Water Audit California v. County of Napa et al

The moving party fails to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith.

The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

A. PROCEDURAL MATTERS

1. Nature of Demurrer

Real Party in Interest Bonny’s Vineyard (RPI) demurs to the Second Amended Verified Petition for Administrative Writ of Mandate and Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive Relief (SAPC), filed by Water Audit California (Petitioner).

Petitioner filed the SAPC following this Court’s March 11, 2026, Minute Order sustaining, with leave to amend, RPI’s demurrer to the First Amended Petition and Complaint (FAPC).

RPI demurs to the SAPC on the same grounds upon which it demurred to the FAPC, namely: “(1) The Petition is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and is therefore untimely as matter of law; (2) Petitioner failed to comply with mandatory procedural prerequisites, including the failure to file a required request for hearing; (3) Petitioner failed to join indispensable parties and failed to exhaust administrative remedies, requiring dismissal pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 389; (4) the Petition is uncertain, ambiguous, and unintelligible within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 [subdivision] (f); and (5) the Petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant under Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10 [subdivision] (e), including because of the allegations contradicted by matters subject to judicial notice.” (Notice of Motion at 2:2-9.)

2. Nature of the SAPC

“Even though the plaintiffs labeled their causes of action, that does not mean they are bound by those labels. It is an elementary principle of modern pleading that the nature and character of a pleading is to be determined from its allegations, regardless of what it may be called, and that the subject matter of an action and issues involved are determined from the facts alleged rather than from the title of the pleadings or the character of the damage recovery suggested in connection with the prayer for relief. (Citation omitted.)” (Jaffe v. Carroll (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 53, 57.)

The SAPC is less than a model of clarity in pleading. It contains ten sections that, each, purport to assert a different cause of action “Against County of Napa, Planning Commission, and Board of Supervisors.” (See, generally, SAPC.) A cursory review of the pleading, however, suggests that Plaintiff asserts at most five, and at fewest, only three independent claims. The SAPC clearly alleges facts relating to: 1) a petition for a writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) for violations of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); 2) a complaint for violation of the Public Trust Doctrine; and (3) a complaint for violation of the equal protection and due process guarantees of Article I, Section 7 of the California Constitution.

In addition, it may, or may not, also seek writs of mandamus, both administrative (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5), and traditional mandamus (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1085) for non-CEQA related acts or omissions by Respondent.1

The Court, herein, endeavors to analyze the instant demurrer based on these five apparent claims.

3. Requests for Judicial Notice

The Court rules on RPI’s Request for Judicial Notice (RFJ) as follows.

Request No. 1 (December 18, 2024, Meeting Minutes of the Napa County Planning Commission), No. 2 (Planning Commission Board Agenda Letter for Agenda Date 12/18/2024), and No. 3 (Napa County Supervisors Findings of Fact and Decision on Appeal): DENIED. None of the subject documents have been authenticated as an official document produced by a governmental agency. Moreover, in actions for mandamus, “documents in the administrative record are not considered in ruling on a demurrer unless they are ‘by appropriate reference made a part of the complaint or petition.’ [Citation.]” (Saint Francis Mem’l Hosp. v. State Dep’t of Pub. Health (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 965, 973-74.)

Request No. 4: GRANTED. The Court takes judicial notice of the July 2, 2025, filing, with the Napa County Recorder, of the Notice of Determination attached as Exh. D to the RJN, subject to the following. “Judicial notice may be taken of ‘the fact of a document’s recordation, the date the document was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in a recorded document, and the document’s legally operative language, assuming there is no genuine dispute regarding the document’s authenticity.

From this, the court may deduce and rely upon the legal effect of the recorded document, when that effect is clear from its face.” (Linda Vista Vill. San Diego Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Tecolote Invs., LLC (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 166, 184 (Linda Vista Village); see also Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 (Green Foothills) [held: trial court properly took judicial notice of the filing of a Notice of Determination].) Petitioner does not, through the Opposition, dispute the document’s authenticity.

The Court rules on Petitioner’s Requests for Judicial Notice as follows.

Request Filed May 13, 2026 (Notice of Determination): DENIED. The document is not file-endorsed and, therefore, there is no evidence that it constitutes a document recorded with the Napa County Clerk.

1 As discussed in detail below, the precise nature of the writs of mandamus sought by the SAPC, and the grounds therefore, are uncertain.

Second Request Filed May 18, 2026 (recordings of hearings appear[ing] on the Napa County Board of Supervisors website): DENIED. Petitioner fails to provide the Court with any documents. Petitioner simply sets forth two https internet addresses. Moreover, in actions for mandamus, “documents in the administrative record are not considered in ruling on a demurrer unless they are ‘by appropriate reference made a part of the complaint or petition.’ [Citation.]” (Saint Francis Mem’l Hosp. v. State Dep’t of Pub. Health (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 965, 973-74.)

B. LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. Matters Properly Subject to Judicial Notice Demonstrate that All CEQA Claims Asserted Through the SAPC are Time Barred

RPI asserts that each COA is barred by the statute of limitations. (See, e.g., Support Memorandum at 22:12, et seq.) The Court finds that the claims based on allegations of noncompliance with CEQA are barred.

“When any ground for objection to a complaint . . . appears on the face thereof, or from any matter of which the court is required to or may take judicial notice, the objection on that ground may be taken by a demurrer to the pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) “The untimeliness of the lawsuit must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint and matters judicially noticed before an appellate court will affirm an order sustaining the demurrer.” (Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 326; see also Committee for Green Foothills v.

Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42 (Green Foothills) [held: trial court properly sustained demurrer to CEQA action without leave to amend based, in part, on judicial notice taken of the filing of a Notice of Determination].) Where these matters appear to demonstrate an affirmative defense to the claims, a plaintiff must “plead around” the defense by alleging facts sufficient to avoid the apparent defense. (See Gentry v. eBay Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 816, 825.)

CEQA provides that “[a]n action or proceeding alleging that a public agency has improperly determined whether a project may have a significant effect on the environment shall be commenced within 30 days from the date of the filing of the notice required by subdivision . . . subdivision (a) of Section 21152.” (Pub. Resources Code § 21167, subd. (b).) The statute similarly provides that, “[a]n action or proceeding alleging that an environmental impact report does not comply with this division shall be commenced within 30 days from the date of the filing of the notice required by . . . subdivision (a) of Section 21152 by the lead agency.” (Id. at subd. (c).)

Public Resources Code section 21152 (Section 21152), subdivision (a) provides that, “[i]f a local agency approves or determines to carry out a project that is subject to this division, the local agency shall file a notice of determination within five working days after the approval or determination becomes final, with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located and with the State Clearinghouse in the Office of Planning and Research.” “If a state or local agency has filed [a Notice of Determination] stating whether a project will have a significant environmental impact [citation], the statute of limitations for all types of CEQA claims related to the project is 30 days from the date the notice was filed.

The 30-day statute applies to claims challenging an agency’s determination about environmental impact [citation], claims challenging the adequacy of an EIR [citation], and all other claims alleging CEQA violations [citation].” (Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 47.)

RPI relies on the Notice of Determination filed July 2, 2025, with the Napa County Recorder. (See Request for Judicial Notice at Exhibit D (RJN).) As discussed above, the Court takes judicial notice of “the fact of [the NOD’s] recordation, the date the [NOD] was recorded and executed, the parties to the transaction reflected in [the NOD], and the [NOD’s] legally operative language . . ..” (Linda Vista Village, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at 184.) By its terms the NOD relates to “Use Permit #P22-00002-UP” for the “Bonny’s Vineyard – Meyer’s Family Winery, New Winery #P22-00002” project. (See RJN at Exh. D, p. 1.)

The initial Petition and Complaint in this action was filed (nunc pro tunc by Order of the Court) on September 22, 2025, 93 days after the filing of the NOD. It provides, in part that “[t]his action challenges the approval of Bonnys’ [sic] Vineyard (Meyer’s Family Winery) New Winery Permit No. P22-00002-UP and Mitigated Negative Declaration . . . by the County of Napa . . . and the County’s pattern and practice of violating mandatory duties under the Public Trust Doctrine, the California Environmental Quality Act (‘CEQA’), and governing procedures.” (SAPC at ¶ 1.)

It therefore appears, from matters that are properly subject to judicial notice that all CEQA claims in this action challenging “Use Permit #P22-00002-UP” relating to the “Bonny’s Vineyard – Meyer’s Family Winery, New Winery #P22-00002” project are barred by the statute of limitations. (NOD at p. 1; see Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th 42, 47, 56.)

It is, therefore, Plaintiffs’ burden to “plead around” this affirmative defense. (See Gentry v. eBay Inc., supra 99 Cal.App.4th at 825.)

Through its Opposition, Petitioner argues that “a 30-day statute of limitations is dependent on the timely filing and public posting of a Notice of Determination, as required by [Section 21152]. Not only does Water Audit allege that the County filed the NOD late with the Napa County clerk and CEQA, the known public record reflects multiple inconsistent dates and document versions, and there is no evidence that the NOD was publicly posted by the Napa County clerk for 30 days (also required by [Section 21152]).” (Id. at 8:11-16.) The Court addresses each of these contentions in turn.

The Court finds no merit in Petitioner’s argument that it alleged that the County filed the NOD late. Section 21152, subdivision (a), provides that “[i]f a local agency approves or determines to carry out a project that is subject to this division, the local agency shall file a notice of determination within five working days after the approval or determination becomes final, with the county clerk of each county in which the project will be located and with the State Clearinghouse in the Office of Planning and Research.” Petitioner fails to cite to any authority suggesting that a late-filed Notice of Determination is not subject to the statute’s limitations period once it is filed.

While Petitioner asserts, through its Opposition that “allegations of the County’s failure to timely file and/or publicly post the NOD raises factual and evidentiary disputes, not resolvable on demurrer” it cites to no such allegations, and the Court is unable to locate any in the 226 paragraphs of the SAPC.2 (See Opposition at 8:17-19.)

Moreover, the argument appears, on its face, to have no merit. The requirement that a Notice be filed within five days would appear to be for the advantage of the project sponsor, here RPI. The Court can divine no policy reason by which a violation, by the public agency, of that requirement should suspend the statute of limitations on collateral attacks on project approval.

The Court finds no merit in Petitioner’s reference to the County Clerk’s obligation to post the NOD for 30 days. Section 21152, subdivision (c), provides that “[a] notice filed pursuant to this section, including any subsequent or amended notice, shall be available for public inspection, and shall be posted within 24 hours of receipt in the office and on the internet website of the county clerk. A notice shall remain posted for a period of 30 days.”

“Several cases have made an exception to the strict limitation periods in section 21167 when the notice of determination is materially defective.” (Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 52.)

However, while Petitioner asserts, through its Opposition that “allegations of the County’s failure to timely file and/or publicly post the NOD raises factual and evidentiary disputes, not resolvable on demurrer” it cites to no such allegations, and the Court is unable to locate any in the 226 paragraphs of the SAPC. (Opposition at 8:17-19.) Moreover, Petitioner does not assert, through the Opposition, that the NOD was not properly posted for the requisite 30-day period. Petitioner asserts only that “there is no evidence that the NOD was publicly posted by the Napa County clerk for 30 days.” (Opposition at 8:12-16.) Again, where a time limitation appears from the allegations of the pleading and matters subject to judicial notice, it is Petitioner’s obligation to plead around them. (See Gentry v. eBay Inc., supra 99 Cal.App.4th at 825.)

Finally, Petitioner’s statement that, “the known public record reflects multiple inconsistent dates and document versions” is vague and ambiguous. Petitioner fails to identify any specific defect (whether relating to “inconsistent dates and document versions” or otherwise) and fails to establish that any defect is material such that it justifies applying an exception to the limitation period in section 21167.

Based on the foregoing, the Court does not find that the SAPC contains allegations sufficient to plead around the apparent bar of the statute of limitations. For this reason, the demurrer is SUSTAINED as to “all types of CEQA claims related to the project . . ..” (Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 47.)

2 The Court expended impacted resources reviewing the 226 paragraph SAPC in an effort to locate such allegations, based on Petitioner’s representation. It was unable to find any. To the extent that Petitioner has not, in fact, made such allegations through the SAPC, Petitioner’s representation, through the Opposition, that it has alleged such facts constitutes a material misrepresentation to the Court. Petitioner is cautioned to take care not to make unverified representations to the Court going forward.

Based on the fact that caselaw provides exceptions to the strict limitation periods of section 21167 based on a materially defective notice of determination (see Green Foothills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at 52) the Court would ordinarily be obligated to grant Petitioner leave to further amend the Petition to attempt to plead around the limitations bar. However, the Court finds that Petitioner’s CEQA claims are barred for a second, independent reason that would render futile any attempt at alleging good claims for noncompliance with CEQA.

2. Petitioner’s Failure to Timely File a Request for Hearing Provides Independent Grounds for Dismissal

RPI next argues that Petitioner failed to timely file a request for hearing as required by Public Resources Code section 21167.4, subdivision (a).

“In any action or proceeding alleging noncompliance with [CEQA], the petitioner shall request a hearing within 90 days from the date of filing the petition or shall be subject to dismissal on the court’s own motion or on the motion of any party interested in the action or proceeding.” (Cal Pub Resources Code § 21167.4; see also Mitchell v. Orange County (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 1185, 1192 [“We find the statute must be construed to mean the petitioner need only file a request for a hearing within 90 days of filing the petition”].)

As noted above, the original Petition was filed in this action on September 22, 2025. Petitioner filed its Request for Hearing pursuant to Public Resources Code section 21167.4 more than 90 days later, on March 9, 2026. Thus, all claims alleging noncompliance with CEQA are subject to dismissal.

For this reason, the Court finds that any attempt by Petitioner to amend the Petition to state a valid claim for noncompliance with CEQA would be futile. As such, the Demurrer is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to these claims.

3. The Remaining Causes of Action are Uncertain

The Court finds that the elimination of CEQA Claims renders the SAPC fatally unclear.

“The party against whom a complaint or cross-complaint has been filed may object, by demurrer . . . to the pleading on [the] grounds [that] . . . [t]he pleading is uncertain. As used in this subdivision, ‘uncertain’ includes ambiguous and unintelligible.” (§ 430.10, subd. (f).) A demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and strictly construed; even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. (See Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1135 (Lickiss) [held: a demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and strictly construed; even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures].)

The SAPC suffers from significant ambiguities. It is not at all clear to the Court whether the writ, or writs of mandamus sought by Petitioner relate exclusively to allegations of noncompliance with CEQA, or, whether Petitioner contends that it is entitled to mandamus relief independent of any allegations of such noncompliance. Moreover, it is not clear which of the factual allegations set forth in the SAPC support the Public Trust Doctrine and California Constitutional claims, and, if asserted, the non-CEQA mandamus claims. For this reason, the Court is unable to meaningfully analyze whether the SAPC alleges sufficient facts to support any of the surviving claims. Petitioner’s Opposition brief does not clarify the nature of these claims or guide the Court’s analysis.

For this reason, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the remainder of the SAPC on grounds that the remaining claims are unintelligible as pled.

It is an abuse of discretion for a court to deny leave to amend where there is any reasonable possibility that a Plaintiff can state a good cause of action. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) The Court finds a reasonable possibility that Petitioner can amend to state good claims for: (1) mandamus (based on acts and omissions other than noncompliance with CEQA); (2) violation of the Public Trust Doctrine; and/or (3) violation of the California Constitution.

For this reason, the demurrer, as to these claims, is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

However, the Court notes the following principals and urges Petitioner to consider them in further amending the Petition.

The Court begins by noting that “[a] complaint . . . shall contain . . . [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a). Italics added.) In pleading, surplusage and argument are to be avoided. (See Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (2026) at § 6:14.1; see also 640 Tenth, LP v. Newsom (2022) 78 CA5th 840, 852, 294 CR3d 123, 130, fn. 7 [“[w]e disregard everything in the Complaint other than well-pleaded factual allegations and matters properly subject to judicial notice”].)

The SAPC contains significant legal analysis and legal argument. (See, e.g., id. at ¶¶ 2-3, 5-6, 26-42.) These passages constitute surplusage and should be avoided.

Again, the key in pleading is “a statement of the facts constituting the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.10, subd. (a).) This is as true for Petitions for Mandamus as any other civil complaint. “A proceeding in mandamus is subject to the general rules of pleading applicable to civil actions [citation] except as otherwise provided in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1067 to 1110b. Therefore, if Petitioner amends in an attempt to state non-CEQA mandamus claims, it will be necessary for the amended petition to allege specific facts showing entitlement to relief upon one of the grounds just mentioned. If such facts are not alleged, the petition is subject to general demurrer [citations] or the court is justified in denying the petition out of hand [citation].” (Gong v. City of Fremont (1967) 250 Cal.App.2d 568, 573 (Gong). Italics added.)

Moreover, should Petitioner seek to, again, assert both administrative and traditional mandamus, Petitioner should confirm that the facts pled, when presumed true, entitle it to both forms of relief.

“The writ of mandate is available either to compel the performance of a ministerial act which the law specially enjoins (a remedy commonly called ‘traditional mandamus,’ Code Civ. Proc. § 1085) or to inquire into the validity of some kinds of quasi-judicial actions of administrative agencies (commonly called ‘administrative mandamus,’ Code Civ. Proc. § 1094.5).” (Gong, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d at 571–72.) “The [traditional mandamus] statute tersely declares that the writ is available ‘to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins.’ (Code Civ.

Proc. § 1085.) Thus, it is limited to the enforcement of purely ministerial duties and will not lie to control discretion within the area lawfully entrusted to an administrative body. [Citations.]” (Gong, supra, 250 Cal.App.2d at 572.) “Administrative action is subject to review under section 1094.5 only as to certain aspects specified in subsection (b): want or excess of jurisdiction; whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was prejudicial abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is shown by failure of the administrative agency to proceed as required by law, failure of the findings to support the decision, or failure of the evidence to support the findings.” (Id. at 573.)

Finally, in amending, Petitioner should also clarify whether any of its remaining claims, and if so, which of these, “challenges the approval of Bonnys’ [sic] Vineyard (Meyer’s Family Winery) New Winery Permit No. P22-00002-UP.” (SAPC at ¶ 1.) This clarity is necessary to permit RPI to understand the scope of its role in the litigation following dismissal of the CEQA related claims.

[2] MOTION TO STRIKE WATER AUDIT’S SECOND AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR ADMINISTRATIVE WRIT OF MANDATE AND WRIT OF MANDATE AND COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

JUDICIAL DISCLOSURE: Pursuant to California Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3E(2), Judge Smith discloses that her husband works for Hundred Acre Winery, a Napa County winery. She is unaware of any connection between Hundred Acre Winery and the instant litigation, and unaware of any impact from the instant action on her husband’s employer. She can be fair and impartial in this matter.

TENTATIVE RULING: The motion is MOOT.

The moving party fails to include, in the notice of this motion, the current version of the Tentative Ruling notice required by Local Rule 2.9, effective 1/1/26. The current version allows a party or counsel to request a hearing by calling the Court or emailing the Court, at JudicialReception2@napa.courts.ca.gov and providing specified information set out in Local Rule 2.9. The moving party is therefore directed to immediately provide, by telephone call AND email, the current Tentative Ruling notice explicitly required by Local Rule 2.9 to opposing party/ies forthwith.

The requirements for requesting oral argument under Local Rule 2.9 remain in effect. However, the Court may grant belated requests for oral argument or continuance of hearing, made by any party who represents it did not timely receive the required notice, regardless of whether or not moving party is present at the hearing.

Real Party in Interest Bonny’s Vineyard (RPI) moves, to strike certain portions of the Second Amended Verified Petition for Administrative Writ of Mandate and Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive Relief (SAPC), filed by Petitioner Water Audit California.

The Court’s concurrent ruling sustaining RPI’s demurrer to the SAPC, renders MOOT the instant motion.

In The Matter of Trisha Marie Brown 26CV000414

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

TENTATIVE RULING: Notice has been properly published and no written objections have been filed. The petition is GRANTED without need for appearance.

In The Matter of Arturo Garcia Sapien 26CV000690

PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME

TENTATIVE RULING: Notice has been properly published and no written objections have been filed. The petition is GRANTED without need for appearance.

PROBATE CALENDAR – Hon. Joseph J. Solga, Dept. B (Historic Courthouse) at 8:30 a.m.

Estate of Gloria Maxine Lopez 24PR000039

REPORT ON STATUS OF ADMINISTRATION

TENTATIVE RULING: A status report is on file. Based on the Court’s review of the status report, the Court determines that continuation of administration is in the best interests of the estate and/or of interested persons. Thus, the Court orders that administration of the estate continue. (Prob. Code, § 12201, subd. (c)(2).) The matter is CONTINUED to May 27, 2027, at 8:30 a.m. in Dept. B. The Status Hearing may be vacated if, prior thereto, the personal representative files a petition for an order for final distribution. The Personal Representative shall file a status report 10 days prior to the next hearing. The Clerk is directed to provide notice to the parties.

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