DOUGLAS PARTELLO vs CITY OF OXNARD, et al.

Motion: Defendant City of Oxnard’s Motion to Quash Subpoena

Tentative Ruling: Defendant City of Oxnard’s Motion to Quash Subpoena is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion to quash is granted as to the City Attorney accounts. The Court further limits the scope of the remainder of the subpoena to the time frame starting August 1, 2024,

2025CUMC047374: DOUGLAS PARTELLO vs CITY OF OXNARD, et al.

through November 5, 2024. The Court further restricts the scope of the subpoena to exclude IP addresses and routing data.

Moving party is ordered to serve notice of the Court’s ruling.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard” Where the witness whose deposition is’sought’is not a party (or a “party-affiliated” witness), a subpoena must be served to compel the witness’ attendance, testimony, or production of documents. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2020.010, subd. (b), 2025.280, subd. (b); see’Terry v. SLICO"(2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 352, 357.) A deposition subpoena may command only the production of business records for copying without attendance at a deposition. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.020, subd. (b).) “Where personal records of a ‘consumer’ [] or an employee's employment records [] are subpoenaed, the ‘deposition’ (or records turnover) cannot take place until at least 20 days after the subpoena is ‘issued.’” (Weil & Brown, Cal.

Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2024) ¶ 8:541.1; Code Civ. Proc., § 2025.270, subd. (c).) “Special notice and procedures are’required’for production of the “personal records” of a “consumer” or employee, to protect that person's right of privacy. The purpose is to give that person the opportunity to seek a court order to quash or limit the subpoena before the records are’disclosed.” (Id."at ¶ 8:580; Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.6, subds. (b) & (e).)"" "" “The ‘consumer’ may object to production of the subpoenaed records by either filing a motion to quash the subpoena, or simply serving written objections on the requesting party, the proposed’deponent’and the deposition officer.” (Weil & Brown, Cal.

Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial,"supra,"at ¶ 8:593.10.) “Any consumer whose personal records are sought by a subpoena duces tecum and who is a party to the civil action in which this subpoena duces tecum is served may, prior to the date for production, bring a motion under Section 1987.1 to quash or’modify’the subpoena duces tecum. Notice of the bringing of that motion shall be given to the witness and deposition officer at least five days prior to production. The failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall not invalidate the motion to quash or’modify’the subpoena duces tecum but may be raised by the deposition officer as an affirmative defense in any action for liability for improper release of records” (Code Civ.

Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g); see’Slagle v. Superior Court"(1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1313 [5-day time limit for service of motion not jurisdictional].)"" "" Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.1 grants the trial court authority to quash a subpoena when necessary. Section 1987.1 provides, “If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders.” "" "" “Alternatively, any party, witness, consumer, employee or person whose personal identifying information is sought in connection with an action involving that person's right of free speech []

2025CUMC047374: DOUGLAS PARTELLO vs CITY OF OXNARD, et al.

may seek a protective order against the subpoena or deposition proceedings.” (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civ. Proc. Before Trial,"supra,"at ¶ 8:605.) “In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1.)"" "" A motion to quash production of documents at a deposition must be accompanied by a separate statement setting forth the’particular documents’or demands at issue and the factual and legal reasons why production should not be compelled. (Cal.

Rules of Ct., rule 3.1345(a)(5).)2"" "" The filing of a motion to quash automatically excuses the custodian and deposition officer from producing the subpoenaed records until the court orders their production. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985.3, subd. (g), 1985.6, subd. (f)(3);"Thai v. Richmond City Center, L.P. (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 282, 287.)""

II. Application

A. Scope of Discovery in a CPRA Suit

Discovery in a CPRA case is limited to the situation when a Plaintiff “make[s] a [sufficient] showing of bad faith,” or can provide “tangible evidence” records have been improperly withheld. (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 272, 290.) In the case before the Court, Plaintiff has asserted taxpayer waste claims which do not carry the discovery limitations of a CPRA case. Given the broad scope of discovery in general, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s subpoena is not limited by the CPRA restrictions.

B. Attorney Client Privilege

The subpoena seeks metadata related to communication involving two City Attorney accounts. Plaintiff argues that the metadata is not protected by privilege because it does not include content. Plaintiff’s position, that he needs the metadata to demonstrate that documents were withheld, undermines the position that they are entitled to metadata related to the City Attorney accounts. In addition, in the context of which account the information is sought from, the date, time, and persons that the City Attorney communicated with are substantive content. The motion to quash is granted as to the City Attorney accounts.

C. Deliberative Process and Mental Process Privilege

“[E]vidence that relates to the mental processes of individual legislators is irrelevant to the judicial task.” (Nadler v. Schwarzenegger (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1327, 1336.) [“So long as the inquiry goes to the subjective motivations of legislators, it is prohibited, no matter to whom the inquiry is directed.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1152-1153.) Plaintiff’s argument that the emails do not involve the legislative process is well taken. The City has not demonstrated that the information sought is part of the legislative process. The Court finds that the information sought is not limited by the deliberative process exception.

2025CUMC047374: DOUGLAS PARTELLO vs CITY OF OXNARD, et al.

D. Breadth of the Subpoena

The subpoena requests records from April 24, 2024, but the news release was issued on October 18, 2024. Plaintiff did not file his nomination papers with the City Clerk until August 1, 2024, and the election was November 5, 2024. The Court therefore limits the time frame of the subpoena to the time frame starting August 1, 2024, through November 5, 2024. The Court further restricts the scope of the subpoena to exclude IP addresses and routing data.

The Court denies the motion as to the remaining categories.

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