| Case | County / Judge | Motion | Ruling | Indexed | Hearing |
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Motion to Quash Subpoena Wells Fargo
1. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME HEARING ON MOTION TO QUASH INC031863 RUBIN VS ROSS SUBPOENA WELLS FARGO BY DAVID ROSS Tentative Ruling: Denied.
Responding party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.
This is a breach of contract and fraud case. This action was filed in 2002. In 2007, following the imposition of terminating sanctions for discovery abuses and the striking of the answer, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Jason Rubin (“Judgment Creditor”) and against defendant David Ross (“Judgment Debtor”) in the amount of $1,439,178. On July 11, 2024, the Judgment Creditor renewed the Judgment on behalf of the Trust in the amount of $6,107,850.56.
In February 2026, the Judgment Creditor served subpoenas duces tecum on Wells Fargo Bank and Citibank, N.A. (“Subpoenas”) seeking account bank account records for accounts opened by Judgment Debtor, his wife and business entities owned by Judgment Debtor.
Judgment Debtor now moves to quash the Subpoenas, arguing that Subpoenas are not supported by a showing of good cause because the supporting affidavits are based on inadmissible hearsay and legal conclusions rather than facts. Judgment Debtor argues that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (“EJL”) is unconstitutional because it is an invasion of the right to privacy and eliminates the marital privilege. He argues that the EJL violates his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Judgment Creditor argues that Judgment Debtor made an identical motion to quash business records subpoenas in 2024, which the Court denied. Judgment Creditor argues that the affidavit is sufficient to establish good cause. Judgment Creditor argues that an affidavit may be based on hearsay and it is no necessary to attach any documents. Judgment Creditor argues that good cause exists for the discovery because Judgment Debtor has engaged in bad faith practices to delay satisfaction of the Judgment. Judgment Creditor argues that Judgment Debtor cites no authority showing that the EJL is unconstitutional or violates any civil rights.
Motion to Quash:
A deposition subpoena for production of business records may be used to obtain discovery within the state from a person who is not a party to the action in which discovery is sought. (CCP(a)(3).) The ELJ provides that a judgment creditor is permitted to serve a subpoena duces tecum on a third party witness pursuant to CCP § 1987.5 et. seq. in connection with a judgment debtor examination under
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Pursuant to CCP § 1987.1(a), the court, upon motion, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare. The motion to quash may be made by a party, witness, consumer, employee or person whose personally identifying information is sought. (CCP §1987.1(a)(1)-(5).) A motion to quash a subpoena may be granted on the ground that the subpoena is defective or that the matters sought to be discovered are privileged, protected, or beyond the scope of discovery. (CCP. § 1987.1(a); 2017.010; Rudnick v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 924, 929.) The procedural remedy for a defective subpoena is generally a motion to quash. (Lee v. Swansboro County Property Owners Assn. (2007) 151 Cal. App. 4th 575, 582.)
Here, on February 24, 2026, the Judgment Creditor served a Subpoena Duces Tecum on Wells Fargo Bank. (Decl. of Yost (WF Mot.), Ex. A.) On February 29, 2024, a Subpoena was served on Citibank, N.A. (Decl. of Yost (Citi. Mot., Ex. A.) The Subpoenas request:
Bank account records identifying payments made or received by the Judgment Debtor David Ross, his spouse, or entities under his control, that are in the possession of the witness are material because they are likely to identify the Judgment Debtor's other financial accounts, means of payment or other assets under the Judgment Debtor's control, which may be used to satisfy the judgment.
(Decl. of Yost, Ex. A.) The Citibank Subpoena requested documents, including communications regarding the accounts, periodic statements, credit and debit items and wire transfers. The Wells Fargo Subpoena requested periodic statements and credit and debit items. (Id.)
Judgment Debtor argues that the Declarations of Mark Yost attached as Exhibit 3 (“Good Cause Decl.”) to each of the Subpoenas is insufficient to establish good cause. CCP § 1985 requires that an affidavit be served with a subpoena duces tecum showing good cause for the production of the matters and things described in the subpoena, specifying the exact matters or things to be produced and setting forth in full detail the materiality thereof to issues involved in the case and stating that the witness has the desired matters or things in his or her possession or under his or her control. (CCP § 1985(b).)
Here, the Declarations state that good cause for discovery of the account information exists because Judgment Creditor’s investigation confirmed that the Judgment Debtor and his spouse and entities are using banks, money transmitting services and third parties to transfer funds and conceal the true ownership and control over funds and property subject to the Judgment. (Good Cause Decl., ¶5.) He asserts that bank records previously produced show that Judgment Debtor deposits earnings into the Wells Fargo Account. (Id at ¶9.)
He also explains that the entities were included based on public records and court filings and other previously produced documents showing that Judgment Debtor has ownership or control of the entities. (Id at ¶¶ 11-19.) These facts are sufficient to establish good cause. Contrary to Judgment Debtor’s assertion, it is not necessary to provide the records relied upon in the Good Cause Declaration. The Declaration may include facts which have been ascertained from hearsay. (McWilliams v. Los Angeles Transit Lines (1950) 100 Cal.
App. 2d 27, 31.)
Judgment Debtor argues that portions of the EJL are unconstitutional, such as the requirement that judgment debtors but not judgment creditors personally serve notices, the inapplicability of the marital privilege to the EJL, and the loosening of requirements for ex parte applications by judgment creditors for issuance of an order to appear for examination. This Court previously considered this issue in connection with Judgment Debtor’s prior to Motion Quash filed in 2024. The Court determined that there is no authority for these contentions. Moreover, As none of these EJL provisions are at issue and the arguments are irrelevant.
Judgment Debtor also appears to argue that the Subpoenas invade his right to privacy. Generally, financial information is protected by the right to privacy. (SCC Acquisitions, Inc. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal. App. 4th 741, 754.) However, the constitutional right to privacy is not absolute and even private information can be disclosed in some circumstances. Where a privacy right is at issue, the court must carefully balance the right of privacy against the need of discovery. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 855-856.)
The burden is on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, against which the court must consider the need for discovery identified by the opposing party. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 556.) Because banking records, such checks and other transactional documents are confidential, courts must balance the right of civil litigants to discovery with the right of banking customers to maintain reasonable privacy in the financial affairs. (Valley Bank of Nevada v.
Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal. 3d 652, 657.)
The need for discovery outweighs the privacy rights of Judgment Debtor. The Judgment was entered almost 20 years ago. The banking information is directly relevant to identify asserts to be used to satisfy the Judgment. It appears that Judgment Debtor has engaged in bad faith tactics to delay or avoid the satisfaction of the Judgment. DENIED
Sanctions
CCP § 1987.2(a) provides that in making an order pursuant to a motion made under Section 1987.1, the court may award the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive. “Substantial justification” means “that a justification is clearly reasonable because it is well grounded in both law and fact.” (Evilsizor v. Sweeney (2014) 230 Cal. App. 4th 1304, 1312.)
Here, the Motions appear to have been made without substantial justification. The Court previously denied Judgment Debtor’s motions to quash similar business records subpoenas based on identical, unfounded arguments. The Motions appear to be a further delay tactic. Sanctions granted in amount of $1,300.00 against judgment debtor.
2. CASE # CASE NAME HEARING NAME HEARING ON MOTION TO QUASH INC031863 RUBIN VS ROSS SUBPOENA CITI BANK BY DAVID ROSS Tentative Ruling: Denied.
Responding party to provide notice pursuant to CCP 1019.5.
This is a breach of contract and fraud case. This action was filed in 2002. In 2007, following the imposition of terminating sanctions for discovery abuses and the striking of the answer, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff Jason Rubin (“Judgment Creditor”) and against defendant David Ross (“Judgment Debtor”) in the amount of $1,439,178. On July 11, 2024, the Judgment Creditor renewed the Judgment on behalf of the Trust in the amount of $6,107,850.56.
In February 2026, the Judgment Creditor served subpoenas duces tecum on Wells Fargo Bank and Citibank, N.A. (“Subpoenas”) seeking account bank account records for accounts opened by Judgment Debtor, his wife and business entities owned by Judgment Debtor.
Judgment Debtor now moves to quash the Subpoenas, arguing that Subpoenas are not supported by a showing of good cause because the supporting affidavits are based on inadmissible hearsay and legal conclusions rather than facts. Judgment Debtor argues that the Enforcement of Judgments Law (“EJL”) is unconstitutional because it is an invasion of the right to privacy and eliminates the marital privilege. He argues that the EJL violates his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983.
Judgment Creditor argues that Judgment Debtor made an identical motion to quash business records subpoenas in 2024, which the Court denied. Judgment Creditor argues that the affidavit is sufficient to establish good cause. Judgment Creditor argues that an affidavit may be based on hearsay and it is no necessary to attach any documents. Judgment Creditor argues that good cause exists for the discovery because Judgment Debtor has engaged in bad faith practices to delay satisfaction of the Judgment. Judgment Creditor argues that Judgment Debtor cites no authority showing that the EJL is unconstitutional or violates any civil rights.