Arno Murayama vs James Nielsen et al

In opposing the motion, Defendants assert that it should be denied because the proposed TAC adds a “new” second cause of action for violation of Civil Code section 1946.2 less than a month before trial and would be a “waste of time and resources” and further, new allegations by Plaintiff that he “continuously occupied the rental Property as his residence during the tenancy” (TAC, ¶ 59) directly contradict the allegations of the TAC that he “worked and lived in San Francisco during the week and lived with Mr. Bishop on the weekends in the rental Property. After Mr. Bishop’s death, Plaintiff resided in the Rental Property until April 30, 2024” (SAC, ¶ 19.) Defendants additionally argue that Plaintiff does not have standing to allege a violation of Civil Code section 1946.2.

At the outset, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff seeking leave to amend as being “on the eve of trial.” Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend was filed in January, after Defendants declined to stipulate to the filing of the TAC. Defendants were certainly well within their rights to decline to stipulate, but their description of Plaintiff’s actions is not wholly accurate.

It is also not accurate to say that Plaintiff is attempting to “add” a new cause of action; in the SAC, the second cause of action purports to assert a claim for violation of Civil Code section 1946.2 and constructive eviction just as the TAC does, and the facts underlying these claims are substantively the same. Thus, the TAC does not significantly alter the SAC in the manner argued by Defendants, and therefore the standing argument raised by them is arguably one that could have been raised previously in connection with the SAC.

As for Defendants’ contention concerning contradictory allegations, the Court is not persuaded, at least at this juncture, that the cited allegations are actually contradictory. The allegation that Plaintiff “continuously occupied the rental property” does not necessarily contradict the allegation that he resided there with Mr. Bishop on the weekends if he continuously occupied the dwelling on the weekends over an extended period of time and otherwise treated it in a manner that a residence would be treated (e.g., as the individual’s mailing address, etc.).

Ultimately, Defendants have not demonstrated that Plaintiff’s proposed amendments are futile or would significantly prejudice them.5 As such, in line with the liberal policy permitting amendment, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file the TAC is GRANTED.

The Court will prepare the final order.

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5 Defendants assert that granting leave to amend will cause further delay and trial is imminent. Plaintiff, who has previously opposed Defendants’ efforts to continue the trial, suggests the amendment will not impair the trial schedule because “the changes clarify the issues,” “the facts are already known,” and the “proposed amendment narrows and organizes claims, which promotes efficiency rather than delay.” Which party is correct remains to be seen. Plaintiff’s third effort to plead his case at minimum invites further litigation and places the pleadings into a state in which they are no longer at issue one month before the scheduled trial date.

Indeed, Plaintiff’s effort to plead a cause of action for breach of written lease in the Fourth Cause of Action both “on behalf of [the estate]” and “[i]ndependently,” in light of the Court’s ruling after the motion for summary adjudication that no individual action for that claim lied as to the SAC, is itself likely to result in further discussion. Plaintiff may be getting his pleading cake now but not eating any of it until a trial much later than June 2026. 18

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Case Name: Hamid Khazaeli v. Julie B. Cliff, et al.