements such as, “I wonder what other people will think,” and that the threats were intended to wrongfully obtain money from Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶¶ 81-82.) The FAC further alleges that the threats included the danger that Defendant would reveal Plaintiffs’ private personal information and make false statements to Plaintiffs’ socialmedia and business networks to cause them harm. (Id., ¶ 83.)

As with the original Complaint, the nature of the alleged threats is not sufficiently clear. The quoted statement, “I wonder what other people will think,” does not itself identify a threat to reveal private information, make false statements, accuse Plaintiffs of wrongdoing, or otherwise wrongfully induce payment. Nor does the FAC allege the particular writings, the substance of the threats, the property or money

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demanded, the connection between the alleged threats and the demand for payment, or facts showing that the alleged conduct satisfies the elements of civil extortion.

The Demurrer is therefore SUSTAINED with leave to amend as to the fourth cause of action.

LEAVE TO AMEND

Because this is a challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings, and because the Court cannot conclude at this stage that Plaintiffs are incapable of alleging additional facts curing the identified defects, leave to amend is appropriate.

Plaintiffs may file a Second Amended Complaint within 10 days after service of notice of entry of this order.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court. Thereafter, counsel for the prevailing party shall prepare a written order consistent with this ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1312, and provide notice of the ruling to all appearing parties as required by law. The Court further directs the parties’ attention to revised Local Rule 3.403(b)(iv) (eff. Jan. 1, 2024) regarding the form of proposed orders.