NiMO Holdings, LLC v. All Home Lending, Inc.

On 12/15/2025, Judgment Debtors’ attorney sent an email stating the Stipulation did not provide for attorneys’ fees, and that the 12/05/2025

check constituted payment in full of the principal and interest allegedly due. (Id., ¶ 12, Exh. 9.) In response, Judgment Creditor’s counsel asserted that attorney’s fees remained owing under the contract and judgment and warned that additional fees would continue to accrue if the balance remained unpaid. (Ibid.)

On 12/17/2025, Judgment Creditor filed a Memorandum of Costs After Judgment (ROA 245) seeking the following costs:

Postjudgment Costs Dates Incurred Amount (2) Recording and 8/2/23, 8/4/23 & $473.00 indexing abstract of 8/7/23 judgment (6) Approved fee on 2/13/24 – First $870.00 application for order for appearance fees appearance of judgment for debtor Mike debtor, or other approved Ahmari and third- costs under Code Civ. party debtor Ana Proc., § 708.110 et seq. Ahmari to appear at debtor examination (7) Attorney fees, if 1/1/24-10/31/25 $6,965. allowed by Code Civ. 00 Proc., § 685.040 (8) Other: Stipulations to $264.40 continue examinations for Mike Ahmari and Ana Ahmari, under 708.110 et al. TOTAL: $8,572. 40

On 12/29/2025, Judgment Debtors filed the pending motion to tax costs.

B. Post Judgment Costs and Fees

“As explained by our Supreme Court in Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602. . . postjudgment costs and fees are distinct from prejudgment costs and fees, and they are governed by different laws. ‘The statutes and rules distinctly address three different types of costs and fees: prejudgment costs, including attorney fees where authorized by contract, statute or law (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(10)), are recovered through procedures established under section 1034, subdivision (a) and [California Rules of Court,] rules 3.1700 and 3.1702(b); appellate costs and fees are recovered under section 1034, subdivision (b) and [California Rules of Court,] rules 3.1702(c) and 8.278; and postjudgment enforcement costs and fees are recovered under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, specifically sections 685.040 to 685.095.’ [Citation].” (Elmi v. Related Management Co., L.P. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 683, 699.)

A judgment creditor is entitled to the “reasonable and necessary costs” incurred in enforcing the judgment—including attorney fees if the underlying judgment provides for an award of Code of Civil Procedure, §

1033.5(a)(10)(A) contractual attorney fees or where “otherwise provided by law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.040; see Conservatorship of McQueen (2014) 59 Cal.4th 602, 610; Nash v. Aprea (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 21, 28—before motion for award of postjudgment attorney fees may be awarded as costs, fees must have been incurred to “enforce” judgment and underlying judgment had to include § 1033.5(a)(10)(A) attorney fee award; Guo v. Moorpark Recovery Service, LLC (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 745, 751—where underlying judgment awarded reasonable attorney fees, judgment creditor's assignee entitled to recover attorney fees under § 685.040 despite trial court's failure to specify amount.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure, section 685.070, subdivision (a), a judgment creditor may recover specified postjudgment enforcement costs as a matter of right unless otherwise excluded by the Enforcement of Judgments Law. Recoverable costs include statutory fees for issuing and levying writs of execution and earnings withholding orders, fees for issuing and recording abstracts of judgment or certified copies of judgment, fees for filing notices of judgment liens on personal property, and reasonable and necessary costs incurred in connection with debtor examinations and other enforcement proceedings approved by the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 685.070(a), 708.110 et seq.)

C. Timeliness of Memorandum of Costs

A judgment creditor claiming costs authorized as “of right” under Code of Civil Procedure § 685.070 must file with the court and serve on the judgment debtor a Memorandum of Costs before the judgment is fully satisfied but not later than two years after the costs were incurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070(b); see G.F. Galaxy Corp. v. Johnson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 542, 552-553—§ 685.070(b) does not require that judgment creditor wait until enforcement action's successful resolution before filing cost memorandum, which would be barred if filed after judgment is fully satisfied; Gray1 CPB, LLC v.

SCC Acquisitions, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 882, 897—where judgment debtor tendered cashier's check for full judgment amount plus interest nearly two years after judgment, judgment creditor's motion for postjudgment costs for $3.1 million in attorney fees filed 12 days after tender but one day before cashing was untimely.)

Judgment Debtors move to tax all costs in the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment filed on 12/17/2025, on the ground that an accord and satisfaction occurred on 12/09/2025, when Judgment Creditor negotiated a check from Ahmari marked “payment in full.”

In support, Judgment Debtors submit evidence that, on 12/05/2025, Judgment Creditor’s counsel emailed Judgment Debtor stating that $9,109.61 remained due in principal and interest, in addition to $22,334.67 in attorneys’ fees. (Ahmari Decl., ¶ 10, Exh. 7.) On 12/08/2025, Judgment Debtor personally delivered a check in the amount of $9,109.61 to Judgment Creditor’s administrator. (Id., ¶ 11, Exh. 8.) The memo line of the check stated: “Payment in full.” (Ibid.) Bank records show that Judgment Creditor negotiated the check on 12/09/2025. (Ibid.)

Judgment Creditor opposes the motion, contending the judgment was not fully satisfied because the payoff amount excluded accrued postjudgment interest and was based on incorrect interest calculations.

In support, Judgment Creditor submits evidence that, although Judgment Debtors tendered a check for $9,109.61 marked “payment in full,” the check was not delivered until 12/08/2025 and was calculated only through 12/05/2025, leaving additional postjudgment interest unpaid. (Opposition, Ahmari Decl., ¶ 14.) Judgment Creditor further contends that the payoff figures previously provided to Judgment Debtors were based on an internal accounting error in which postjudgment interest was mistakenly calculated from 08/28/2023 rather than the actual judgment date of 04/17/2023. (Opposition, Gleason Decl., ¶¶ 5-9, Exhs. B-D.) According to Judgment Creditor, corrected calculations demonstrated that additional principal, interest, and recoverable enforcement costs remained owing, such that Judgment Debtors’ tender did not fully satisfy the judgment. (Ibid.)

Here, Judgment Debtors have not established that the judgment was fully satisfied before the 12/17/2025 Memorandum of Costs After Judgment was filed, as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.070, subdivision (b).

Although Judgment Debtors tendered a check on 12/08/2025, the evidence reflects that the amount tendered did not include all accrued postjudgment interest. Judgment Debtors admit that the tendered amount excluded “3 days of interest.” (Ahmari Decl., ¶ 14.)

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 680.300, the “principal amount of the judgment” includes the amount of the judgment together with any costs added to the judgment, reduced by payments, partial satisfactions, or amounts no longer enforceable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 680.300.) Payment on a judgment is allocated first to accrued interest on the principal amount, and then to the principal. (Big Bear Properties, Inc. v. Gherman (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 908, 915; see Code Civ. Proc., § 695.220.)

Judgment Debtors contend the “Payment in full” notation on the check established an accord and satisfaction under California Commercial Code section 3311.

California Commercial Code section 3311 requires: (1) the debtor tendered an instrument in good faith as full satisfaction of the claim, (2) the amount of the claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide dispute, and (3) the claimant obtained payment of the instrument (Cal. U. Com. Code, § 3311.) Additionally, the instrument or accompanying written communication must contain a "conspicuous statement" that it was tendered as full satisfaction of the claim (Ibid.)

Here, the underlying judgment and statutory postjudgment interest were fixed and readily calculable. Judgment Debtors admit that the tendered amount excluded “3 days of interest.” (Ahmari Decl., ¶ 14.) Even assuming the claim was subject to a bona fide dispute based on the claimed attorney’s fees, the present record does not establish an accord and satisfaction under California Commercial Code section 3311

because the check was not tendered in full satisfaction of all amounts claimed to be due. Further, Judgment Creditor consistently asserted that attorney’s fees remained owing under the contract and judgment. (See Ahmari Decl., ¶¶ 5-12, Exhs. 2-9.) At the time the payment was tendered, Judgment Creditor had claimed more than $20,000 in attorney’s fees. (Ibid.)

Thus, the amount tendered did not fully satisfy the judgment, and the “payment in full” notation alone does not establish an accord and satisfaction under California Commercial Code section 3311.

D. Timeliness of Motion to Tax Costs

A judgment debtor who contests claimed costs must file a noticed motion to tax costs within 10 days after service of the Memorandum of Costs. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (c).) The deadline is extended where service is made by mail, fax, Express Mail, or other overnight delivery method. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 685.070, subd. (f), 1013; see Briggs v. Elliott (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 683, 693—deadline to file motion to tax costs extended by 5 calendar days where judgment creditor served memorandum of costs on judgment debtor by mail at California address.)

Here, Judgment Creditor filed and served the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment on 12/17/2025 by mail from California. (ROA 245.) Judgment Debtors filed the instant motion on 12/29/2025. Accordingly, the motion is timely.

E. Standard on Motion to Tax Costs

If the items on a verified memorandum of costs appear to be proper charges, the memorandum is prima facie evidence of their propriety, and the burden is on the party contesting them to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. (Foothill-De Anza Comm. College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29; Wagner Farms, Inc. v. Modesto Irrigation Dist. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 765, 773-774.)

The party challenging costs bears the initial burden to present evidence and prove the costs are not recoverable; mere statements in points and authorities and conclusory statements by counsel are insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing. (Seever v. Copley Press, Inc. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266.) On the other hand, items that are properly objected to are put in issue, and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs. (Ladas v. California State Auto. Ass’n. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774–776.) Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the litigation is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. (Foothill- De Anza Comm. College Dist. v. Emerich (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 11, 29-30.)

F. Attorneys’ Fees

Under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.080, subdivision (a), “[t]he judgment creditor may claim costs authorized by Section 685.040 by noticed motion.” The statute further provides that “[t]he costs claimed

under this section may include, but are not limited to, costs that may be claimed under Section 685.070.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.080, subd. (a).) Thus, a noticed motion under section 685.080 may encompass the same postjudgment enforcement costs recoverable through a memorandum of costs under section 685.070, including attorney’s fees authorized under section 685.040. (Highland Springs Conference & Training Center v. City of Banning (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 416, 424-425 [a memorandum of costs and a noticed motion filed together].)

Although attorney’s fees may be recoverable as enforcement costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.040, Judgment Creditor has separately filed a noticed motion seeking attorney’s fees, which remains pending. Because the amount, reasonableness, and recoverability of the requested fees are disputed, and because the issue is already before the Court through the separately noticed fee motion, the issue is more appropriately resolved through that motion.

Accordingly, the Court declines to award attorney’s fees through the present Memorandum of Costs After Judgment and instead defers the issue to the pending fee motion.

G. Cost Incurred More than Two Years

The costs incurred for recording and indexing abstracts of judgment on 08/02/2023, 08/04/2023, and 08/07/2023 were not included in the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment until more than two years after they were incurred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 685.070, subd. (b).) Because the Memorandum of Costs After Judgment was not filed until 12/17/2025, those specific costs are untimely under Code of Civil Procedure section 685.070, subdivision (b), and are therefore taxed.

H. Other Costs

Judgment Debtors do not specifically challenge the remaining claimed enforcement costs, including the debtor examination fees and stipulation-related costs.

Judgment Debtors to give notice.

5 Douglas v. Plaintiff Christopher Ryan Douglas moves to compel Defendant Navigate Regents of the BioPharma Services, Inc. to provide verified responses without University of objections to Plaintiff’s special interrogatories (set one) and request for California production of documents (set one). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED.

Responses to interrogatories and requests for production of documents are due 30 days after service (plus appropriate time for method of service). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.260; 2031.260.) If the party to whom a discovery request is directed fails to respond timely, that party waives all objections, including claims of privilege and work product protection. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290(a); 2031.300(a).)

Defendant first contends that the motion should be denied because Plaintiff’s discovery is premature in light of the fact that Defendant has a pending demurrer to the operative Second Amended Complaint.

The right to discovery does not depend on whether a case is at issue. For example, a plaintiff may serve a deposition notice 20 days after service of summons (§ 2025.210, subd. (b)) notwithstanding that the defendant has 30 days to respond to the complaint (§§ 412.20, subd. (a)(3) & (6), 430.40, subd. (a)). Moreover, discovery continues despite a challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint. (Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1429, 1436, fn. 3 [pleading deficiencies do not affect party's right to conduct discovery]; Budget Finance Plan v. Superior Court (1973) 34 Cal.App.3d 794, 797 [plaintiff may continue to conduct discovery after demurrer to complaint sustained].)

Defendant has not sufficiently shown that the pending demurrer should prohibit Plaintiff from conducting discovery.

Defendant also contends that the discovery was served prematurely in violation of Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.020(b). Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.020, “[a] plaintiff may propound interrogatories to a party without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, that party, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.020, subd. (b).) Similarly, Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.020 provides, “[a] plaintiff may make a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling without leave of court at any time that is 10 days after the service of the summons on, or appearance by, the party to whom the demand is directed, whichever occurs first.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.020, subd. (b).)

Defendant was served by substitute service on December 10, 2025 with the Summons and Complaint. (ROA 43.) Plaintiff then served the special interrogatories and requests for production of documents, along with the First Amended Complaint, on Defendant on December 29, 2025, well over 10 days after December 10, 2025. (ROA 55.) Contrary to Defendant’s contention, the discovery was not served prematurely.

As a result of Defendant’s failure to respond to the discovery requests, Plaintiff is entitled to an order compelling responses without objections except for those based on the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2030.290, 2031.300.) However, if Defendant asserts such objections, Defendant shall provide a privilege log within 30 days pursuant to Code Civ. Proc § 2031.240(c) that identifies each document for which privilege or work product protection is claimed, its author, recipients, date of preparation, and the specific privilege or work product protection claimed.

Defendant is ORDERED to serve responses and the privilege log (if applicable) within 30 days.

Sanctions are available on motions to compel responses to interrogatories and inspection demands. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2030.290(c), § 2031.300(c). (“The court shall impose a monetary sanction ... against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response ... unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”).)

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