Christopher Duran vs. Jonathan Irmler

202200570270CUPA: Christopher Duran vs. Jonathan Irmler 05/26/2026 in Department 20 Motion to Compel Juror Jake Segre’s Affidavit or Statement

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Juror Jake Segre’s Affidavit or Statement is DENIED. The screenshots attached as Exhibit 2 to the Declaration of Arthur Djougourian appended to the Motion to Compel make it clear that the presiding juror, Mr. Segre, is uncomfortable being contacted by Plaintiff’s counsel, asks Plaintiff’s counsel to stop contacting him, and states he will not sign anything unless the Court requests it directly of him. That is the end of the inquiry.

The Court is not aware of, nor has Plaintiff’s counsel provided any legal authority that would give this Court the authority to compel any juror to sign a declaration. A declaration is a juror’s sworn statement and the juror must be willing to attest that the contents are true. Moreover, even if such an order were proper, which it is not, a verdict may not be impeached by inquiring into a juror’s mental or subjective reasoning process. When a juror gives the reasons for a vote, the words are a verbal reflection of the jurors’ mental processes and consideration of such a statement as evidence of those processes is barred by Evidence Code section 1150 subdivision (a). (People v.

Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 388-389; Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1683 [“evidence about a jury's ‘subjective collective mental process purporting to show how the verdict was reached’ is inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict”].)

People v. Rhodes (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 541 cited by Plaintiff is wholly inapplicable. That case held that “counsel for a convicted defendant is entitled to the list of jurors who served in the case, including addresses and telephone numbers, if the defendant sets forth a sufficient showing to support a reasonable belief that jury misconduct occurred, that diligent efforts were made to contact the jurors through other means, and that further investigation is necessary to provide the court with adequate information to rule on a motion for new trial.” (Id. at pp. 551-552.) It said nothing regarding the power of a court to compel a discharged juror to sign an attorney-drafted declaration.

Based on the forgoing, the motion is DENIED. The Court has already scheduled an OSC regarding the misrepresentations made by counsel to the presiding juror that “the Court would like to see a declaration from [him] where the basis of the decision was that there was sudden emergency per CACI 452 jury instruction” and that there was a deadline to submit that declaration with the Court.