BMW Bank of North America vs. Serna
Case Information
Motion(s)
Application/Request & Motion - Other
Motion Type Tags
Other
Parties
- Plaintiff: BMW Bank of North America
- Defendant: Shelley M. Serna
- Defendant: Manuel T. Villagrana II
Ruling
The Court ORDERS Defendants Shelley M. Serna and Manuel T. Villagrana II to turn over to Plaintiff the Vehicle which is believed to be located at Extra Space Storage, Space Number J373, at 15875 Laguna Canyon Rd., Irvine CA 92618. The failure to turn over the Vehicle to Plaintiff may subject Defendants to being held in contempt of court. The Court waives the requirement for Plaintiff to post an undertaking since the amount owed is higher than the estimated value of the Vehicle.
Defendants’ re-delivery bond shall be $95,000.
Moving Party is to give notice.
58 Iwanaga vs. Global Financial Data Incorporated
19-01094012 Motion for Pretrial Determination of Admissibility of Evidence
Defendant and Cross-Complainant Global Financial Data Incorporated (“GFD”), Defendant Michelle Huff Kangas, and Defendant Bryan Taylor’s motion for an order to exclude evidence of Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case or conviction for any purpose is DENIED.
“Except as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence is admissible.” (Evid. Code, § 351.) Relevant evidence is that which has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (Evid. Code, § 210.) Defendants contend Kangas’s alleged comments about her criminal case and conviction are irrelevant or marginally because the comments were not directed at Plaintiffs and that any alleged harassment was not based on sex.
Plaintiffs Kevin Iwanaga, Lindsay Amendola, and Pierre Gendreau allege they were subjected to a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”). FEHA “recognize[s] two theories of liability for sexual harassment claims ... ‘... quid pro quo harassment, where a term of employment is conditioned upon submission to unwelcome sexual advances ... [and] hostile work environment, where the harassment is sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.’ ” (Herberg v. California Institute of the Arts (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 142, 149; Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1043.)
“[A] hostile work environment sexual harassment claim requires a plaintiff employee to show she was subjected to sexual advances, conduct, or comments that were (1) unwelcome [citation]; (2) because of sex [citation]; and (3) sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive work environment [citations]. In addition, she must establish the offending conduct was imputable to her employer.” (Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions (2006) 38 Cal.4th 264, 279.) “To plead a cause of action for [hostile work environment] sexual harassment, it is only necessary to show that gender is a substantial factor in the discrimination, and that if the plaintiff had been a man she would not have been treated in the same manner.
Accordingly, it is the disparate treatment of an employee on the basis of sex-not the mere discussion of sex or use of vulgar language-that is the essence of a sexual harassment claim.” (Id. at p. 280 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].)
“ ‘ “[W]hether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances [including] the frequency of the