RENFRO v. CAMPBELL

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: MAY 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

discretionary authority in the corporation could be managing agents.” Of note, “supervisors who have no discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy would not be considered managing agents even though they may have the ability to hire or fire other employees.” (White v. Ultramar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 577.)

The complaint identifies Fernandez as plaintiff’s supervisor/manager and that he is “an ‘other person acting on behalf of an employer’ within the meaning of Labor Code §558.1.” (Compl. at ¶ 3.) However, beyond that conclusory statement, there are no allegations that Fernandez is a managing agent. Fernandez is alleged to have reduced plaintiff’s hours and sent him home early. The complaint alleges Fernandez criticized plaintiff for not doing better work even though plaintiff was unable to move boxes appropriately because of his restrictions.

The complaint does not contain any allegations that Fernandez had broad discretionary power and exercised substantial discretionary authority in the corporation. Therefore, the demurrers to these three causes of action are sustained with leave to amend. Plaintiff has 20 days from the hearing date to file an amended complaint which addresses these deficiencies.

No. 25CV01823

RENFRO v. CAMPBELL

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO CHANGE VENUE

The motion is granted. The Court orders this action be transferred to Madera County.

Self-represented plaintiff David Renfro brought this case against self-represented defendant Edward E. Campbell (erroneously sued as Beau Campbell) alleging five causes of action including breach of contract, federal copyright infringement, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress and unjust enrichment. Plaintiff alleges he performed design and engineering services and seeks $68,000.00 for unpaid services. (Compl. at ¶ 17.) The complaint also alleges defendant made false and disparaging statements about plaintiff, causing severe emotional distress. (Compl. at ¶ 17.) According to the filed proof of service, defendant was personally served with the summons and complaint on November 7, 2025, in Madera, California.

On February 10, 2026, this Court denied defendant’s motion to quash service, ruling that defendant was personally served as an individual (instead of as a business entity). Defendant now moves to transfer venue to Madera County based on his residence as a defendant in his individual capacity. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).) Plaintiff opposes on the grounds venue is proper in Santa Cruz County because this is where the contract was entered into and work provided, as well as this is where his emotional distress witnesses are located.

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: MAY 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

In general, when the main relief sought does not relate to real property, the superior court in the county where defendants, or some of them, reside is the proper venue. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a); California State Parks Found. v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 833.) But because this “general rule” is subject to the qualification “except as otherwise provided by law,” it only has effect when no other venue provision applies. (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 27 Cal.3d 477, 483-484; Tharp v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 496, 500.) On timely motion, the court must order a transfer of an action “when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 396b, 397, subd. (a); Rycz v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 836.)

Plaintiff is entitled to a presumption that he has brought the action in a proper county, and the burden of proving that a change of venue is warranted falls on the defendant. (J. C. Millett Co. v. Latchford-Marble Glass Co. (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 838, 839.) The general rule directs that venue is proper at a defendant’s residence unless there is a specific venue statute, in which case the general rule is subordinated. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (a).) Defendant is entitled to have the action tried in the county of his choice, unless the plaintiff “by his complaint, establishes his case is within a statutory exception to the general rule.” (Holstein v.

Superior Court for San Diego County (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 708, 710.) A defendant entitled to a change of venue as to one count in a multiple count complaint is entitled to the change as to the entire action. (Jhirmack Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 715, 720.) There is a specific rule applicable to contract actions against individuals: if defendant contracts to perform an obligation in a particular county, venue is proper in the county where the obligation is to be performed, where the contract was entered into, or where the defendant resides at the commencement of the action. (Code Civ.

Proc., § 395, subd (a).)

The place of making a contract is the place where the last act necessary for its validity was done, usually the act constituting the acceptance. (Braunstein v. Superior Court In and For Monterey County (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 691, 696.) This place of making is the place where the obligation of the defendant arises unless there is a special contract in writing to the contrary. (Armstrong v. Smith (1942) 49 Cal.App.2d 528, 533-534.) The performance material under section 395 is the performance of the defendant. (Meyer v. Burdett Oxygen Co. (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 519, 523.)

Here, defendant’s supporting declaration establishes that he reached out to plaintiff via electronic communications in Madera County to have plaintiff design a tiny home on wheels that defendant intended to use in Madera County for himself and his family. (Campbell Declaration, ¶¶ 6-7.) Based on the evidence, it appears if any contract was entered into, it was entered into in Madera County, which is the defendant’s residence. Based on section 395, subdivision (a), venue is proper in Madera County. Plaintiff’s argument that his choice of forum is controlling where

LAW AND MOTION TENTATIVE RULINGS DATE: MAY 26, 2026 TIME: 8:30 A.M.

venue is proper in more than one county is unpersuasive. Plaintiff’s legal authority for that proposition, Karson Industries v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, is inapplicable; that case involved a corporate defendant, not an individual.

No. 24CV01806

FARR v. RUSH

REFEREE’S EX PARTE MOTION TO DEPOSIT FUNDS IN ATTORNEY CLIENT TRUST ACCOUNT, MAKE PAYMENTS AND FOR INSTRUCTIONS

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STAY DISTRIBUTION OF SALE PROCEEDS AND VACATE OR MODIFY INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT

The referee’s ex parte application to deposit funds in her attorney client trust account and to make payments is moot per the parties’ stipulation and order filed May 19, 2026. The Court denies defendant’s motion to vacate or modify the interlocutory judgment and vacates the preliminary injunction preventing distribution according to the interlocutory judgment.

Defendant has consistently obstructed this litigation forcing the Court to appoint a referee to accomplish the sale of the property. While defendant argues that the interlocutory judgment was obtained by fraud, she failed to assert any plausible evidence of fraud prior to entry of the judgment, and failed to oppose the referee’s final report of sale and order permitting various payments from the proceeds of sale. Her evidence of fraud presented in this motion consists of communications she claims were improper between the referee and plaintiff’s counsel, and other perceived procedural violations by plaintiff’s counsel in his dealings with her. The Court finds none of these constitute fraud.

The Court will set a date for the referee to file her final report following disbursements.

This Court granted an interlocutory judgment on September 16, 2025. Thereafter, on March 23, 2026, the Court heard the unopposed motion by referee approving her final report of sale, approving payment of the loan, and approving her costs and fees. (Order, April 13, 2026.)

On May 8, 2026, defendant Rush appeared ex parte and obtained a TRO to stop the distribution of sale proceeds so her motion to modify the judgment could be heard.

On May 14, 2026, referee moved ex parte to deposit funds into client trust account on the basis that defendant’s TRO was served after close of escrow and payments were made.