Liang v. Judicial Council of California

Compliance with the Government Claims Act

A suit seeking “money or damages” within the meaning of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, §§ 905, 945.4) “includes all actions where the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief.” (Sparks v. Kern County Bd. of Supervisors (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 794, 798.) Courts have held the claim process applicable in cases based on negligence (Martinez v. County of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 242), intentional tort (Cooper v. Jevne (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 860), nuisance (City of San Jose v. Superior Court. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447), and violation of a statutorily imposed duty (San Leandro Police Officers Assn. v. City of San Leandro (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 553). “ ‘[T]he claims presentation requirement applies to all forms of monetary demands, regardless of the theory of the action.’ ” (Nasrawi v. Buck Consultants LLC (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 328, 338.)

In order to pursue a tort claim against a public entity or public employee under California state law, Plaintiffs must establish that they have complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (Gov. Code, §§ 945.4, 950.2.) “Before a civil action may be

brought against a public entity [or public employee], a claim must first be presented to the public entity and rejected.” (Ocean Servs. Corp. v. Ventura Port District (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1762, 1775; Gov. Code, § 950.2.) “[F]ailure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal. 4th 730, 738 [citation and internal quotations omitted].)

Compliance with the claims presentation requirement is an element of the plaintiff’s claim. (State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde) (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1234, 1243-44 [“Timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural requirement, but is ... a condition precedent to plaintiff’s maintaining an action against defendant ... and thus an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.”] [citation and internal quotation marks omitted].)

The Government Claims Act requires plaintiffs to file a written claim with the public entity within six months of the accrual of the cause of action, as a prerequisite to filing a civil claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.2.) The date of accrual is the date of the occurrence of the last fact essential to the cause of action. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Ass’n v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 815, as modified July 18, 2001.)

“The date of accrual of a cause of action marks the starting point for calculating the claims presentation period. [Citation.] The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done, or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent liability arises. [Citation.] In other words, it sets the date as the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements [citations]—the elements being generically referred to by sets of terms such as wrongdoing or wrongful conduct, cause or causation, and harm or injury [citations]. [Citation.]

A cause of action accrues for purposes of the filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act on the same date a similar action against a nonpublic entity would be deemed to accrue for purposes of applying the relevant statute of limitations.” (K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School District (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1239, as modified (May 5, 2009) disapproved of on other grounds by Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903.)

Plaintiff’s cause of action for violation of due process alleges Defendant’s acts and omissions deprived Plaintiff of fundamental procedural fairness and impartial judicial review, including ignoring evidence, ruling on arguments not presented, and dismissing reconsideration motions without legal evaluation. (Compl. at p. 6, ¶¶ 1-2.) The cause of action for negligence and gross negligence alleges Defendant failed to investigate or correct systemic failures, despite receiving formal notice via a government claim. (Id. at ¶ 4.) The cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress alleges Defendant’s inaction and misconduct caused Plaintiff prolonged psychological trauma. (Id. at ¶ 5.)

Plaintiff requests that his claims be equitably tolled. The doctrine of equitable tolling, however, “cannot be invoked to suspend [Government Code] section 911.2’s six-month deadline for filing a prerequisite government claim” because “the six-month period of section 911.2 is

not a statute of limitations [citation] to which tolling rules might apply.” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1121.) Furthermore, “[a]pplication of tolling to the claims presentation deadline would undercut the public policies and purposes that require that deadline be ‘strict[ly]’ applied.” (Id. at p. 1122.)

To the extent Plaintiff’s causes of action are based on the June 22, 2023 small claims court decision, the September 18, 2023 appeal ruling, or the Orders on Request for Court Order (Small Claims), the claims are untimely. On the face of the Complaint, these claims are barred because Plaintiff’s failed to present a timely written claim. The demurrer is sustained as to the first cause of action.

Common Law Causes of Action

In California, all government tort liability must be based on a statute. California Government Code section 815, a provision in the California Tort Claims Act, states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute ... [a] public entity is not liable for an injury, whether such injury arises out of an act or omission of the public entity or a public employee or any other person.” (Gov’t Code, § 815.) This section “abolishes common law tort liability for public entities.” (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 876, 899.)

The Complaint does not allege a statutory basis for Plaintiff’s negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims against Defendant. The demurrer is sustained as to the second and third causes of action.

Uncertainty

Demurrers for uncertainty are generally disfavored (Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822) because “under [California’s] liberal pleading rules, where the complaint contains substantive factual allegations sufficiently apprising defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, a demurrer for uncertainty should be overruled or plaintiff given leave to amend.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) The court will only sustain a demurrer for uncertainty if it is so poorly drafted that defendants cannot reasonably respond. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California Inc. (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 612, 616.) A demurrer for uncertainty must identify by line and page number, the language that creates the uncertainty. (Fenton v. Groveland Community Services Dist. (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d 797, 809.)

The Complaint is not “so incomprehensible that a defendant cannot reasonably respond.” (Lickiss v. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (2012) 208 Cal. App. 4th 1125, 1135.) Any “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury, supra, 14 Cal. App. 4th at p. 616.) The demurrer on the basis of uncertainty is overruled.

“The plaintiff bears the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility of amendment.” (Rakestraw v. California Physicians' Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 354 (Rakestraw).) To satisfy that burden, the plaintiff “ ‘must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.’ [Citation.] ... The plaintiff must clearly and

specifically set forth the ‘applicable substantive law’ [citation] and the legal basis for amendment, i.e., the elements of the cause of action and authority for it. Further, the plaintiff must set forth factual allegations that sufficiently state all required elements of that cause of action. [Citations.] ... [¶] The burden of showing that a reasonable possibility exists that amendment can cure the defects remains with the plaintiff. [Citations.]” (Rosen v. St. Joseph Hospital of Orange County (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 453, 458.) Here, Plaintiff did not meet this burden.

Defendant to give notice.

9 Alayarian The Motion to Compel Answers to Form Interrogatories brought by Company, a Defendant VMA Harbor Place Holding Company, LLC, is MOOT, in part California and GRANTED in part. Corporation v. VMA Harbor Place Per the Declaration filed by Plaintiff on May 13, 2026, complete verified Holding Company, responses to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, were served on LLC May 12, 2026. (¶9 of Forstrom Declaration [ROA No. 82].) Based on the above, the request for an order compelling such response is MOOT.

Nonetheless, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s request for sanctions, in a reduced amount. Plaintiff Sam Alayarian is ordered to pay sanctions to Defendant in the amount of $860.00. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.290, subd. (c); See also Code Civ. Proc., § 2023.030, subd. (a) and § 2023.010, subd. (d).)

Defendant to give notice.

Case Management Conference

Trial is set for September 13, 2027, at 9:00 a.m. in this department.

Plaintiff to give notice.

10 Saba v. Tayyan Plaintiff George Saba’s motion to remove Defendant Angel Tayyan as trustee is DENIED.

Lack of Jurisdiction

Plaintiff George Saba moves to remove Defendant Tayyan as trustee of “The Saba Family Trust, aka the Saba Family Irrevocable Intervivos Trust dated April 28, 2008, as amended and restated, on October26, 2015.”

Probate Code § 15642 provides the following:

(a) A trustee may be removed in accordance with the trust instrument, by the court on its own motion, or on petition of a settlor, cotrustee, or beneficiary under Section 17200. (b) The grounds for removal of a trustee by the court include the following: (1) Where the trustee has committed a breach of the trust. (2) Where the trustee is insolvent or otherwise unfit to administer the trust.

(3) Where hostility or lack of cooperation among cotrustees impairs the administration of the trust. (4) Where the trustee fails or declines to act. (5) Where the trustee’s compensation is excessive under the circumstances. (6) Where the sole trustee is a person described in subdivision (a) of Section 21380, whether or not the person is the transferee of a donative transfer by the transferor, unless, based upon any evidence of the intent of the settlor and all other facts and circumstances, which shall be made known to the court, the court finds that it is consistent with the settlor’s intent that the trustee continue to serve and that this intent was not the product of fraud or undue influence.

Any waiver by the settlor of this provision is against public policy and shall be void. This paragraph shall not apply to instruments that became irrevocable on or before January 1, 1994. This paragraph shall not apply if any of the following conditions are met: ...

However, there are jurisdictional limitations with the request Plaintiff is seeking. Pursuant to the notice of related case, there is a probate matter in department CM03 titled “Saba-Trust”, case no. 2022- 01295368. (See ROA 56).

The probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over proceedings concerning the “internal affairs” of trusts. (Prob. Code, § 17000, subd. (a).) This is true even if the trust is administered outside of probate. (See e.g., Estate of Heggstad (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 943, 951 (Trustee's petition for instructions invoked probate court's jurisdiction to determine whether property was part of estate or was trust property).

The probate code defines “internal affairs of a trust” to include: (1) Determining questions of construction of a trust instrument. (2) Determining the existence or nonexistence of any immunity, power, privilege, duty, or right. (3) Determining the validity of a trust provision. (4) Ascertaining beneficiaries and determining to whom property shall pass or be delivered upon final or partial termination of the trust, to the extent the determination is not made by the trust instrument. (5) Settling the accounts and passing upon the acts of the trustee, including the exercise of discretionary powers. (6) Instructing the trustee.

(Prob. Code, § 17200(b)(1)-(6)).

As the court held in Estate of Bowles (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 684, “[t]he probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the first amended section 17200 petition concerning the internal affairs of the trust.” (Id. at 696).

Accordingly, this court does not have jurisdiction to decide the internal affairs of the trust, which includes the relief Plaintiff is seeking by way of this motion. Therefore, the motion is DENIED.

Defendant shall give notice.

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