Application/Request & Motion - Other
The Court ORDERS Defendants Shelley M. Serna and Manuel T. Villagrana II to turn over to Plaintiff the Vehicle which is believed to be located at Extra Space Storage, Space Number J373, at 15875 Laguna Canyon Rd., Irvine CA 92618. The failure to turn over the Vehicle to Plaintiff may subject Defendants to being held in contempt of court. The Court waives the requirement for Plaintiff to post an undertaking since the amount owed is higher than the estimated value of the Vehicle.
Defendants’ re-delivery bond shall be $95,000.
Moving Party is to give notice.
58 Iwanaga vs. Global Financial Data Incorporated
19-01094012 Motion for Pretrial Determination of Admissibility of Evidence
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Global Financial Data Incorporated (“GFD”), Defendant Michelle Huff Kangas, and Defendant Bryan Taylor’s motion for an order to exclude evidence of Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case or conviction for any purpose is DENIED.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Defendants contend Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case and conviction are irrelevant or marginally because the comments were not directed at Plaintiffs and that any alleged harassment was not based on sex.
Plaintiffs Kevin Iwanaga, Lindsay Amendola, and Pierre Gendreau allege they were subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). FEHA “recognize[s] two theories of liability for sexual harassment claims ... ‘... quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances ... [and] hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.’ ” (Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 149
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“[A] hostile work environment sexual harassment claim requires a plaintiff employee to show she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome [citation]; (2) because of sex [citation]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment [citations]. In addition, she must establish the offending conduct was imputable to her employer.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279.) “To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner.
Accordingly, it is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex-not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language-that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” (Id. at p. 280 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)
“ ‘ “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances [including] the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 283.) Sexual conduct that involves or is aimed at persons other than the plaintiff is considered less offensive and severe than conduct that is directed at the plaintiff. (See Gleason v.
Mesirow Financial Inc. (7th Cir.1997) 118 F.3d1134, 1144 [“the impact of ‘second-hand harassment’ is obviously not as great as the impact of harassment directed at the plaintiff”]; Black v. Zaring Homes, Inc. (6th Cir.1997) 104 F.3d 822, 826 [fact that most comments were not directed at the plaintiff weakened her harassment claim]; Jackson v. Racine County (E.D.Wis.2005) 2005 WL 2291025, *7 [comments made to the plaintiffs about the appearance of other female employees bear less weight than the comments directed toward the plaintiffs themselves].)
A hostile work environment sexual harassment claim by a plaintiff who was not personally subjected to offensive remarks and touchings requires ‘an even higher showing’ than a claim by one who had been sexually harassed without suffering tangible job detriment: such a plaintiff must ‘establish that the sexually harassing conduct permeated [her] direct work environment.’ (Fisher, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 610, 262 Cal.Rptr. 842.)” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 284–285.) “[A] hostile work environment sexual harassment claim is not established where a supervisor or co-worker simply uses crude or inappropriate language in front of employees or draws a vulgar picture, without directing sexual innuendos or gender-related language toward a plaintiff .....” (Id. at p. 282.)
In Lyle, a female writers’ assistant sued three male writers and the entities involved in the production of the television show Friends for hostile work environment sexual harassment. The plaintiff testified that no one in the workplace ever said anything sexually offensive about her directly to her, asked her on a date, propositioned her, demanded sexual favors, or physically threatened her. (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 275.) However, Lyle complained that a number of sexually offensive acts occurred in the workplace, including the writers talking about their sexual preferences and experiences, creating sexual images in a “coloring book” during meetings and leaving the book around the workplace, making masturbatory gestures, and making offensive sexual comments about two of the actresses on the show. (Id.)
The California Supreme Court concluded that the conduct in Lyle’s workplace did not amount to hostile environment sexual harassment. The court held, “Based on the totality of the undisputed circumstances, particularly the fact the Friends production was a creative workplace focused on generating scripts for an adultoriented comedy show featuring sexual themes, we find no reasonable trier of fact could conclude such language constituted harassment directed at plaintiff because of her sex within the meaning of the FEHA.
Furthermore, to the extent triable issues of fact exist as to whether certain offensive comments were made about women other than plaintiff because of their sex, we find no reasonable trier of fact could conclude these particular comments were severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to create a work environment that was hostile or abusive to plaintiff in violation of the FEHA.” (Lyle, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 272.) “FEHA’s prohibitions are not a ‘civility code’ and are not designed to rid the workplace of vulgarity. [Citations.]
To be actionable, the conduct must be extreme, but there is no requirement that the employee endure sexual harassment until his or her psychological well-being is so spent that the employee requires psychiatric assistance.” (Sheffield v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Social Services (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 153, 161–162.)